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Abstract
Essays in Macrofinance and Asset Pricing
Chase Prescott Ross
2021
This dissertation consists of three essays on the topics of asset pricing, macrofinance, and financial
intermediation.
In the first essay, I examine banks’ role in safe asset markets. Banks are vital suppliers of money-like safe
assets: banks produce safe assets by issuing short-term liabilities and pledging collateral. But their ability to
create safe assets varies over time as leverage constraints fluctuate. I present a model to describe private
safe-asset production when intermediaries face leverage constraints. I measure bank leverage constraints
using bank-intermediated basis trades. The collateral premium—a strategy long Treasuries used more often
as repo collateral and short Treasuries used less often—has a positive expected return of 65 basis points per
year because the collateral premium compensates for bank leverage risk.
The second essay shows that post-crisis reforms changed the location of safe asset production. I propose a
pair of tests to identify who issues safe assets and which safe asset issuers opportunistically time issuance
when the price of safe assets is high. Federal agency issuance both responds to day-to-day fluctuations
in demand for safe assets—measured via the convenience yield—and is an important determinant in the
subsequent price of safe assets. Agencies issue more the day after an unexpected increase in the convenience
yield, and an unexpectedly large agency issue decreases the convenience yield the next day. The Federal
Home Loan Bank system is a newly crucial safe asset producer.
The third essay, coauthored with Landon J. Ross and Sharon Y. Ross study the effect of firm cash holdings
on equity returns. U.S. companies hold cash on their balance sheets, and the share of assets held in cash
varies across companies and over time. A firm’s cash holdings are an implicit holding in a low-return asset,
which pushes down a firm’s equity return. Investors should thus hedge out the cash on the balance sheets
when calculating equity returns. We show that neglecting to consider cash holdings results in biases in
portfolio optimization, factor creation, and cross-sectional asset pricing. We decompose common stock market
betas into components, which depend on the portfolio’s cash holding, the return on cash, and the portfolio’s
cash-hedged equity return.
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Chapter 1
The Collateral Premium and Levered Safe-Asset Production
1.1 Introduction
Banks create money-like safe assets in traditional ways—bank deposits—and in new ways, through secured
financing transactions like repurchase agreements (repo). Banks cannot always create safe assets: their ability
to make safe assets changes over time as they become more or less leverage constrained. While the aggregate
safe-asset supply fluctuates with the quantity of sovereign debt outstanding, it also fluctuates as banks face
time-varying leverage constraints. I develop a simple model to describe money-like safe-asset production
when banks are leverage constrained, measure the constraints using returns from bank-intermediated basis
trades, and present the pricing implications of time-varying leverage constraints for safe assets.
Intuitively, a safe asset is a low-risk asset because it has low consumption covariance and is therefore
information-insensitive. There are two flavors of safe assets: short-term safe assets that are a money-like,
liquid transaction medium, and long-term safe assets that store value because they have no credit risk. Safe
assets require either a government guarantee, like a U.S. Treasury, or collateral, like a repo backed by a
security or commercial paper backed by a bank’s assets. By design, investors have little incentive to produce
private information on a safe asset, and agents can use them as payment or as a store of value without fear
of adverse selection. Safe assets earn the convenience yield, the nonpecuniary return to assets useful for
providing safety or liquidity.
I look within Treasuries, an asset class commonly considered safe, and show substantial heterogeneity in
their moneyness. I show that banks prefer to use the least money-like Treasuries as collateral for short-term
safe assets, consistent with Greenwood et al. (2015)’s finding that long-term Treasuries are less money-like
due, in part, to their high interest-rate risk. With costly short-term equity issuance, Treasuries’ collateral
value depends on bank leverage constraints, leading to an implicit inefficiency: banks use longer-term safe
assets as collateral for money-like, short-term safe assets, but using long-term safe assets as collateral makes
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them riskier because their collateral value becomes linked to bank leverage constraints.
Leverage and private safe-asset production are two sides of the same coin when equity issuance is costly.
As shown in Kashyap et al. (2010), the costs of raising new external equity in the short-term prevent banks
from offsetting capital shocks with new equity issuance. Banks do not regularly issue equity on a day-to-day
basis. In this context, a bank cannot produce safe assets without incremental leverage or costly balance sheet
adjustments. Variation in the banking system’s leverage constraint leads to variation in the banking system’s
ability to produce private safe assets.
The total safe-asset supply is the sum of public safe assets, like Treasuries, and private safe assets. Total
safe assets outstanding in the U.S. amounted to 301% of GDP in Q4 2019: 108% came from government-backed
assets and 193% from private safe assets using the Federal Reserve’s National Accounts and Gorton et al.
(2012)’s definitions. The domestic financial sector had 15.5× leverage, of which 40% went toward producing
private safe assets. As a rough estimate using Q4 2019 data, a 10% decline in financial sector leverage
corresponds to a 19 percentage point decline in safe assets as a share of GDP, naively assuming no migration
outside the banking system.
I build a simple two-period model in the spirit of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2015) to describe
expected returns in an economy where a bank produces short-term, money-like safe assets using the assets on
its balance sheet as collateral. The model generates its predictions using three key features. First, households
derive nonpecuniary utility from holding money-like safe assets unrelated to the assets’ expected returns, a
common money-in-the-utility-function feature like Tobin (1965). Second, the banking system is constrained
in its ability to issue bank liabilities, a short-term safe asset, because it must hold a capital buffer, equivalent
to an aggregate balance sheet haircut. The assumption prevents the bank from levering infinitely to satiate
households’ safe asset demand. Third, safe assets have varying money weights to account for that specific
security’s ability to satisfy the household’s safe-asset demand. For example, on-the-run Treasuries—which
the model would assign a comparatively higher money weight—typically have higher prices and lower yields
because they are more liquid; off-the-run Treasuries have higher yields, and dealers use them more often as
collateral.
The model generates three predictions, which I test empirically. First, it predicts that households’ safe
asset demand pushes up the price of safe assets and appears as a wedge between the standard consumption
covariance and expected return relation. As the safe-asset supply grows, the wedge diminishes, and expected
Treasury returns asymptote to levels implied by their consumption covariance. Second, the model predicts
that the collateral premium—the difference in expected returns for Treasuries used as collateral and those
that are not—is positive because it compensates for bank leverage risk. The expected return on Treasuries
used as collateral compensates the holder for the risk that bank leverage constraints might increase, reducing
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its value as collateral. All Treasuries hedge contractions in the money-like, safe-asset supply, but Treasuries
used as collateral are worse hedges than Treasuries not used as collateral. Third, as banks become more
constrained, the safe-asset supply falls, and the convenience yield grows because banks cannot lever up to
fully satiate safe-asset demand.
To test the model’s implications, I use data from Ross and Ross (2020) that calculates daily returns
to more than 100 bank-intermediated basis trades and aggregates the returns to estimate bank leverage
constraints, termed ArbConstraint. When banks are not leverage constrained, they can lever up and push the
bank-intermediated arbitrage returns toward zero. Arbitrage returns are high in absolute value when banks
cannot lever up and arbitrage the basis toward zero. Given the considerable variance in the ArbConstraint,
the day-to-day volatility in the total safe-assets supply should depend primarily on the volatility in private
safe assets outstanding. Indeed, as a rough approximation, the monthly variance of the change in outstanding
tri-party repos and publicly-held Treasuries is 5.2% and 0.7%; tri-party repo is seven times more volatile.
ArbConstraint has two distinct advantages compared to balance sheet measures of bank leverage constraints.
First, the measure is based on market prices and does not depend on balance sheet data. Balance sheet
measures of leverage are typically limited to public companies and may not accurately reflect the economic
leverage banks use.1 Second, the constraint measure depends on products commonly traded by intermediaries
worldwide, so the measure proxies for the leverage constraint for global intermediaries, not just U.S.-based
firms.
Is it plausible that bank leverage constraints meaningfully vary daily? Yes. The Bloomberg economic
calendar had more than 40,000 global macro events in 2019 alone, and the private-sector forecasted about
18,000 events. In the U.S., private-sector forecasters provided projections for 2,400 of the 3,400 macro events,
amounting to nine daily macro events of enough importance that the private sector provided estimates. With
so much new information about the global economy released daily, and with the considerable resources the
private sector spends to forecast that information, it is not surprising that the banking system’s leverage
constraints vary daily. Moreover, Infante et al. (2018) show the collateral multiplier for Treasury securities
varies daily.
I use CUSIP-specific collateral data collected from the tri-party repo market with money-market fund
counterparties. The data are monthly, and run from 2011 to 2018, providing almost one-million CUSIP-month
observations. The data allow me to identify which CUSIPs banks used as collateral. I observe both sides of
the repo—the lender and borrower—which provide variation in both the time-series and cross-section.
1In the U.S., firms are allowed to net certain collateralized financing transactions. The transactions appear neither on their
balance sheet nor in aggregate measures, like the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts. Gorton et al. (2020) collect data on
collateral pledged from six large broker-dealers 10-Qs, and show collateral pledged—roughly equal to the volume of collateralized
financing transactions—fell $2.7 trillion from 2007Q2 to 2009Q1. In contrast, on-balance-sheet repo for the entire bank and
broker-dealer industry fell by only half that amount over the same period.
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I use the data to explore the model’s asset pricing implication: safe assets are not equally useful, leading
to considerable variation in their expected returns. I document that Treasuries commonly used as collateral
have higher expected returns than Treasuries not used as collateral. Dealers’ choices for CUSIPs pledged as
collateral match intuition: dealers use less liquid and longer-dated bonds more often. Bonds used as collateral
have higher expected returns than similar bonds not used as collateral, even after controlling for observables.
Once a bank uses a Treasury as collateral, it loads on an additional risk: bank leverage risk.
The model shows that expected returns for safe assets depend on their consumption covariance, their bank
leverage covariance, and their exogenously-given money weight. I sort Treasury CUSIPs by their collateral
ratio (CR), the share of a CUSIP’s total market-value used as repo collateral. In my sample, banks use 3.3%
of each Treasury CUSIP, on average, as collateral provided to money-funds. After sorting bonds into terciles
based on CR, the collateral premium is a strategy long Treasuries in the top tercile and short Treasuries in
the bottom tercile, and it has an annualized average return of 65 basis points after controlling for liquidity.
I argue that the collateral premium is positive and economically large because it compensates for bank
leverage risk. Treasuries are useful as collateral if intermediaries can pledge them as collateral, which
mechanically requires the bank to take on incremental leverage. I show that the collateral premium is positive
because it compensates for bank leverage risk four ways. First, I show that the collateral premium strongly
covaries with innovations to bank leverage constraints, as calculated from ArbConstraint. Second, I show
low-CR Treasuries’ yields fall by more than high-CR Treasuries’ yields when banks become more leverage
constrained. Third, bonds used as collateral must have worse returns in bad states of the world if the
collateral premium is compensation for bank leverage risk; otherwise, no risk that requires compensation. I
show that bonds used as collateral by leverage-constrained banks had lower returns than Treasuries held by
other banks in the earliest stages of the European sovereign debt crisis. Fourth, I perform an event study and
show that Treasuries have negative cumulative abnormal returns after dealers begin using that CUSIP more
intensively as collateral. I reject the hypothesis that the Treasuries have lower realized returns because of
other risk-compensated characteristics.
Finally, I show that intermediary asset pricing and pricing with bank leverage constraints are equivalent
when pricing safe assets. They are equivalent because innovations to intermediary leverage proxy for
innovations to both the intermediaries’ stochastic discount factor and the safe-asset supply. Changes to
intermediary leverage are the same as changes to the private safe-asset supply. To test this hypothesis, I
perform cross-sectional asset pricing tests and show that bank leverage constraint innovations, measured from
an AR(1) of ArbConstraint, price the cross-section of safe-asset portfolios when banks are not constrained.
When banks are constrained, however, all flavors of safe assets have lower returns. I approximate the
wedge in the fundamental asset pricing equation due to safe-asset demand with the time-series alphas and a
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functional-form assumption: when households have log utility over safe assets, the pricing test implies there
are about 30% more money-like safe assets in low bank leverage constraint states compared to high bank
leverage constraint states.
Relation to Literature This paper contributes to the literature on private safe-asset production with
time-varying bank leverage constraints. A well-developed literature examines how banks transform illiquid
assets into tradable information-insensitive debt. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model bank runs, and Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990) focus on the role of information in crises. Dang et al. (2017a) show banks are optimally
opaque to keep their debt information-insensitive and useful as a transaction medium. Diamond (2020)
presents a model in which intermediaries choose the least-risky portfolio, a diversified portfolio of nonfinancial
firms’ debt, to back their short-term debt issuance. Diamond (2020) also finds that increased safe-asset
demand increases the intermediaries’ leverage and size. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2015) show
that demand for safe assets is an essential determinant of banks’ short-term debt issuance, finding that
Treasury issuance crowds out lending financed by short-term bank debt.
This paper also contributes to the literature on changes in the safe-asset supply. Krishnamurthy et al.
(2016) shows that Treasuries are safe because the large number of Treasuries outstanding leave investors
“nowhere else to go.” Krishnamurthy et al. (2019) present a safe-asset determination model, finding that
the sovereign’s fundamentals and the size of its outstanding debt are key determinants. Bernanke et al.
(2011) document a growing demand for safe assets, and Gorton et al. (2012) find that the safe-asset share
of financial assets in the U.S. is constant over the past sixty years, but its composition has changed from
traditional-bank liabilities to shadow-bank liabilities. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) show
that a scarcity of Treasuries relative to GDP pushes spreads between Treasuries and highly-rated corporate
bonds higher as investors place a larger premium on the safety and liquidity aspects of U.S. sovereign debt.
Gorton et al. (2015) show that more repos fail when the convenience yield is high. Gorton and Laarits (2018)
find a safe-asset shortage post-crisis compared to pre-crisis. Sunderam (2015) shows that the financial sector
produces more safe assets in the form of asset-backed commercial paper when the convenience yield is high.
This paper also contributes to the literature by documenting Treasuries’ collateral premium, its relationship
with bank leverage, and providing details about the collateral allocation process in tri-party repo. Hu et al.
(2019) use similar repo data and focus on repo prices. They show that repo markets are competitive for safe
assets but segmented for repos with risky collateral and that dealers optimize borrowing costs by strategically
distributing collateral across fund families. Infante (2020) shows that increased demand for safe assets leads
to a decrease in repos backed by Treasuries outstanding as the demand for safe assets compresses Treasuries’
risk premia. Jank and Moench (2019) find that German banks respond to a falling safe-asset supply by
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increasing existing collateral re-use. Singh (2017) highlights the relationship between dealer balance sheet
capacity and the financial system’s ability to intermediate collateral.
1.2 Institutional Details
I focus on a specific type of short-term bank liabilities: repurchase agreements (repo). A repo is a secured
financing transaction in which one party lends a security to a borrower and agrees to repurchase it later, often
the next day, shown in Figure 1.1. The repo market is a large and central component of the financial system:
in the U.S., primary dealers had $4 trillion of repo outstanding in 2018. The repo market in Europe had €7
trillion of outstanding contracts, with €3 trillion in daily turnover. Duffie (1996) describes repo mechanics in
detail.
Intermediaries provide deposit account equivalents to institutional cash pools, like money-market mutual
funds, with repo. Repos-as-deposit-accounts blossomed in popularity because institutions’ large cash balances
far exceed deposit insurance limits. Cash pools need checking account-like services, and the collateral in repo
is a safety buffer. Gorton et al. (2012) and Pozsar (2011) attribute the pre-crisis surge in repo to growth in
institutional cash pools—pensions, endowments, corporations—paired with a shrinking supply of Treasuries
and other traditionally-considered safe assets relative to GDP.
Bank Balance Sheet Example A traditional bank collects deposits, makes loans, and manages the
resulting maturity mismatch between its assets (long-term loans) and liabilities (short-term deposits, i.e.,
checking accounts or savings accounts). Short-term bank liabilities are safe assets. Holding equity levels
constant, a bank mechanically increases its leverage when it issues money-like liabilities.
Table 1.1 uses a simplified bank balance sheet to show how a bank creates a safe asset by levering up
and trading repo. In the pre-repo panel, the bank has $100 in Treasuries funded with $100 in equity. In
the post-repo panel, the bank pledges its Treasuries as collateral in a repo to borrow $100 cash. The bank’s
leverage, equal to assets divided by equity, doubles after the repo. Holding equity levels constant, the bank
must increase its leverage if it issues any liabilities like repo. Kashyap et al. (2010) show the costs of raising
new external equity are important in the short-term and prevent banks from offsetting capital shocks with new
equity issuance. In this context, a bank cannot produce safe assets—always short-term liabilities—without
incremental leverage. Variation in the banking system’s leverage constraint mechanically leads to variation in
the banking system’s ability to produce private safe assets.
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Repo Market Details The U.S. repo market is bifurcated into the tri-party and bilateral markets. In
tri-party repo, a custodian sits between the lender and borrower to reduce operational burdens for smaller
participants.2 According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, tri-party repo volume was $2.1 trillion in
May 2020; tri-party repo collateral was 58% Treasuries, 40% agency MBS, and 2% agency debt. Counterparties
interact directly in the bilateral market, which is also called the delivery versus payment market because the
transfer of collateral and cash is simultaneous. Few data exist for the bilateral market despite its apparent
size. Baklanova et al. (2016) and Copeland et al. (2014) estimate the bilateral market was $1.9 trillion in
March 2015, and find 60% of the collateral was Treasuries, 20% equities, and the rest was ABS or corporate
debt. Baklanova et al. (2015) give additional details on repo markets.
Cash lenders in the tri-party market include money-market funds, corporate treasuries, municipalities,
and insurance companies. Cash borrowers include hedge funds and other levered investors, like mortgage
real-estate investment trusts. The bank intermediates between cash lenders and cash borrowers to provide
leverage to the bank’s levered prime-brokerage clients. In return, cash lenders receive a set of high-quality
collateral securities, but not a specific security. Because my data comes from money-market fund filings, I
have data on only tri-party repo collateral.
Repo collateral is either general or specific. General collateral encompasses a broad set of interchangeable
high-quality securities, like U.S. Treasuries, agency mortgage-backed securities, or agency debt (e.g., Federal
Home Loan Bank debt), but can also include more exotic securities and equities. In the typical cash-driven
tri-party repo transaction, the cash lender limits acceptable collateral regarding maturity, issue concentration,
liquidity, and other factors.
Tri-party trades are cash-driven because they are motivated by a cash lender’s desire for a safe store
of value. The bilateral market is security-driven because investors want a specific security. For example,
investors might use a bilateral repo to acquire a Treasury trading special. Specific collateral CUSIPs might
trade special because they are in high demand in the cash market: most often, investors want that specific
Treasury because the bond is on-the-run or the cheapest-to-deliver into a Treasury future.
Tri-party Collateral Optimization Financial market participants spend considerable time and resources
to select which CUSIPs to use as collateral and decide how to allocate collateral efficiently across counterparties.
The optimization involves two steps: first, dealers decide which CUSIPs to use as collateral, then dealers
choose how to allocate the CUSIPs across all their positions that require collateral. Dealers leave their
collateral inside their custodial account at the tri-party clearing bank—called the box—to facilitate same-day
2Until 2017, Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase were both tri-party custodians. JP Morgan Chase closed its
tri-party business in 2017.
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settlement. The custodian simply moves the collateral from the borrower’s box to the lender’s box since the
custodian holds both box accounts on its balance sheet.
Dealers prefer to place collateral with the lowest outside option in the box. Banks can often finance a
Treasury trading special at lower rates outside the box in security-specific bilateral repos.3 The custodian
gives dealers tools to allocate collateral across secured trades efficiently, but many dealers use in-house
methods. Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), the tri-party repo custodian in the U.S., provides a default
collateral matching algorithm that is uncontroversial and endogenously designed to meet clients’ (i.e., dealers’)
demands.
Dealers carefully choose what collateral to put in the box because they cannot easily access that collateral
later. There is nontrivial friction to moving collateral in and out of the box. After post-crisis tri-party repo
reforms, overnight collateral is locked-up until 3:30pm.4 If collateral becomes desirable in dealer markets,
the dealer must manually substitute unencumbered collateral from its box to the tri-party lock-up to ensure
it has sufficiently collateralized all its repo deals at all times. Without intraday credit from the custodian
to finance collateral substitution, the dealer must hold extra collateral in its box if it needs to substitute
collateral already locked-up. Substitutions often happen for Treasuries since hedge funds and dealers often
trade in and out of their positions in ways that require substitutions. Together, the frictions involved in
moving collateral in and out of the box mean dealers spend considerable resources ranking collateral and
making deliberate collateral decisions.
Dealers can use BNYM’s collateral optimization tools to optimize across several dimensions, but the goal
is to have the lowest financing cost and the most unencumbered high-quality liquid assets. The matching
requires three inputs: a list of all the dealer’s collateral, a list of all the repo deals and what collateral
is eligible for each deal, and the dealer’s collateral preference ranking. BNYM, for example, offers its
customers a cheapest-to-deliver optimization across portfolios. Other possible allocation preferences include
3Dealers often use on-the-run Treasuries as general collateral—this is not a mistake. A dealer long on-the-run Treasuries
might find financing for the position at a lower rate early in a trading session while other investors are short the CUSIP or other
dealers are looking for the CUSIP. The CUSIP is no longer desirable once the shorts are covered, and it will trade as general
collateral.
4Regulators have focused on reducing the tri-party market’s use of intraday credit, a major point of concern in the financial
crisis. Before the reforms, the two clearing banks provided about $2.8 trillion in intraday credit to counterparties between day
t− 1’s repos unwind in the morning (around 8:30am) and the lock-up of day t’s repos (around 8:30pm). That is, cash lenders in
tri-party repo provided financing for the collateral only overnight, from about 8:30pm to 8:30am the next day; the remainder of
the day the clearing bank provided financing secured by the collateral in the borrowing dealer’s box account at the clearing bank.
Reforms have decreased intraday credit by preventing the daily unwinding of non-maturing repo deals. See Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (2010). Intraday credit in tri-party markets became first-order important in the financial crisis because of
JPM’s intraday loans to Lehman Brothers. If Lehman declared bankruptcy mid-day, JPM would have ended up with a $200
billion intraday loan to Lehman. Moreover, had JPM thought Lehman’s cash lenders—money-funds—might stop rolling their
repos with Lehman, JPM would not have unwound the previous day’s repos, in which case Lehman “would be done because
the tri-party investors [money-market funds] would control its securities inventory. The investors presumably would promptly
liquidate the $200 billion in collateral and there is a good chance that investors would lose confidence in the tri-party mechanism
and pull back from funding other dealers” (Parkinson, 2008). Ultimately, JPM required Lehman to post an additional $8.6
billion of collateral shortly before its bankruptcy, leading to litigation between the two. See Fitzgerald (2015).
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allocating high-quality liquid assets for short-term trades and cheapest-to-deliver collateral for long-term
trades; optimizing the collateral allocation based on the source of collateral (from the dealer’s trading desk,
its clients, or its treasury assets); allocating low value-at-risk (VaR) assets to fixed-income, currency, and
commodity trades and high VaR assets to tri-party trades. Many dealers prefer to use their own allocation
method or to supplement BNYM’s optimization tools.
Dealers order which securities to pledge as collateral in their collateral prioritization schedule as part of
the matching algorithm, effectively ranking collateral from cheapest- to richest-to-deliver. For example, the
schedule provided in BNYM marketing material gives the following preference order: municipal bonds; ABS
and CMOs; medium-term notes; corporate bonds; Ginnie Mae MBS REMIC; Ginnie Mae stripped MBS;
MBS pass-throughs; GNMA MBS; TIPs bonds and notes; and, finally, Treasury bills, bonds, notes, and
floating-rate notes.
Within Treasury collateral—my focus—dealers prefer to allocate the least liquid, longest-maturity, and
odd-lot Treasuries so that the unencumbered assets remaining in the dealer’s box are round lots of short-dated
bills. Short-dated Treasuries are helpful if unexpected margin calls or calculation errors require additional
delivery of securities.
Although cash lenders do not control what collateral they receive at the CUSIP-level, they control what
collateral types they receive. For fixed-income collateral, lenders can choose acceptable collateral from a list
of 87 types of fixed-income securities across 17 buckets of securities.5 Cash lenders can also allow equity
collateral.6 The lender can choose additional constraints for equity collateral, such as the maximum market
capitalization percentage that borrowers can pledge and the collateral value as a share of that security’s
average traded volume. For both equity and fixed-income collateral, lenders can specify even more granular
cuts or make manual adjustments.
The general collateral optimization process is: dealers combine their inventory held at BNYM and elsewhere
along with their exposures. They give BNYM a collateral eligibility schedule that shows what collateral
is acceptable for each transaction. The inputs create position eligibility data, showing which collateral is
eligible for each trade, considering margins and concentration limits. The clearing bank allocates collateral
by combining position eligibility with the dealer’s collateral rank preference in the collateral prioritization
5The buckets include Treasuries, agency debentures, international agencies, trust receipts, cash, GNMA, agency mortgage
backs, agency REIMCs/CMOs, government trust certificates, SBA, sovereign debt, agency credit risk securities, municipal bonds,
private-label CMOs, ABS, corporate bonds, and money-markets. Each bucket provides more granularity. Within Treasuries,
there are five types: bills, bonds, notes, strips, and synthetic Treasuries. Within agency REMICs/CMOs, lenders can choose
among 15 types. The types are: residuals, inverse IO floaters, IOettes, interest-only, principle-only, inverse floaters, super floaters,
companion floaters, sequential and other floaters, PAC and other scheduled floaters, Z bonds, companion bonds, sequential
bonds, TAC bonds, PAC and other scheduled bonds. Cash lenders can choose the acceptable credit rating for municipal bonds,
private-label CMOs, ABS, corporate bonds, and money-market instruments. The lender also sets an appropriate margin for each
collateral-type, and they can exclude securities in default and counterparty securities.
6Cash lenders can choose whether or not they will accept common stock (by exchange), preferred, ETFs, UITs, ADRs,
warrants or rights, mutual funds, equity indices, convertible bonds, or preferred stocks.
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schedule. Finally, BNYM physically moves the collateral to the appropriate box. If dealers choose to include
positions held away from BNYM in the optimization, they will also need to use SWIFT, or something similar,
to move positions.
Collateral-use Persistence Some Treasury CUSIPs are used as collateral persistently even after controlling
for observables. There are two reasons. First, dealers agree on which Treasuries to place in the box because
dealers implicitly agree on which Treasuries are least money-like. Second, the tri-party custodian facilitates
same-day settlement by placing collateral from the borrower’s box and into the lender’s box, both of which
are accounts held on the custodian’s balance sheet, so the collateral does not leave BNYM’s balance sheet.
Once the repo borrower puts some CUSIPs in their box, they tend to stay there. The CUSIP leaves the box
if the dealer sells the security outright, changes strategy, or if the CUSIP starts trading special.
Once placed in a box for use as collateral, dealers use Treasuries as collateral persistently in the time-
series within-dealer and cross-section across-dealers. I show collateral persistence by defining a variable
Collateral Sharei,d,t which reflects dealer d’s use of CUSIP i in month t as a share of the total amount of




If a dealer only used two CUSIPs as collateral in a month with values $90 and $10, then Collateral Sharei,d,t =
0.9 for the first bond.
I show time-series persistence by regressing a dealer’s date t collateral share of a specific CUSIP on that
dealer’s collateral share for the same CUSIP lagged by one month or 12 months, and I run the regression
once for each dealer.
Collateral Sharei,d,t = α+ βCollateral Sharei,d,t−1 + εi,d,t
I plot the β coefficient in Figure 1.2 for each dealer. The left panel shows that a dealer’s collateral share is
highly correlated from one month to the next. The right panel shows the same at a 12-month horizon. The
persistence is statistically significant for all dealers in my sample at the 1-month horizon and for most at the
12-month horizon. The average point estimate at the 1-month horizon is 0.36 and at the 12-month horizon
0.18.
I also show collateral persistence in the cross-section: if a benchmark dealer boxes the Treasury, other
dealers likely box the same Treasury. To test across-dealer persistence, I use Société Générale as the benchmark
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dealer, although the results are similar for any large dealer. I run the following regression:
Collateral Sharei,d,t = α+ βCollateral Sharei,SocGen,t + εi,d,t
I plot the t-statistic for the β from the regression in Figure 1.3 against the monthly average repo collateral
pledged by that dealer, highlighting global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) in blue. The larger a
dealer’s tri-party repo business, the more they agree on which Treasuries to box. All dealers with more than
an average of $7 billion of pledged Treasury collateral have significant collateral share correlations.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Setup
I build a simple two-period model in the spirit of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2015). The model
has two periods, t and t+ 1. Agents make decisions in period t before any dividends have been paid, and
uncertainty resolves in period t+ 1. There are three components of the model: a household sector, a bank,
and a government. There are five assets, an unboxed Treasury bond θub—denoted θHub if held by households
and θBub if held by the bank—a boxed Treasury bond θb, a bank liability B, a Lucas tree with terminal value
K which pays dividends kt and kt+1, and tradable equity in the bank E that pays dividends divt and divt+1.
The bank liability B is analogous to a repurchase agreement, and the Lucas tree is equivalent to a real asset,
either a business or land. It is cheaper for the bank to pledge the boxed bond as collateral underlying the
bank repo B compared to the unboxed Treasury bond. The returns to the Treasury bonds, bank liability,
Lucas tree, and bank equity are stochastic, but households know the Lucas tree dividends with certainty.
In period t, households and the bank make allocation decisions, and the tree pays dividend kt. The
allocation decisions in period t pin down the bank’s dividend payments unless the bank’s haircut changes.
The bank pays divt immediately after agents make their choices in period t. In period t + 1 uncertainty
resolves, the returns on the assets are known, the bank pays out divt+1, and the tree pays out its dividend,
kt+1.
The model generates its predictions from three features. First, the model assumes that households earn
nonpecuniary utility from holding money-like safe assets, denoted M :
M t = πBB + πθubθHub + πθbθHb
M t+1 = πBB(1 +RB) + πθubθHub(1 +Rθub) + πθbθHb (1 +Rθb)
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where πi allows for varying money weights for different safe assets, πi > 0 for any safe asset i. Such a feature
can be motivated by the demand for a transaction medium as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2015)—motivated by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012)—and Stein (2012), and is consistent with
money-in-the-utility-function literature like Tobin (1965).
Second, the model imposes a stochastic haircut requirement on the bank’s deposit constraint. The bank is
a technology which transforms collateral on its balance sheet—in the form of Lucas trees or Treasuries—into
safe assets in the form of bank liabilities B subject to a haircut across its assets. If the bank could issue
liabilities equal to its assets (i.e., without a haircut), it could lever infinitely and hold zero equity. The
model assumes an exogenous haircut prevents the bank from leveraging up past a certain point, and that the
haircut can change between period t and t+ 1. The model also imposes that banks cannot issue more equity,
motivated by Kashyap et al. (2010)’s finding that equity issuance costs prevent banks from issuing equity to
offset capital shocks in the short-term.
The assumption that banks produce safe assets subject to a haircut is realistic. Banks can be leverage
constrained through a regulatory channel by capital requirements (e.g., common-equity Tier 1 ratio) or
leverage requirements (e.g., supplemental leverage ratio). Banks can also be leverage constrained through a
market discipline channel: even if regulatory constraints are not binding, private lenders may not want to
supply more funding to risky banks.
Third, I assume that assets have exogenously-given money weights, denoted πi, to account for the ability
of that specific security to satisfy the household’s money-like safe asset demand. For example, on-the-run
Treasuries—which the model assigns a comparatively higher money weight—typically have higher prices and
lower yields because households prefer more liquid safe assets, all else equal.
Households Households are endowed with a share of the bank, worth E, and K units of the Lucas tree
which pay dividends in each period and have a terminal value of K(1 +RK) in period t+ 1. The households
can borrow from the bank, pledging λK as collateral, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the haircut on the collateral the
bank offers on its loans.
Households choose their optimal allocation across five choice-variables: α, the amount of the bank equity
the households retain in the first period; λK, the size of the loan they get from the bank by pledging their
tree as collateral; B, their holding of the bank liability; θHb , their boxed Treasury holding; and θHub, their
unboxed Treasury holding.
Agents receive Ω(M ) which is their nonpecuniary utility from holding money-like safe assets, where
Ω′(M ) > 0,Ω′′(M ) < 0, limM→0 Ω′(M ) = ∞, and limM→∞Ω′(M ) = 0. In the standard two-period set-up,
an agent weighs the asset’s cost and the associated consumption decline in the current period against the
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asset’s payoff and the marginal utility in the two states. In this model, agents have an extra incentive to hold
more money-like safe assets unrelated to their returns.
The household’s problem is




u (ct + Ω (M t)) + βEt [u (ct+1 + Ω (M t+1))] (1.1)
ct = kt + (1− α)E + αdivt + λK −B − θHub − θHb
ct+1 = kt+1 + αdivt+1 + (1− λ)K(1 +RK) +B(1 +RB) + θHub(1 +Rθub) + θHb (1 +Rθb)
Further define Ct = ct+Ω(M t) and Ct+1 = ct+1 +Ω(M t+1). The first-order conditions for θHub, the household’s
choice of unboxed Treasury bonds:




(1 +Rθub)(1 + Ω′(M t+1)πθub)
]
(1.2)
The first-order conditions for both Treasuries and the bank liability B are similar because they satisfy the
agent’s safe-asset demand. For now, I will make the simplifying assumption that πθb = πθub = πB = 1.
Bank The bank is a technology that transforms its assets into money-like bank liabilities B. The bank’s
assets are boxed Treasuries, θBb , unboxed Treasuries, θBub, and the loans the bank makes against Lucas tree
collateral, λK. Define the bank’s assets A = λK + θBb + θBub. The bank must pay some costs to administer its
assets: φ(λK), µ(θBub), and µ(θBb − κ), where κ > 0 reflects that boxed Treasuries are cheaper for the bank to
hold and pledge as collateral compared to unboxed Treasuries. The bank can transform unboxed Treasuries
into boxed Treasuries by paying a flat fee. Additionally, the bank faces a stochastic liability issuance limit in
the form of an exogenous haircut ht across the bank’s entire collateral portfolio, equivalent to its assets, each
period:
B ≤ (1− ht)(λK + θBub + θBb )
B(1 +RB) ≤ (1− ht+1)
(
λK(1 +RK) + θBub(1 +Rθub) + θBb (1 +Rθb)
) (1.3)
Haircuts ht are stochastic; for example, the government may impose a haircut on B, forcing the bank to
delever and pass on lower RB to the households in period t+ 1.
The bank chooses three variables: the haircut λ it offers on Lucas trees for the loans it underwrites
to households, and the bank’s Treasury positions, θBb and θBub. The bank does not charge a haircut on its
Treasury holdings, reflecting Holmström (2015)’s “no questions asked” principle. The bank’s choices maximize
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divt + βEt [divt+1] (1.4)
where
divt = B − λK − θBub − θBb − φ(λK)− µ(θBub)− µ(θBb − κ)
divt+1 = λK(1 +RK) + θBub(1 +Rθub) + θBb (1 +Rθb)−B(1 +RB)
Government The government issues Treasury bonds in fixed total supply Θ, which are held by either the
bank or the household: Θ = θBb + θBub + θHb + θHub.
Observations For tractability, I make several standard assumptions following Campbell (2017). I assume
that households have time-separable power utility and constant relative risk aversion γ over consump-
tion, consumption is conditionally lognormal, and consumption and asset returns are jointly conditionally






≡ ∆ct+1 = µc + σcεt+1
where the shocks εt+1 ∼ iid N (0, 1).
Proposition 1 (Expected Returns for Treasuries). Expected returns for unboxed Treasuries depend on three
components: the Treasury bond’s consumption covariance, its haircut covariance, and its money premium.
Increasing haircuts ht increases the money premium ω′(M ), assuming M > 1, and decreases expected Treasury
returns.
Proof. Standard arguments yield the geometric risk premium (ignoring the Jensen component):
Et[rθub,t+1 − rf,t+1] ≈ γσc,θub − σh,θub − ω′θub(M t) (1.5)
where log (1 + Ω′(M t+1)πθub) = µh+σhεt+1, rθub,t+1 = log(1+Rθub,t+1), and −ω′θub(M t) = log(1−Ω
′(M t)πθub).
Following Campbell (2017), σc,θub is the conditional covariance of log unboxed Treasury returns and consump-
tion growth, which under the homoskedastic assumption is equivalent to the the unconditional covariance
of innovations to Covt(ct+1 − Etct+1, rθub,t+1 − Etrθub,t+1). I define σh,θub analogously. The risk-free rate is
rf,t+1 = − log(β) + γµc − 1/2γ2σ2c assuming µh = 0 and γσcσh = 0. An analogous result holds for the boxed
Treasury.
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The first term, γσc,θub , is the unboxed Treasury consumption covariance term. It is standard in consumption-
based asset pricing: if the covariance between an asset’s returns and consumption growth is positive then the
asset is risky because it has lower returns when marginal utility is high. Investors require a risk premium to
compensate them for holding an asset with bad payoffs in bad states. Moreover, the risk premium is increasing
in agents’ risk aversion γ. Treasuries are safe assets with comparatively high returns during flight-to-safety
states when marginal utility is high. A Treasury’s consumption covariance is low and the bond carries a
smaller risk premium than risky assets, like equities.
The second term, σh,θub , is the covariance of innovations to the safe-asset supply with the Treasury’s
returns. Suppose ht+t > ht, then banks are hit by a rising haircut, pushing down RB , which in turn lowers
M t+1. Money-like assets with lower returns when M t+1 is lower (e.g., if σh,θub < 0) are risky.
The third component, ω′θub(M t), reflects the Treasury’s money-like, safe-asset value. It is decreasing in
M t. Suppose in equilibrium there are few safe assets in the economy, then ω′θub(M t) approaches infinity, and
agents push up the price of Treasuries so much that expected returns turn negative. The money premium
disappears when there are infinite safe assets: limM→∞ ω′θub(M t) = 0.
The effect of increasing haircuts on the money premium is
∂ω′θub(M t)
∂ht





M t − πθub
]
> 0 (1.6)
The model does not pin down the sign of A′(ht) because the model implicitly defines the bank’s equilibrium
portfolio of λK, θBb , and θBub (which combine to A). I empirically estimate the sign as negative, A′(ht) < 0,
consistent with Adrian et al. (2014)’s finding that broker-dealer leverage is correlated with asset growth. I
give details for the empirical exercise in the parameter estimation discussion below. When M t > 1 then
1/Mt − 1/(Mt−πθub ) < 0 since 1− ht > 0 and A(ht) > 0. Combined, the partial is positive.
The partial clarifies two competing channels in the production of private safe assets after haircuts increase.
If the economy is at equilibrium and haircuts increase, B falls and M is too low. If A′(ht) > 0, banks respond
to the heightened safe-asset demand by expanding their balance sheet, despite the higher haircut, to earn the
larger convenience yield by issuing money-like liabilities. In this case, agents do not need to bid up the price
of Treasuries because B satiates their safe-asset demand. But if A′(ht) < 0 then banks shrink their balance
sheets as haircuts increase, B and M fall, and households bid up Treasuries because there is no alternative
to satiate their safe-asset demand. Empirically, I find that banks shrink their balance sheets when haircuts
increase so the latter channel dominates.
Proposition 2 (The Collateral Premium). The collateral premium is positive because it is compensation
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for bank leverage risk.
Proof. Using standard arguments following proposition 1, the collateral premium is the difference between
the boxed Treasury’s and unboxed Treasury’s returns:
Et[rθb,t+1 − rθub,t+1] ≈ σh,θub − σh,θb + log
[
M t − πθb
M t − πθub
]
(1.7)
Because both types of Treasuries are safe assets, I make the simplifying assumption that σc,θb and σc,θub are
small and equal. The right-most term reflects the differences in the money weights of the two bonds. Since
banks will use the least money-like bonds as collateral, I expect πθub > πθb > 0 which implies the right-most
term is positive when M t > 1.
The collateral premium is the difference in their haircut covariances when the bonds have identical money
weights:
Et[rθb,t+1 − rθub,t+1] ≈ σh,θub − σh,θb > 0 (1.8)
The collateral premium is positive when σh,θub > σh,θb , which I verify empirically in section 1.3.2.
In practice, banks persistently use some Treasury CUSIPs as collateral, which I discussed in section 1.2.
Once repo borrowers place their Treasuries in the box (i.e., a boxed Treasury) at the tri-party repo clearing
bank, those Treasuries tend to stay in the box. Because of the market structure, dealers persistently use
Treasuries placed in the box as collateral compared to unboxed Treasuries. Therefore, boxed Treasuries are
more exposed to bank leverage risk shocks than unboxed Treasuries.
Proposition 3 (The Convenience Yield and Bank Leverage Constraints). The convenience yield—the
difference in expected returns for Lucas trees and safe assets—is increasing in bank leverage constraints, ht.
and attenuated by bank leverage risk.
Proof. The difference in the expected returns for K and the boxed Treasury θb is
Et[rK,t+1 − rθb,t+1] ≈ γ(σc,K − σc,θb) + σh,θb + ω′(M t) (1.9)
which is increasing in ht if M t > 1 and A′(ht) < 0. Intuitively, as ht increases, banks become more constrained
and cannot issue more safe assets. Agents bid up the price of Treasuries in the first period, which pushes
down expected returns for Treasuries and creates a wedge between rK and rθb .
I am interested in estimating ω′(M t) when I measure the convenience yield.7 The estimate is attenuated if
7Measuring the convenience yield using highly-rated corporate debt and Treasuries helps reduce the difference in the securities’
16
I do not control for haircut covariance σh,θb because σh,θb ≤ 0, which I show in section 1.3.2. A similar result
holds if I change the definition of convenience yield to use the unboxed Treasury yield, but the attenuation
bias is smaller because σh,θb < σh,θub < 0.
1.3.2 Parameter Estimation and Comparative Statics
Parameter Estimation Table 1.2 shows estimated covariances. The top panel uses annualized monthly
data from 2011 to 2018, and the bottom panel uses annual data from 1972 to 2019. To estimate the covariances,
I use the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury Total Return USD index, the Fama–French market factor, and
personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The Treasury total return index is a market-value weighted index
of fixed-rate nominal debt excluding Treasury bills available beginning in 1972. The index excludes STRIPs
to prevent double-counting. I put each series into real terms and use the 1-month Tbill rate as the risk-free
rate. I convert the series to real terms using the PCE inflation index, the preferred measure of inflation of
the Federal Reserve’s FOMC. The result are annual percent changes in real terms.
Over the full sample, the average real annual excess return for the market is 3.8% (σ = 17.7%); the
average annual excess return for Treasuries is −0.8% (σ = 6.9%); and the average annual growth in PCE is
2.9% (σ = 1.9%).8 The covariance between consumption growth and the Treasury returns is 0.02, and the
covariance between consumption growth and the market return is 0.17.
I estimate covariances for boxed and unboxed Treasuries by sorting Treasury CUSIPs on their collateral
ratio, the percent of the Treasury CUSIP’s market value used as tri-party repo collateral with money-market
funds. The boxed Treasury portfolio consists of Treasuries with collateral ratios in the highest tercile. The
unboxed Treasury portfolio consists of Treasuries in the lowest collateral ratio tercile. I use monthly data
from 2011 to 2018 to match the period for which I have Treasury collateral data. The average annualized
real excess return for the boxed Treasuries, rθb − rf , is 0.2% (σ = 3.8%); for unboxed Treasuries, rθub − rf is
−0.9% (σ = 1.1%).
To measure haircut covariances, I proxy innovations to ht with innovations to bank-intermediated arbitrage
returns, ArbFac. I describe ArbFac’s construction in Section 1.4.2. The covariance of Treasury returns and
consumption growth are nearly equal across the unboxed and boxed Treasuries (0.000 and 0.001), but the
covariance of their returns and bank leverage constraints are different: −0.042 and −0.335, respectively.
When banks grow more constrained (ht ↑) boxed Treasuries have lower returns than unboxed Treasuries—this
is why the collateral premium is positive.
consumption covariance terms.
8The negative average annual real excess return Treasury is robust to different samples, tenors, and inflation measures. For
example, the equal-weighted average annual real excess return for CRSP Treasury indexes of bonds with at least 1-year maturity
(including 1y, 2y, 5y, 7y, 10y, 20y, and 30y) is −2.0% (σ = 8.5%) over a sample from 1942 to 2019, using CPI-U.
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I estimate A′(ht) in Table 1.3, which shows correlations of the change in banks’ collateral holdings,
A = λK + θBb + θBub, as haircut ht increases. I proxy for ht using ArbFac, where ArbFac > 0 corresponds
to bank leverage constraints falling. All four columns use quarterly balance sheet data from the Federal
Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the U.S. The first two columns calculate A using Table L.108, “Domestic
Financial Sector” where A is the sum of loans and Treasury securities. The last two columns calculate A
using Table L.110, “Private Depository Institutions.” The point estimates in each regression show a positive
relationship between shrinking haircuts and banks’ asset growth. Since banks cannot easily adjust their loan
portfolios quickly, the effect is larger and more significant at longer lags. The results support my assumption
that A′(ht) < 0 and are consistent with Adrian et al. (2014)’s finding that broker-dealer leverage is correlated
with asset growth.
Comparative Statics I plot the key comparative statics and features of the model in Figure 1.4. The
top-left figure shows the geometric risk premiums for both types of Treasuries over varying equilibrium values
of M t (equation 1.5). As M t goes to 0, the money premium grows, pulling down expected returns; as M t
increases, expected returns grow at a slowing pace: households do not bid up the Treasury’s price to purchase
a safe asset because there are more safe assets in the economy. The bottom-left panel shows the money
premium, ω′(M t), which is large when M t is smaller and falls as it increases.
The top-right panel shows the collateral premium, the difference between boxed and unboxed Treasuries
from equation 1.7. The collateral premium is positive for all values of M t and increases as M t falls because
the two bonds have different money weights. The bottom-right panel is the convenience yield of equation 1.9
estimated using the boxed Treasury’s covariances, where the convenience yield with the bank leverage risk
adjustment excludes the σh,θb term. As M t decreases, the convenience yield increases because safe assets are
scarcer when the bank cannot produce as many B per unit of collateral, so agents are willing to pay more for
a safe asset compared to the Lucas tree.
1.4 Data
I use two datasets to test the implications of the model and measure the collateral premium. The first dataset
includes collateral data from tri-party repos with money-market funds. The second dataset measures bank
leverage constraints using bank-intermediated basis trades.
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1.4.1 Collateral Data
Beginning November 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required money-market funds
(MMFs) to disclose granular data on their portfolios every month in form N-MFP. The disclosure details the
fund’s portfolio at the end of the month, and the fund must file the form within five days after the month-end.
The SEC initially delayed publication of the data for sixty days but dropped the delay in September 2014. In
October 2016, the SEC made small adjustments to the form and updated the form to N-MFP2. I use data
collected by the Office of Financial Research as part of its U.S. Money Market Monitor project.9
The N-MFP and N-MFP2 include details about the fund at an aggregate level, including its daily liquid
assets, and data on the fund’s portfolio, often at the CUSIP level. When a fund owns a security outright,
the form includes the issuer’s name (e.g., “U.S. Treasury Note”), the title of the issue (“U.S. Treasury Note
2.454300%”), the legal entity identifier for the security, and the category of the security. The form also
includes data on collateral used in repos. In the case of repo, the issuer is the counterparty (“Wells Fargo
Bank NA”), and the form includes the value of the collateral, the coupon or yield, the collateral maturity
date, the principal amount of the collateral, and the category of the collateral (e.g., asset-backed security, U.S.
Treasury, equities, etc.). Infrequently, a fund denotes that hundreds of securities back a repo and do not list
individual security details. The filings do not have security-level specific identifiers, so matching the collateral
securities to other data requires manual cleaning from the fund-provided text collateral descriptions.
I focus on Treasury collateral in repos. Given the coupon and the maturity, I can match most Treasuries
to their CUSIPs. My data includes roughly 10.3 million collateral observations. I match 907,000 Treasury
securities used as collateral with the CRSP daily Treasury dataset. I also hand-clean the repo counterparty
data because the same holding company may conduct repos using different legal entities. Of the roughly
2,500 different names used as repo counterparties in the data, I count 72 unique bank-holding-level dealers
and other cash borrowers.
1.4.2 Bank Leverage Constraint Data
I use data from Ross and Ross (2020) to estimate bank leverage constraints using bank-intermediated basis
trades identified in Boyarchenko et al. (2020). I proxy bank leverage constraints using bank-intermediated
arbitrage returns across three types of trades: rates, foreign exchange, and credit. The rates trades include
cash U.S. Treasury versus swaps (2y, 5y, 10y, 20y, 30y); off-the-run Treasury versus on-the-run Treasury
(6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 5y, 7y, 10y, and 30y); and the cheapest-to-deliver cash Treasury versus Treasury futures (2y,
5y, 10y, 20y, 30y). The foreign exchange trades are covered interest parity trades in the spirit of Du et al.
9https://www.financialresearch.gov/money-market-funds/
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(2018) (for AUD, CAD, CHF, DKK, EUR, GBP, JPY, NOK, NZD vs. the USD, at 1-week, 1-month, and
3-month maturities, using overnight indexed swap (OIS) or interbank offered rates).10 The credit trades are
single-name credit default swap (CDS) versus cash bonds (investment grade and non-investment grade at 1y,
2y, 3y, 4y, 5y, 7y, and 10y) and CDX versus a portfolio of CDS (investment grade 5y and high yield 5y). Ross
and Ross (2020) try to estimate as-realistic-as-possible costs to calculate the basis trades’ returns, including
secured and unsecured funding costs, initial margin, and variation margin. Appendix 1.9.1 gives more details
on the individual trades.
There are many advantages to using market data to estimate bank leverage constraints. There is good
reason to believe that bank balance sheet measures do not fully reflect intermediaries’ true economic leverage
due to window-dressing, netting across contracts, and risk-weights. Balance sheet data are often unavailable
for non-public or foreign intermediaries. Moreover, the arbitrages are not exotic; intermediaries can trade
them easily. Since banks from many countries participate in these markets, the measure captures the marginal
value of global intermediaries’ wealth. The measure is also daily.
The measure is not without drawbacks. First, we are limited to public data. We do not observe institution-
specific funding costs, haircuts, or capital charges. When possible, Ross and Ross (2020) approximate the
costs with public data. Second, none of the basis trades are true arbitrages. They are exposed to noise-trader
risk, horizon risk, and model risk. Perhaps most important, our measure of the annualized basis trade returns
assumes no change in funding costs. The assumption is reasonable in normal times but fails in bad times.
Third, Ross and Ross (2020) have financing rates only back to the early 2000s using overnight-index swap
rates (or back to the early 1990s using general collateral repo rates) and do not observe institution-specific
rates. They also cannot estimate the effect of capital charges on the trades as capital charges apply across
the entire trading book rather than a single trade. Finally, the trades are first available at different times:
the off-the-run/on-the-run Treasury trade is the longest time-series, while the CDS-bond basis trades are
available beginning only in the early 2000s.
To minimize idiosyncrasies in any one market, Ross and Ross (2020) provide a daily approximation
of bank leverage constraints by aggregating the basis trades to a single measure. Ross and Ross (2020)
calculate the z-score for each basis trade using that trade’s first full year of moments. They take the
absolute value of the z-score to capture the intuition that the trades are largely reversible (i.e., if the trade
expected return is negative, you can often flip the long and short legs). They calculate the equal-weighted
average across the individual basis trades available on that day for each category of arbitrages (e.g., 6m
off-the-run/on-the-run, 12m off-the-run/on-the-run, etc.). Finally, they average across the category-level
averages (e.g., off-the-run/on-the-run, CIP, CDS trades) to create ArbConstraint.
10No OIS rates are unavailable for NOK.
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They estimate daily innovations to bank leverage constraints, ArbFac, following the method of He et al.
(2017): first, they estimate innovations ut to ArbConstraintt using an AR(1)
ArbConstraintt = ρ0 + ρArbConstraintt−1 + ut
They then convert it to a growth rate by dividing with the lagged level and multiplying by −1 so the
interpretation is consistent with most factors: a positive number reflects good news as the banking system




Figure 1.5 plots the level of the average arbitrage constraint ArbConstraint and the innovations as measured
by the factor ArbFac.
1.5 Empirical Results
First, I test the asset pricing implications of the model. I show that the collateral premium is positive
even after controlling for characteristics like liquidity and maturity. I argue that the collateral premium is
positive because it loads on bank leverage risk. Second, I show that safe assets are priced by innovations to
intermediary leverage constraints. In pricing safe assets with intermediary leverage constraints, innovations
to intermediaries’ marginal value of wealth and innovations to the private safe-asset supply are two sides of
the same coin. Third, I show that higher bank leverage constraints attenuate the convenience yield on safe
assets, and I compare the convenience yield with the collateral premium.
1.5.1 Collateral Premium
Measuring the Collateral Premium
I calculate the collateral ratio, CR, for each Treasury CUSIP i to measure the intensity of that Treasury’s
use as collateral in month t:
CRi,t = Collateral Ratioi,t =
(
Market Value of Treasury CUSIP i used as Repo Collateral




There is considerable variation in CR across CUSIPs and across time. Table 1.4 presents summary statistics
for the repo deals in my sample, including their collateral use. The average CR is 3.3%, with a cross-sectional
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standard deviation across CUSIPs of 8.5% and a time-series standard deviation of 1.7% (i.e., a CUSIP’s
own collateral ratio volatility over time). In value-weighted terms, 83% of Treasuries outstanding have some
non-zero amount used as collateral. Figure 1.6 provides a box plot of the equal-weighted collateral ratios
across CUSIPs by year; the average and variance of CR grow through the sample, the latter shown by the
growing interquartile range.
The riskiness of dealers pledging collateral varies considerably over time, leading to differential exposures
to bank leverage risk across Treasuries. I calculate the CUSIP-specific CDS spread of banks using that CUSIP
as collateral. Figure 1.7 shows the average and range of the CUSIP-specific CDS spreads each month. I
weight by the amount of collateral pledged by the dealer. For example, if two dealers both pledge $100 of a
CUSIP as collateral, and the dealers have CDS spreads of 0 and 100 bps, then the average CDS spread for
that CUSIP is 50 bps. During the Euro crisis, the variation in CUSIP-specific spreads increased dramatically.
Some Treasury CUSIPs were pledged by dealers with an average CDS spread below 100 bps, and other
CUSIPs were pledged by dealers with an average CDS spread above 400 bps.
As discussed in section 1.2, Treasuries used as collateral are typically lower liquidity Treasuries. I
double-sort Treasuries by their liquidity and collateral ratio to control for liquidity differences. Money-funds
release their data with a lag, so I lag the collateral ratio trait by one month to ensure the collateral ratio
is in investors’ information sets. I measure liquidity using the monthly median of daily bid-ask spreads for
each Treasury CUSIP, also lagged by one month. Following the sorting procedure in Asness et al. (2013),
I independently sort each Treasury CUSIP into a CR tercile and a liquidity tercile using the lagged data.
Table 1.5 gives the annualized average return for a portfolio long Treasuries in the high-CR tercile and short
Treasuries in the low-CR tercile as 1.18% with an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.25.
I construct the collateral premium using the independent double-sorts:
Collateral Premium =Hi CR/Low Liq + Hi CR/Mid Liq + Hi CR/High Liq3
− Lo CR/Low Liq + Lo CR/Mid Liq + Lo CR/High Liq3 .
(1.11)
The collateral premium is the return an investor would earn by holding a portfolio long Treasuries used as
collateral often and short Treasuries used as collateral less often. Table 1.5 shows that the annualized average
collateral premium, controlling for liquidity, is 65 bps per year with a Sharpe ratio of 0.21. Table 1.6 reports
the average returns and standard deviations for the tercile sorts. Averaging across the bottom High−Low
row gives the collateral premium of 65 bps per year. Over the same period, average annual returns of 2-year
and 5-year Treasury notes were 1.13% and 2.78%, so the collateral premium is economically large and equal
to 58% of a 2-year note’s return and 23% of a 5-year note’s return.
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Tercile sorts are useful because they provide tractable ways to mimic investable strategies, but they
collapse information along other dimensions. I use nearest-neighbor matching to estimate the collateral
premium more precisely. I match Treasury bonds used as collateral often to their nearest-neighbor Treasury
bond not used as collateral often. I sort Treasuries into two equal-sized buckets: high- or low-CR, where the
latter has many Treasuries with CR = 0. I match Treasuries to their nearest-neighbor in the other bucket
using duration, liquidity, and maturity remaining each month. Table 1.7 shows the matching results. Each
column shows the annualized average difference in monthly returns between Treasuries in the high- and
low-CR halves using different distance metrics. The nearest-neighbor match shows the collateral premium is
between 13 and 22 bps, lower than the tercile sort collateral premium as expected.
The Collateral Premium Loads on Bank Leverage Risk
Why is the collateral premium positive and large, even after controlling for covariance with liquidity? I argue
the collateral premium is positive because it is compensation for bank leverage risk. Treasuries are useful
as collateral when intermediaries can pledge them, which mechanically requires the bank to use leverage.
There are fewer money-like safe assets available when banks become constrained because banks produce
fewer privately-produced safe assets. Investors then bid up the prices of the remaining safe assets—namely,
Treasuries—which is equivalent to pushing their yields down. When banks become leverage constrained,
unboxed Treasuries’ prices increase more than boxed Treasuries’ prices because banks are more likely to
shrink their boxed Treasury portfolios and less willing to buy Treasuries outright to use as collateral.
I show that the collateral premium is positive because it loads on bank leverage risk in four ways. First, I
show that the collateral premium strongly covaries with innovations to bank leverage constraints. Second,
I show low-CR Treasuries’ yields fall by more than high-CR Treasuries’ yields when banks are leverage
constrained, as calculated from ArbConstraint. Third, I show that bonds used as collateral by leverage
constrained banks—which I define as European banks in the earliest stages of the European sovereign debt
crisis—had lower returns than Treasuries held by other banks. Fourth, I perform an event study and show
that Treasuries have negative abnormal returns after dealers begin using that CUSIP as collateral. I reject the
hypothesis that collateralized Treasuries have lower returns because of other risk-compensated characteristics.
The Collateral Premium and Innovations to Bank Leverage Constraints Table 1.8 shows that
daily innovations to bank leverage constraints strongly covary with the collateral premium, even after
controlling for changes in the riskiness of the banking system and changes in Treasuries’ liquidity. The first
column shows the results from regressing the collateral premium on ArbFac with no controls or fixed-effects.
A one standard deviation increase in ArbFac corresponds to a concurrent collateral premium return of 1.5
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bps (column 3). When using the collateral premium double-sorted with liquidity, the same math gives
a collateral premium return of 0.5 bps (column 6). This daily covariance of ArbFac and the collateral
premium is consistent with both the model’s predictions and motivates the cross-sectional asset pricing tests
in section 1.5.2.
Yields by Bank Constraint State If the collateral premium is compensation for bank leverage risk, then
boxed bonds should have relatively lower prices—and higher yields—than unboxed bonds in bad states when
marginal utility over money-like safe assets is high. I show that yields for boxed and unboxed Treasuries
fall—equivalent to prices increasing—when banks are constrained, but unboxed Treasuries’ yields fall more
than boxed Treasuries’ yields. In other words, both boxed and unboxed Treasuries hedge contractions in the
money-like, safe-asset supply, but boxed Treasuries are worse hedges than unboxed Treasuries. I calculate
the value-weighted yield-to-maturity for each leg of the collateral premium analogous to equation 1.11. I
define high- and low-bank-constraint states by sorting ArbConstraint into buckets based on the median level
of ArbConstraint.
Table 1.9 and Figure 1.8 show the difference in high- and low-CR portfolios’ yields, less the one-month
T-bill rate. The table’s top panel shows the CR-sorted portfolios’ yields, and the bottom panel shows the CR
and liquidity double-sorted portfolios’ yields. Both panels show that low-CR portfolios have lower yields than
high-CR portfolios. Consistent with the model intuition, yields fall when moving from the unconstrained to
constrained bank leverage state. The effect is equivalent to their prices increasing. Bank leverage risk shows
up in each panel’s last row: the low-CR portfolios’ yields fall by more than the high-CR when banks become
constrained. Using the single-sort series in panel A, the yield spread between high-CR and low-CR grows
from 0.82% to 0.95%, a statistically significant difference of 14 bps. An analogous test in panel B shows the
yield spread for the double-sorted portfolios grows 13 bps, which is proportionally larger given the smaller
yield spreads for the double-sorted portfolios.
European Crisis Event I use the cross-sectional dimension of my collateral data to show that bank
leverage constraint risk, rather than some other bond characteristic, is the collateral premium’s primary
driver. Bonds used as collateral must have worse returns in bad states of the world if the collateral premium
is compensation for bank leverage risk; otherwise, there is no risk that requires compensation. I show that
bonds used as collateral by European banks during the initial panic stage of the European sovereign debt
crisis had lower returns than otherwise similar bonds used as collateral by non-European banks.
I perform a difference-in-difference on Treasury returns to compare bonds used as collateral by European
and non-European banks during the initial stage of the European sovereign debt crisis in July 2011. I use
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Stracca (2013)’s identification of Euro crisis event dates. He identifies crisis events by comparing the average
10-year government bond yield spread for Italy and Spain versus German bunds. He identifies events using
three criteria: there must be large jumps in the spreads to bunds; the jumps should be associated with a
significant political event; and the jump should not be explained “even potentially” by a non-Euro-related
event on the same day. The first adverse event Stracca (2013) identifies is July 11, 2011, when “the crisis
engulfs Italy.”
I estimate the difference-in-difference regression:
ri,t = α+ γ1I(Post) + γ2I(Treated) + γ3I(Post)× I(Treated) + β′Xt + εt (1.12)
where t is a month, i is a Treasury CUSIP, and Xt is a vector of controls, including the CUSIP’s duration,
liquidity, a dummy for on-the-run, and its remaining maturity. I weight the regression with the market value
of each CUSIP. I define I(Post) = 1 if the date is after July 11, 2011, and 0 otherwise. I define the treatment
group as CUSIPs that are intensively used as collateral by European banks. I calculate a CUSIP’s European
bank share as the share of a CUSIP used as collateral by European banks relative to that CUSIP’s total
use as collateral in April 2011, one quarter before the July event. I set I(Treated) = 1 for bonds above the
median European share in April 2011. The average European bank share is 95.2% for the treatment group
and 42.3% for the control group. I run the difference-in-difference regression over a period of five months
before and after the July 11 event. I estimate the difference-in-difference regression separately for high- and
low-CR bonds. I use contemporaneous collateral ratios because I am interested in ex post outcomes.
The test assumes only European banks were treated, meaning that only European banks became leverage
constrained. Examining ex post CDS spreads shows that this assumption is a good approximation. Classifying
treated banks as those with the largest CDS spread changes does not materially change the results.
Table 1.10 presents the regression results. The first two columns use high-CR bonds, and the last two
columns use low-CR bonds. The main result is the I(Post)× I(Treated) row in the first two columns: among
high-CR bonds, high European bank share bonds had lower returns than similar bonds used as collateral by
non-European banks. European banks’ high-CR bonds had 57 bps lower average monthly returns, as shown
in column (2). Bonds not used as collateral—low-CR bonds—should not have as large a return differential
depending on if European or non-European banks pledged them. I confirm this in columns (3) and (4), where
the interaction term coefficient is weakly negative and not different from zero.
As the Euro crisis accelerated, interest rates fell, and risk-off sentiment drove a flight-to-safety, boosting
the returns across all flavors of Treasuries. Therefore, the I(Post) coefficient is positive and significant for all
specifications. Figure 1.9 visualizes the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference regression.
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In the top left panel, there is no evident trend in the treated or control groups’ returns before July 2011;
after the event, the difference grows dramatically.
Dollar funding played a significant role in European banks becoming leverage constrained over this
period; the liquidity shock was a specific manifestation of a bank leverage shock. Correa et al. (2017) show
how dollar-funding shocks caused banks to cut lending to U.S. firms. European banks facing a liquidity
shock needed dollars to pay down their dollar-denominated debt and delever, so they sold their dollar-
denominated short-term trading assets: Treasuries. Market commentary from that period shows that Euro
bank deleveraging concerns reached beyond money-funds. For example, one bank analyst published a note
in November 2011 titled “What are the Risks of €1.5-2.5tr Deleveraging?” (Van Steenis et al., 2011). In
October and November 2011, the Euro-dollar basis was at extreme levels, indicating European banks were
willing to pay a large premium for dollar access. As a robustness check, I exclude October and November
2011 from the difference-in-difference regression and find similar results.
Actual vs. Predicted Event Study When a CUSIP jumps from low to high collateral use, it becomes
riskier and should have lower realized returns after the event. I show that Treasuries have lower realized returns
after banks use them as collateral. I also show that the lower returns are not due to other risk-compensated
characteristics. I perform an event study for Treasury returns around the event of CUSIPs moving from the
low-CR tercile to the high-CR tercile. I find that bonds have negative cumulative abnormal returns after
making the jump. The result is consistent with the bond earning a larger risk premium once dealers use the
bond as collateral because the bond now loads on bank leverage risk.
I define a jump event as the first date a CUSIP spends at least two months in a low-CR tercile and then
jumps directly to the high-CR tercile and stays there for at least two months. I use the 10-year Treasury
return as the benchmark to estimate abnormal returns. I estimate the CUSIP’s beta to the benchmark using
daily data in the quarter before the event:
ri,t = αi + βir10yr,t + εi,t
The abnormal return, ARi,t, is the difference between the predicted return r̂i,t and the actual return. I test
whether the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) across CUSIPs is equal to zero each day. Figure 1.10
shows the results in the blue lines. There is no obvious pattern in the average cumulative abnormal return
for Treasuries before the event. After the event, realized abnormal returns are lower and statistically different
from zero.
Do Treasuries have lower realized abnormal returns because banks use them more as collateral, or do they
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exhibit some characteristic that makes banks more likely to use them as collateral? To answer the question, I
compare abnormal returns around the actual event to a predicted event.
I forecast CRt+1 using a Treasury CUSIP’s observables available at time t. The predicted event is the
first date when I predict a Treasury CUSIP will jump from the low-CR to high-CR terciles. Suppose the
cumulative abnormal return falls after the predicted event. In that case, the actual event study shows that
bonds with specific characteristics have lower returns, and those same characteristics are why banks use the
bonds as collateral more often.
I estimate Et[Tercile(CRt+1) = High | Tercile(CRt) = Low] with a one-step-ahead cross-validated LASSO
with candidate explanatory variables, including contemporaneous variables that are deterministic and known
beforehand. The contemporaneous variables are maturity remaining, original maturity, age, and dummies for
whether the security is a bond, bill, or note. The LASSO also includes lagged variables: SOMA holdings,
duration, benchmark Treasury returns for 1-, 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year maturities, and six lags of each.
I calculate abnormal returns by estimating the CUSIP’s beta to the 10-year benchmark Treasury returns
using daily data over the quarter before the event.
Figure 1.10 shows the results from the predicted event study with the red lines. I find that abnormal returns
after the predicted event are not statistically different from zero. In contrast, the abnormal returns after the
actual event are different from zero and negative. I reject the hypothesis that some other risk-compensated
characteristic explains why banks use the bonds more often as collateral.
1.5.2 Cross-Sectional Results
Consumption-based asset pricing relates asset prices to the underlying stochastic discount factor (SDF). I
build on a recent intermediary asset pricing literature showing that the intermediary marginal value of wealth
should price the cross-section of returns, and intermediary leverage proxies for intermediaries’ marginal value
of wealth. My cross-sectional interpretation is similar: the model described above shows that innovations to
intermediary leverage—which proxies for the pricing kernel in He and Krishnamurthy (2013)—drives the
safe-asset supply. In pricing safe assets with intermediary leverage constraints, innovations to the marginal
value of wealth and innovations to the safe-asset supply are two sides of the same coin.
The fundamental equation of asset pricing in my model for any safe asset i is
1 = Ω′(M t)πi + Et [Mt+1(1 +Ri,t+1)]
The SDF, Mt+1, measures the household’s marginal value of wealth, and Ω′(M t)πi measures the marginal
value of holding more money-like safe asset i. It is easy to cast the fundamental equation of asset pricing to
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≡ (βi,M − βi,Ω)λ
where βi,Ω represents the Ω′(M t) term in the common language of asset pricing despite not having a covariance
term. The covariance of an asset’s return to the SDF and the safe-asset supply will price a safe asset. Assets
that pay off when times are bad—when the marginal value of wealth is high, and so the SDF is high—command
higher prices, corresponding to lower expected returns. If an asset’s return is high when Mt+1 is high, then
Cov(Mt+1, Ri,t+1) > 0, and the asset has lower expected returns. The second term shows that when M t
grows, Ω′(M t) goes to zero, and the asset will have higher expected returns.
I test the ability of bank leverage constraints, measured with ArbFac, to price safe assets using a time-series
regression to estimate βi,Ω and the cross-sectional regression to estimate λ. I run the pricing regressions over
two separate samples: high bank-constraint states and low bank-constraint states. By running the tests over
the two states, I control for variation in Ω′(M t) using the simplifying assumption that Ω′(M t) is constant
within each state but not constant across the states. I test this by splitting my sample into two periods: low
h and high h using the median level of ArbConstraint.
The time-series regression to estimate betas for each portfolio i = 1, . . . , N is
Rei,t = αi + βi,ArbFacArbFact + εi,t, i = 1, . . . N, t = 1, . . . , T
where Rei denotes portfolio i’s excess return. The cross-sectional regression to estimate the price of risk λ is
E[Rei ] = λ0 + λArbFacβi,ArbFac + ξi i = 1, . . . N.
I run the pricing test across two groups of safe-asset test portfolios. The first set of portfolios is collateral-
sorted U.S. Treasuries, including 5×5 independent sorts on collateral ratio and liquidity, collateral ratio and
duration, and collateral ratio and maturity. The second set of portfolios is benchmark Treasury portfolios of
1-, 2-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year maturities from CRSP. I require portfolios to have three years of daily data.
I perform two sets of asset pricing tests, each based on different assumptions. The first test—the base
case—assumes that πi is constant for all safe assets. In this case, the wedge in expected returns from the
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money premium will fall out because βi,Ω is constant within a bank-constraint state:
λ̂ArbFac =






The advantage of this test setup is that it requires no assumptions about the functional form of πi, and it
follows the standard two-step asset pricing procedure.






Because the money weight πi > 0, I choose κ as a constant to ensure that κ− αi ≥ 0: κ ≡ max(αi). In this
sense, the time-series alpha is a good proxy for the money weight because it tells us the security-specific
average return assuming no change in bank leverage constraints. When I use the strong functional form
assumption, the cross-sectional test becomes
λ̂ArbFac =
Cov(Rei,t, βi,M − βi,Ω)
Var(βi,M − βi,Ω)
The advantage of assuming a functional form for πi is that I can compare the supply of safe assets M in the
high and low bank-constraint states. Since πi does not change across bank-constraint states but Ω′(M t) does,
I can calculate the average κ− αi across all portfolios separately for the high and low constraint state tests,










where the last step uses the assumption that Ω(M ) = log(M ). The full sample estimate of equation 1.14 is
1.30: in the low bank-constraint state, there are 30% more safe assets than in the high bank-constraint state.
There are four criteria I use to judge the results of the two-stage asset pricing tests. First, I expect
λArbFac is positive because a portfolio with larger βi,ArbFac is riskier, so it should have a larger expected
return. Second, the price of leverage risk should be stable across different portfolios. Third, λ0 should be
small. Fourth, I expect that the pricing relationship should be stronger in periods when banks are more
leverage constrained.
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Constant πi = 1 Results Table 1.11 shows the cross-sectional pricing regression results assuming πi = 1,
and Figure 1.11 summarizes the main result about the price of bank constraint risk. I report both Fama–
MacBeth t-statistics and GMM t-statistics. The table reports the results of separately running the tests
in the high and low bank-constraint states. The first two columns are the main result, which shows the
estimated price of risk when I impose the same price of risk across all the test portfolios. The price of risk is
positive and significant in the low bank-constraint state and insignificant in the high bank-constraint state.
The last row of the table shows the difference in annualized risk premium between two portfolios with a one
standard deviation difference in ArbFac β: (1 + σ(β)× λ)252 = (1 + 0.003088× 0.06581)252 = 5.25%. The
risk premium is economically significant because the average nominal return on a 5-year Treasury bond since
1942 is 5.45%, and the average annualized return during the sample period is 2.14%. The change in the
expected risk premium associated with increasing βArbFac by one standard deviation is roughly the same as
the average return difference between 10-year and 30-year Treasuries.
The other columns of Table 1.11 show that the results in columns (1) and (2) broadly hold across the
portfolios of safe assets: in the low bank-constraint state, the price of ArbFac risk is positive and uniformly
significant using the Fama–MacBeth standard errors, but not using the GMM standard errors. In the high
bank-constraint states, the prices of risk are not different from zero, and the point estimates are weakly
negative.
Figure 1.12 makes the relationship between bank constraints, safe asset expected returns, and the bank-
constraint state clear. The figure uses the estimates shown in the first two columns of Table 1.11. The
top-left panel shows a strong linear relationship between predicted returns and realized returns in the low
bank-constraint state: the line’s slope is the price of risk λ. The top-right panel shows the portfolios’ betas
line up with their realized returns. Moreover, as shown in equation 1.5, when banks are not constrained,
Treasuries have higher expected returns, with betas ranging from 0 to 1.2, and expected returns ranging from
0 to more than 20% (corresponding to the 5×5 collateral by liquidity sorted portfolio that is least liquid and
used most as collateral), although the mean is considerably less at 3.9%.
The bottom half of Figure 1.12 shows that when banks are constrained, expected returns for all types
of safe assets compress and often have negative returns. The result is consistent with households bidding
up the price of safe assets and accepting negative returns because the nonpecuniary value of holding safe
assets outweighs the loss in expected return terms. When banks are constrained, it is tough to see a
linear relationship between predicted returns, betas, and realized returns, which is the visualization of the
statistically insignificant from zero price of risk shown in column (2) of Table 1.11.
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Varying πi Results I run the asset pricing tests using the functional form assumption of equation 1.13.
Table 1.12 gives the cross-sectional price of risk estimates with varying πi estimates. I estimate Ω′(M )πi
using the functional form assumption κ− αi = (Ω′(M t)πi)/Vart(Mt+1) where κ is a constant to ensure that
κ − αi ≥ 0: κ ≡ max(αi). The results do not qualitatively change from the earlier cross-sectional results.
The price of risk estimates in the low bank-constraint state still positive and significant, although a bit lower,
as expected. I present the main result from the table in the M Low Constraint/M High Constraint row, which
uses equation 1.14 to estimate the relative supply of safe assets when banks are in the low constraint state
compared to the high constraint state. Across all portfolios, the alphas imply roughly 30% more safe assets
in the low bank-constraint state compared to the high bank-constraint state. Using the alphas estimated
with different subsets of test portfolios yield estimates from 141% to 154%.
The results across both testing setups confirm the intuition that in states when banks are constrained,
returns across all types of Treasuries are compressed and low because the elevated demand for safe assets
overwhelms the comparative differences in the safe assets, captured by πi.
1.5.3 Bank Leverage Constraints and the Convenience Yield
Proposition 3 shows that the convenience yield increases as banks grow more constrained. When haircuts ht
increase, banks become more constrained. Banks produce fewer safe asset liabilities per unit of collateral
on the asset side of their balance sheets, the safe-asset supply falls, and households bid up the price of the
remaining safe assets: Treasuries. Growing leverage constraints drive a wedge between the Lucas tree’s and
Treasury’s returns, pushing the convenience yield up.
Researchers measure the convenience yield by comparing two risk-free instruments that differ only in
their moneyness. I use two definitions of the convenience yield. First, I use Sunderam (2015)’s OIS versus
Tbill spread. The OIS rate is the rate an investor can swap the floating effective federal-funds rate to a fixed
rate. The OIS rate is an average of the market’s expectation of the federal-funds rate over the swap’s life.
OIS contracts are collateralized and have minimal counterparty risk, although the underlying reference rate
is unsecured. The second measure is the box rate versus Tbill spread, calculated by van Binsbergen et al.
(2018) using put–call parity of S&P 500 index options. Box rates are available at the 6-, 12-, and 18-month
maturities.
I will focus on the 6-month maturity as it is the shortest maturity available for the box rate, although
using shorter OIS maturities does not meaningfully change the results. The average Box−Tbill spread over
the sample from 2004 to 2018 is 37 basis points, and the average OIS−Tbill spread is 2 bps. The innovations
to the two measures of the convenience yield are closely related: the daily changes’ correlation coefficient is
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ρ = 0.40.
Table 1.13 tests proposition 3 and shows the result of regressing changes in the convenience yield measures
on ArbFac using daily data from 2004 through 2018:
∆Convenience Yieldt = α+ β1ArbFact + β′2Xt + εt (1.15)
where Xt is a vector of controls. The first five columns show the result using the OIS convenience yield, and
the last five columns perform the same test using the box convenience yield. Moving right across the columns
adds controls: the change in log Treasury bills outstanding, dummies for quarter- and month-ends, the
change in the average financial company CDS spread, the change in the VIX, the Fama–French market excess
return, and the Bloomberg Treasury liquidity index. When bank leverage constraints relax (ArbFact > 0)
both convenience yield measures fall. The box rate covaries strongly with the same-day ArbFact, while the
lagged ArbFact−1 has a negative coefficient. The OIS measure covaries strongly with the lag. A one standard
deviation increase in ArbFact leads to a fall in the OIS convenience yield of 0.39 bps (column 2) and the box
convenience yield of 0.58 bps (column 7).
Constraining Stress Tests I also test the relationship between bank constraints and the convenience yield
agnostic to ArbFac’s definition of bank leverage constraints. Instead, I use the behavior of the convenience
yield around constraining and non-constraining stress tests.
In the post-crisis era, the Federal Reserve conducts annual stress tests for large banks. Each year, there are
two tests: the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review
(CCAR). The primary difference between the tests is the treatment of capital actions; the DFAST assumes a
set of standard stylized capital actions across all banks, including no changes in repurchases, issuances, and
dividends continuing from the previous year. The CCAR incorporates the bank’s capital plans and tests
whether the bank maintains post-stress capital adequacy. The Fed can object to a bank’s capital plans if the
bank does not maintain capital adequacy in the CCAR, so the CCAR’s results are material to banks’ ability
to pay dividends, lever up, or expand their balance sheets.
I define a stress test as constraining if the Fed objects to at least one G-SIB’s capital plans or requires
at least one G-SIB to resubmit its capital plan. From 2012 to 2019—the period with firm-specific CCAR
results—there are five tests when the Fed objected to a G-SIB’s capital plans (2012 through 2016), and three
tests when the Fed did not object (2017 through 2019). I exclude the 2020 stress test because the covid-19
pandemic materially changed the stress test results’ interpretation, and the Fed released a separate sensitivity
analysis.
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I test the convenience yield response to constraining stress tests by comparing the ten days before and
after the Fed announced results. I estimate the effect of a constraining stress test on the convenience yield
using
Convenience Yieldt = α+ β1I(Post) + β2I(Constraining Test)
+ β3I(Post)× I(Constraining Test) + β′4Xt + εt
(1.16)
where Xt is a vector of controls, including the log-level of Treasury Bills outstanding, the average financial
CDS spread, and year fixed-effects. The convenience yield measure is the OIS−Tbill spread at the 1-month,
3-month, and 6-month maturity.11 The dummy I(Post) is equal to one beginning the day after the Fed
releases the results.12 I index the convenience yield, the log-level of Tbills, and the average CDS spread to
100 the day before the Fed published the results.
Table 1.14 and Figure 1.13 show the results. The interaction row’s coefficients are percentage point changes
in the convenience yield ten days before compared to ten days after a constraining test: the convenience yield
grows 42 percentage points (pp) using the 1-month OIS−Tbill, 40pp using the 3-month measure, 67pp using
the 6-month measure. As a check, columns (7) and (8) confirm that ArbConstraint grows after constraining
tests. Figure 1.14 shows the time-series average and standard errors by day. The standard errors are larger
due to the small sample sizes, but the average convenience yield—regardless of measure—is consistently
higher after constraining tests.
The Convenience Yield and the Collateral Premium The collateral premium attenuates the conve-
nience yield. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) define the convenience yield using the spread
between long-term AAA-rated corporate debt and long-term Treasuries. As I’ve shown, many Treasuries
are used as collateral and therefore load on bank leverage risk and command higher expected returns as
compensation. Similarly, Treasuries used as collateral have higher yields, reflecting their higher risk. Therefore,
the collateral premium likely increases the average Treasury yield, leading to a smaller convenience yield
estimate.
A simple example calculation makes this logic clear. The Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012)
convenience yield estimate is 73 basis points:
Convenience Yield = yAaa − yUST = 73 bps
11The box rate convenience yield is available only through March 2018. Stress tests are in June of each year, so I cannot run
the same regression using the box rate with currently available data.
12The Fed usually publishes results at 4:30pm, although the Fed released the 2011 results at 11:00am.
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where the Treasury yield is some weighted average of securities used as collateral and securities not used as
collateral
yUST = w(yUST, Not-Collateral) + (1− w)(yUST, Collateral)
A nearest-neighbor match like Table 1.7 estimates Treasuries with above-median collateral ratios have yields
4 bps higher than Treasuries below-median:
yUST, High-CR = 4 bps + yUST, Low-CR
After removing the collateral premium effect, the estimated convenience yield is 77 bps, roughly 5% larger.
The collateral premium is a compensated risk source, and a measure of the convenience yield that controls
for it will necessarily be higher than the unadjusted convenience yield.
1.6 Conclusion
Sovereigns do not always issue enough safe assets. Bank-produced liabilities satisfy the remaining safe-asset
demand. When short-term equity issuance is costly, banks must use leverage and collateral to produce
money-like safe assets. Banks’ ability to make incremental safe assets varies considerably from day to day
because their leverage constraints vary from day to day.
In repos, banks produce private safe assets using collateral, often Treasuries. I show that Treasuries
used as collateral load on bank leverage risk because banks cannot pledge more collateral when they are
leverage constrained—pledging requires incremental leverage. I show that bank leverage constraints price
the cross-section of safe assets and covary with the convenience yield. Money-like safe-asset production is
implicitly inefficient because Treasuries’ collateral values depend on bank leverage constraints; banks use
long-term safe assets as collateral to make money-like, short-term safe assets, but safe assets become riskier





















Figure 1.1: Tri-party Repurchase Agreement Transaction. Figure shows the basic setup of a repurchase agreement. In the near leg on date t,
a cash lender provides cash in exchange for collateral. The repo haircut is 1− Cash Loan/Collateral Value. In the far leg on date t+ 1, often the next
day, the repurchase is unwound when the borrower repurchases the collateral at a higher price, which embeds the repo’s interest rate.
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Figure 1.2: Time-Series Persistence of Boxed Treasuries. Plot gives the estimated beta coefficient with 95% confidence intervals from the
regression Collateral Sharei,d,t = α+ βCollateral Sharei,d,t−1 + εi,d,t, where Collateral Sharei,d,t is the collateral share of CUSIP i for dealer d at time
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Figure 1.3: Cross-Sectional Persistence of Boxed Treasuries. Plot gives the t-statistics of the beta coefficient from the regression
Collateral Sharei,d,t = α + βCollateral Sharei,SocGen,t + εi,d,t, where Collateral Sharei,d,t is the collateral share of CUSIP i for dealer d at time
t across all the Treasuries used as collateral by that dealer at that time, and Société Générale is the benchmark dealer to which all other dealers are
compared. Blue dots denote global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) while red dots represent all other dealers. Average repo collateral is the
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Figure 1.4: Comparative Statics. The top-left figure shows the geometric risk premiums for both types of Treasuries over differing equilibrium
values of money-like safe assets M t as given in equation 1.5. The bottom-left panel shows the money premium, the last term in equation 1.5. The
top-right panel shows the collateral premium, which is the difference between the two Treasuries’ expected returns as given in equation 1.7. The
bottom-right panel is the convenience yield of equation 1.9 estimated using the boxed Treasury’s covariances where the convenience yield with the
leverage risk adjustment excludes the σh,θb term. I use covariances estimated in the top panel of Table 1.2 using annualized monthly data over the
















1990 2000 2010 2020
 
ArbFac
Figure 1.5: ArbConstraint and ArbFac. Left panel is ArbConstraint, which is the average z-score of the basis trades available on that date. Data
before 2002 does not include OIS rates, and data before 1991 does not include repo financing rates as the data are not available then. Right panel
shows ArbFac, estimated as the AR(1) innovations from ArbConstraint multiplied by −1 so the interpretation is the same as normal factors: a positive
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Figure 1.6: Time-Series Variation in Collateral Ratio. Box plot of the collateral ratio at the month-CUSIP level by year, equal-weighted across
CUSIPs. The blue bar in the middle of the box is the average collateral ratio in that year, the blue box represents the interquartile range, and the lines


















Figure 1.7: CDS Spread Variation Across Treasury Repo Collateral. Figure shows the range and average of CUSIP-specific CDS spreads
over the full sample. The CUSIP-specific CDS spread is calculated by averaging the CDS spreads of the dealers using a specific CUSIP as collateral;

























Figure 1.8: Yield Spread Between High-CR and Low-CR Grows When Banks Are Leverage Constrained. Left panel shows the average
yield for Treasuries portfolios doubled sorted by collateral ratio and liquidity across bank constraint states. Bank constraint states are defined by the
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Figure 1.9: Parallel Trends around July 2011 Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis Event. The top-left panel shows the predictive margins of
monthly returns for treated and control bonds estimated from equation 1.12 and shown in column (1) of Table 1.10, where a treated bond is a bond
that is more often pledged as collateral by European banks and is in the top tercile of contemporaneous CR. The top-right panel shows the same
predictive margins for treated and control bonds in terms of cumulative returns. The bottom-left panel shows the value-weighted return for the
portfolio of treated and control bonds in the sample of column (1) of the table. The bottom-right panel shows the difference in the value-weighted
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Figure 1.10: Collateral Use: Actual and Predicted Event Studies. Plot shows the average cumulative abnormal returns across Treasury
CUSIPs on each day relative to the actual event, defined as the first date a CUSIP spends at least two months at a low-CR tercile and then jumps
directly to the high-CR tercile and remains there for at least two months. The predicted event is the first date when I predict a Treasury CUSIP
will jump from the low-CR to high-CR terciles using a model to estimate the collateral ratio from the bond’s characteristics, e.g., the predicted date
is when Et[Tercile(CRt+1) = 3|Tercile(CRt) = 1]. I form expectations using a one-step-ahead cross-validated LASSO with candidate explanatory
variables including contemporaneous (variables that are deterministic and knowable beforehand) maturity remaining, original maturity, age, dummies
for whether the security is a bond, bill or note, as well as lagged variables: SOMA holdings, duration, benchmark Treasury returns, and 6 lags of each.
Abnormal returns are calculated by estimating the CUSIP’s beta to the 10-year benchmark Treasury return using daily returns over the quarter before
the event. Left panel shows the average cumulative abnormal return around the actual and predicted events and the right panel shows the two-sided
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Figure 1.11: Price of Risk Across Portfolios. Figure shows the price of bank leverage constraint, proxied via ArbFac, risk estimates from
Table 1.11 across the two sample periods: low and high bank-constraint states. Black error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates
using Fama–MacBeth standard errors, and gray error bars are 95% confidence intervals using GMM standard errors which correct for estimation error
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Figure 1.12: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing. Figure shows the predicted return, beta, and expected return from the cross-sectional asset pricing
regression with the ArbFac when imposing a constant price of risk, λArbFac across all portfolios of collateral sorts, collateral strategies, and benchmark
Treasury portfolios. Pricing regression run in two states: high and low bank-constraint states, where the state is determined using the median level of













































Tests without Failing SIBs Tests with Failing SIBs
Figure 1.13: Convenience Yield Around Announcement of Stress Test Results. I estimate the effect of a constraining stress test on the
convenience yield using Convenience Yieldt = α+β1I(Post) +β2I(Constraining Test) +β3I(Post)× I(Constraining Test) +β′2Xt + εt where the sample
are the 10 days before and after the CCAR stress test result announcement from 2012 to 2019, and Xt is a vector of controls, including the log level of
Treasury Bills outstanding, the average financial CDS spread, and year fixed-effects. Test is classified as constraining if at least 1 G-SIB did not pass
unconditionally. The convenience yield measure is the OIS−Tbill spread at the 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month maturities. The dummy I(Post) is
equal to 1 beginning the day after the results are released. To make the coefficients easier to interpret, the convenience yield, the log level of Tbills, and





Assets ($) Liabilities ($) Assets ($) Liabilities ($)
Cash 0 Repo 0 Cash 100 Repo 100
Treasuries 100 Equity 100 Treasuries 0 Equity 100
Repo-Encumbered Repo-Encumbered
Treasuries 0 Treasuries 100
Total 100 Total 100 Total 200 Total 200
Leverage 1 Leverage 2
Table 1.1: Safe-Asset Production via Bank Leverage. Figure shows a simplified bank’s balance sheet before and after a repo transaction. In
the pre-repo left panel, the bank has $100 in Treasuries funded with $100 in equity. In the post-repo transaction, the bank pledges its Treasuries as
collateral in a repo to borrow $100 cash. Leverage is equal to assets divided by equity.
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Monthly Data (2011–2018) Variable Empirical Proxy Mean (%) SD (%) Cov(·,∆c) Cov(·, h)
Real economy rK − rf Fama–French Market 3.00 15.28 0.043
Boxed Treasury rθb − rf Hi Collateral Ratio Tercile 0.24 3.84 0.001 −0.335
Unboxed Treasury rθub − rf Lo Collateral Ratio Tercile −0.86 1.06 0.000 −0.042
Consumption ∆ct+1 PCE 3.15 2.04
Annual Data (1973–2019) Variable Empirical Proxy Mean (%) SD (%) Cov(·,∆c)
Real economy rK − rf Fama–French Market 3.83 17.66 0.17
Treasury rθ − rf Bloomberg UST Tot. Ret. −0.82 6.89 0.02
Consumption ∆ct+1 PCE 2.91 1.94
Table 1.2: Empirical Covariances. Table presents summary statistics of real excess returns for the market and Treasury portfolios, as well
as covariances with real consumption growth and innovations to bank leverage constraints. The Bloomberg U.S. Treasury total return index is a
market-value-weighted index of fixed-rate nominal debt excluding Treasury bills. The index excludes strips to prevent double-counting. Each series is
in real terms using the PCE inflation index. The risk-free rate is the 1-month Tbill rate. Summary statistics for the monthly data is calculated from
monthly return series, but reported as annualized numbers. The boxed Treasury portfolios is a portfolio long Treasuries with collateral ratios—the
share of the total Treasury CUSIP market value used as tri-party repo collateral with a money-market fund—in the top tercile, lagged by one month.
Similarly, the unboxed Treasury portfolio is long Treasuries that are in the bottom tercile of collateral use, and for many Treasuries their collateral
ratio is zero.
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Domestic Financial Sector Depository Institutions
∆ log(A) ∆ log(A) ∆ log(A) ∆ log(A)
ArbFact−1 0.31∗∗ 0.07 0.30∗ 0.05







Observations 135 132 135 132
R2 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.13
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.3: Empirical Estimate of ∂A(ht)/∂ht. Table presents empirical results for the sign of the change in banks’ collateral holdings, A, as
haircut h increase, where A = λK + θB , with bank loans λK and bank-owned Treasuries θB . Innovations to ht are proxied by ArbFac, which is the
innovations to bank-intermediated arbitrage returns. I discuss ArbFac’s construction in Section 1.4.2; ArbFac > 0 when banks are less constrained. All
four columns use quarterly balance sheet data from the Federal Reserve Financial Accounts of the United States. The first two columns calculate A
using Table L.108, “Domestic Financial Sector” where A is the sum of loans and Treasury securities. The last two columns calculate A using Table
L.110, “Private Depository Institutions.” T-statistics are reported in parentheses using heterosketastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
using the Newey and West (1994) automatic lag selection procedure.
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Collateral Ratio > 0 Full Treasury Sample
Treasuries (daily average) Unique CUSIPs 280 317
Market Value (USD Billions) 7,596 9,153
Original Maturity (months) 11.38 10.20
Remaining Maturity (months) 74.48 66.60
Duration (months) 59.46 53.27
On-the-run CUSIPs 2.39 9.00
Collateral Ratio (monthly) Average 3.69% 3.27%
Min 0.04%
Max 77.87%
Std. Dev. (cross-section) 8.46%
Std. Dev. (time-series) 1.68%
Repo Transaction (full sample) N (Month-Collateral level) 907,181
N (Month-Repo level) 302,868
# Funds (Lenders) 238
# Counterparties (Borrowers) 1,844
# Borrower-Lender Pairs 5,350
Repo Transaction (monthly) Collateral Value (avg, USD Millions) 218
Repo Value (avg, USD Millions) 211
Collateral Value (sum, USD Millions) 703,220
Repo Value (sum, USD Millions) 674,540
Avg. Haircut 3.04%
Std. Dev Haircut (time-series) 8.15%
Table 1.4: Repo Data Summary Statistics. Summary statistics of repo data and Treasury collateral use. Data from monthly money-market
mutual fund filings. Sample Period from January 2011 to October 2018.
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Mean Sharpe
Single-Sorts Collateral Ratio 1.18 0.25
Liquidity 1.20 0.12
Double-Sorts Collateral Ratio by Liquidity 0.65 0.21
Collateral Ratio by Maturity Remaining 0.34 0.02
Liquidity by Collateral Ratio 1.09 0.11
Table 1.5: Collateral Premium. Collateral ratio defined as Collateral Ratioi,t = (Market Value of Treasury CUSIP i used as Repo Collateral)/(Market
Value of Treasury CUSIP i)t, and liquidity is the median of daily bid-ask spreads for each CUSIP in each month. Both measures are lagged by one
month. Single-sort premiums are the high-tercile minus low-tercile premiums. Double-sort premiums are independent sorts based on terciles. Statistics
are annualized from daily observations. Sample is 2011 to 2018.
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Average Return Standard Deviation
Illiqudity Illiqudity
Collateral Ratio Low Mid High High−Low Collateral Ratio Low Mid High
Low 0.55% 1.24% 2.43% 1.88% Low 0.22% 2.27% 7.69%
Mid 1.49% 1.52% 2.63% 1.13% Mid 1.44% 2.39% 7.65%
High 1.80% 2.29% 2.11% 0.31% High 2.29% 3.59% 7.56%
High−Low 1.25% 1.05% −0.32%
Table 1.6: Collateral Premium: Double-Sorted with Liquidity. Collateral ratio defined as Collateral Ratioi = (Market Value of Treasury
CUSIP i used as Repo Collateral)/(Market Value of Treasury CUSIP i), and liquidity is the median of daily bid-ask spreads for each CUSIP in each
month. Both measures lagged by one month and sorts are independent. The collateral premium is the average of the High−Low row. Returns and
standard deviations are annualized from daily observations. Sample is 2011 to 2018.
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Average Treatment Effect (1) (2) (3)
Collateral Premium 21.74∗∗∗ 13.52∗∗ 13.56∗∗
(3.35) (2.81) (2.70)
Observations 29,127 29,127 29,127
R2 Mahalanobis Euclidean Inverse Variance
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.7: Collateral Premium Estimated with Nearest-Neighbor Match. Table shows the results of nearest-neighbor matching across
Treasuries sorted into one of two buckets: high- and low-CR, where the latter contains many Treasuries with CR = 0. I then match Treasuries to their
nearest neighbor using duration, liquidity and maturity-remaining each month. Each column shows the annualized average difference in monthly
returns between Treasuries in the high- and low-CR halves using different distance metrics.
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Collateral Premium Double-Sorted w/ Liquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Leverage Constraints
ArbFact 13.85∗ 13.81∗ 16.16∗ 4.42∗ 4.50∗ 5.14∗




∆U.S. Gov’t Liquidity Indext −0.09 −0.05
(−0.84) (−1.01)
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,791 1,872 1,872 1,791
R2 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.10
Year Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.8: Covariance of Bank Leverage Constraints and Collateral Premium. Collateral Premiumt = α + β1ArbFact + β′2Xt + εt where
Xt is a vector of controls. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is collateral premium return in basis points; the last three columns are
the collateral premium double-sorted with liquidity. Independent variables are ArbFact which measures bank constraints by calculating the returns
to bank-intermediated arbitrages; see the text for additional discussion of its construction. ∆CDSt is the change in the median CDS spread for the
financial sector. The U.S. Government Liquidity index is the Bloomberg U.S. Government Securities Liquidity index, which measures liquidity of
Treasury notes and bonds. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using heterosketastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors using the
Newey and West (1994) automatic lag selection procedure.
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Bank Constraint State Portfolio Months Mean Std. Error T-test p-value
Panel A: Collateral Ratio Sorted
Unconstrained Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.35 0.02
High Collateral Ratio 45 1.17 0.05
High−Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.82 0.05
Constrained Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.29 0.01
High Collateral Ratio 45 1.24 0.04
High−Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.95 0.03
High−Low Collateral Ratio: Constrained vs. Unconstrained 45 0.14 0.06 2.36 0.02
Panel B: Collateral Ratio Double-Sorted with Liquidity
Unconstrained Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.95 0.04
High Collateral Ratio 45 1.21 0.05
High−Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.27 0.03
Constrained Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.78 0.04
High Collateral Ratio 45 1.18 0.03
High−Low Collateral Ratio 45 0.40 0.03
High−Low Collateral Ratio: Constrained vs. Unconstrained 45 0.13 0.04 3.67 0.00
Table 1.9: Collateral Ratio-Sorted Portfolio Yields by Bank Leverage Constraint State. Table presents the value-weighted yield-to-
maturity less the 1-month Tbill for high- and low-CR portfolios across bank leverage constraints. Bank leverage constraint is calculated by the median
ArbConstraint. T-test and p-value correspond to two-sided tests: H0 : (yHigh-CR − yLow-CR)Constrained − (yHigh-CR − yLow-CR)Unconstrained = 0 vs. Ha :
(yHigh-CR − yLow-CR)Constrained − (yHigh-CR − yLow-CR)Unconstrained 6= 0.
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High Collateral Ratio Low Collateral Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diff-in-Diff
I(Post) 118.21∗∗∗ 37.80∗∗ 55.33∗∗∗ 73.24∗∗∗
(6.67) (3.30) (3.36) (6.02)
I(Treated) 25.10∗ 21.28∗ 2.91 2.96
(2.38) (2.05) (0.40) (0.45)
I(Post)×I(Treated) −59.12∗∗ −56.89∗ −1.15 −2.87
(−2.68) (−2.50) (−0.07) (−0.20)
Bond Characteristics
Duration 2.72∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗
(5.81) (6.62) (5.92) (7.13)
Liquidity −25.99∗∗∗ −12.94∗ −11.98∗∗ −3.23
(−4.36) (−2.34) (−3.08) (−0.72)
On-the-run −20.08 19.80 11.29∗ −2.99
(−0.58) (0.48) (2.34) (−0.59)
Maturity Remaining −0.67∗ −0.63∗∗ −0.59 −0.62∗
(−2.44) (−2.64) (−1.73) (−2.05)
Observations 1,049 1,049 1,142 1,142
R2 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50
Month Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.10: Collateral Returns around July 2011 Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis Event. ri,t =
α + γ1I(Post) + γ2I(Treated) + γ3I(Post) × I(Treated) + β′Xt + εt where t is month and i is a Treasury
CUSIP and Xt is a vector of controls. Regression is weighted by the CUSIP market-value. ri,t is in basis
points. I define I(Post) = 1 if the date is after July 11, 2011 and 0 otherwise. I defined the CUSIP as
treated, I(Treated) = 1, if the specific Treasury CUSIP is intensively used by collateral by European banks.
Specifically, I look at all Treasury bonds used as collateral one quarter before the July event—in April
2011—and sort bonds into two halves based on the share of that CUSIP used as collateral by European banks
compared to that CUSIP’s total use as collateral. I set I(Treated) = 1 for bonds above the median European
share in April 2011. I examine the five months before and after the July 11 event. I limit the test to CUSIPs
used as collateral in April 2011. Standard errors clustered by CUSIP. T-statistics using robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
57
Prices of Risk: E[Rei ] = α+ βArbFacλArbFac
Test Portfolios All Collateral Sorts Benchmark USTs
Bank-Constraint State Low High Low High Low High
Intercept (× 100) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.001
t-GMM (0.01) 0.493 (0.13) (0.48) (0.27) (−0.17)
t-FM (0.01) (0.59) (0.16) (0.56) (0.39) (−0.17)
ArbFac (× 100) 6.581 −5.528 6.461 −5.320 10.027 −0.539
t-GMM (1.98) (−0.68) (1.96) (−0.68) (1.49) (−0.11)
t-FM (2.44) (−0.76) (2.39) (−0.76) (2.24) (−0.11)
Diagnostics
Days (T ) 624 723 624 723 933 936
Portfolios (N) 70 66 63 59 7 7
GRS p-value 0.83 0.97 0.71 0.96 0.39 0.95
Annualized Risk Premium (σβ × λArbFac) 5.25 −1.65 4.73 −1.49 6.02 −0.32
Table 1.11: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Result when πi = 1. Table presents cross-sectional price of risk estimates when πi = 1 for all safe
assets. High and low bank-constraint states determined by the median of ArbConstraint. All column includes all the portfolios; collateral sort and
Benchmark U.S. Treasury (USTs) columns include only those portfolios in the test. Test run on daily data and portfolios must have at least 3 years of
daily data. Annualized risk premium row is the increase in expected return associated with a 1 standard deviation increase in βArbFac.
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Prices of Risk: E[Rei ] = α+ βArbFacλArbFac
Test Portfolios All Collateral Sorts Benchmark USTs
Bank-Constraint State Low High Low High Low High
Intercept (× 100) 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.006 −0.001
t-GMM (1.60) 0.358 (1.44) (0.33) (1.57) (−0.23)
t-FM (1.89) (0.44) (1.71) (0.40) (2.10) (−0.23)
ArbFac (× 100) 6.233 −5.642 6.127 −5.414 9.227 −0.523
t-GMM (2.02) (−0.67) (2.01) (−0.67) (1.56) (−0.11)
t-FM (2.44) (−0.76) (2.40) (−0.75) (2.24) (−0.11)
Relative Safe Asset Supply
κ− αi (bps) 5.72 7.44 3.73 5.26 3.18 4.90
M Low Constraint/M High Constraint 130% 141% 154%
Diagnostics
Days (T ) 624 723 624 723 933 936
Portfolios (N) 70 66 63 59 7 7
GRS p-value 0.83 0.97 0.71 0.96 0.39 0.95
Annualized Risk Premium (σβ × λArbFac) 4.97 −1.68 4.48 −1.52 5.53 −0.31
Table 1.12: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Result with Varying πi. Table presents cross-sectional price of risk estimates when money-weights
πi vary across safe assets. The M Low Constraint/M High Constraint row uses equation 1.14 to estimate the relative supply of safe assets when banks are in
the low constraint state relative to the high constraint state. High and low bank-constraint states determined by the median of ArbConstraint. All
column includes all the portfolios; collateral sort and U.S. Benchmark Treasury (USTs) columns include only those portfolios in the test. Test run on
daily data and portfolios must have at least 3 years of daily data. Annualized risk premium row is the increase in expected return associated with a 1
standard deviation increase in βArbFac.
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∆(OIS−Tbill)6mt ∆(Box−Tbill)6mt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Bank Leverage Constraints
ArbFact −2.56 −3.47 −3.75∗ −3.70∗ −4.44∗ −3.71∗ −5.15∗ −5.32∗ −5.04∗ −5.67∗
(−1.44) (−1.95) (−2.02) (−2.03) (−1.96) (−2.50) (−2.36) (−2.35) (−2.38) (−2.14)
ArbFact−1 −5.35∗∗ −5.55∗∗ −5.58∗∗ −7.38∗∗ −4.49 −4.69 −4.79 −6.03
(−2.62) (−2.61) (−2.61) (−2.81) (−1.58) (−1.60) (−1.64) (−1.62)
Controls
∆ log(Tbillt) −8.26∗∗∗ −8.29∗∗∗ −7.34∗∗∗ 1.49 1.49 1.75
(−8.19) (−7.64) (−5.49) (1.41) (1.41) (1.27)
I(Quarter-End) −0.08 0.28 0.66 1.29
(−0.20) (0.45) (0.55) (0.92)
I(Month-End) 0.02 −0.16 −1.33 −2.40∗
(0.05) (−0.39) (−1.66) (−2.33)
∆CDSt 46.61 67.96 223.69 223.62
(0.61) (0.88) (0.88) (0.88)
∆VIXt 0.05 0.09 −0.06 −0.07
(0.23) (0.42) (−0.41) (−0.40)
Mktt − Rf,t −0.04 0.02 −0.53 −0.56
(−0.21) (0.10) (−1.35) (−1.28)
∆U.S. Gov’t Liquidity Indext 1.02 0.70
(1.90) (1.42)
Observations 3,536 3,514 3,514 3,514 2,625 3,526 3,514 3,514 3,514 2,625
R2 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Year Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.13: Convenience Yield and Bank Constraints. ∆Convenience Yieldt = α + β1ArbFact + β′2Xt + εt where Xt is a vector of controls.
Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the 6-month
Box−Tbill spread or the 6-month OIS−Tbill spread. Independent variables are ArbFact which measures bank constraints by calculating the returns to
bank-intermediated arbitrages; see the text for additional discussion of its construction. Quarter-end and month-end denotes dummies equal to 1 on
the last day of the month or quarter, and 0 otherwise. ∆Tbillst is the log difference in outstanding Treasury bills with maturity less than 40 days.
∆CDSt is the change in the median CDS spread for the financial sector. VIXt is the CBOE volatility index. Mktt − Rf,t is the Fama–French market
return. The US Government Liquidity index is the Bloomberg U.S. Government Securities Liquidity index, which measures liquidity of Treasury notes
and bonds. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using heterosketastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors using the Newey and West
(1994) automatic lag selection procedure.
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1-Month 3-Month 6-Month ArbConstraintt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Diff-in-Diff
I(Post) −19.95∗∗ −21.43∗∗∗ −16.75∗ −18.40∗∗ −50.77∗ −45.47∗ −7.85∗∗∗ −7.40∗∗∗
(−3.23) (−3.51) (−2.55) (−2.91) (−2.21) (−2.03) (−4.03) (−3.76)
I(Constraining Test) −26.25∗∗ −32.77∗∗ 0.85 −4.92 162.03∗∗∗ 173.93∗∗∗ −3.06 −1.57
(−2.81) (−3.25) (0.11) (−0.54) (4.05) (4.97) (−1.25) (−0.63)
I(Post)×I(Constraining Test) 42.10∗∗∗ 46.89∗∗∗ 40.03∗∗∗ 44.16∗∗∗ 66.73∗ 58.88∗ 7.83∗∗∗ 6.78∗∗
(5.38) (5.83) (5.09) (5.55) (2.44) (2.37) (3.47) (2.77)
Controls
log(T-Billst) −9.01 −12.30 50.48∗ 3.56
(−1.28) (−1.80) (2.38) (1.87)
CDSt 1.18 0.24 4.23 0.01
(1.16) (0.21) (1.04) (0.04)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R2 0.53 0.53 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.52 0.53
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.14: Convenience Yield and Bank Constraints Around Stress Test Results Announcements. I estimate the effect of a constraining
stress test on the convenience yield using Convenience Yieldt = α+ β1I(Post) + β2I(Constraining Test) + β3I(Post)× I(Constraining Test) + β′4Xt + εt
where the sample are the ten days before and after the CCAR stress test result announcement from 2012 to 2019, and Xt is a vector of controls,
including the log-level of Treasury Bills outstanding, the average financial CDS spread, and year fixed-effects. Test is classified as constraining if at
least one G-SIB did not pass unconditionally. The convenience yield measure is the OIS−Tbill spread at the 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month maturity.
The dummy I(Post) is equal to 1 beginning the day after the results are released. The convenience yield, log-level of Tbills, and the average CDS
spread are indexed to 100 on the day before the results are announced to make the coefficients easier to interpret. T-statistics using robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Bank Leverage Constraint Measurement
I present additional calculation assumptions and details used in Ross and Ross (2020) to calculate bank
leverage constraints, ArbConstraint. Trades constructed with a negative basis alignment. See Boyarchenko
et al. (2020) for additional details.
Covered Interest Parity The trade longs the foreign sovereign rate, financed via repo at the overnight
repo rate, with the haircut financed unsecured at 1-year OIS, shorts the forward exchange swap and finances
the initial margin at 1-year OIS, and sells the Treasury. We assume the repo haircut is 2.8% and the initial
future margin we take from Markit, which varies from 0.8% to 2.1%.
Cash Treasury vs. Futures The trade is long the duration-adjusted Treasury future, financed via
unsecured 1-year OIS for the futures margin. The trade shorts the cheapest-to-deliver Treasury identified by
Bloomberg, financed via repo at the overnight repo rate, with the haircut financed at unsecured 1-year OIS.
We assume the haircut is 2.8%, the initial future margin comes from the CME and varies between 0.1% and
6.5%, and the delivery date is the last day for the futures contract.
Off-the-run vs. On-the-run The trade is long the off-the-run Treasury financed at the overnight repo
rate with the haircut financed at unsecured 1-year OIS and short the on-the-run Treasury using reverse repo
to deliver the Treasury to meet the short. The haircut we assume is 2.8%, and the special repo rate is GCF
−19.7 basis points based on work from D’Amico and Pancost (2018).
Single-name Credit If the CDS-bond basis is negative—corporate bonds are cheap relative to CDS—the
trade buys the corporate bond financed via repo at the overnight repo rate, with haircuts financed unsecured
at the 1-year OIS rate and simultaneously buys CDS for the same corporate with the margin financed
unsecured at 1-year OIS. We assume the corporate bond haircut is 5% for investment-grade and 8% for
high-yield bonds, and the initial CDS margin varies around 1.8%.
CDX vs. Single-name CDS If the CDX-single name basis is negative—the CDX is cheap relative to the
replicating portfolio of CDS—the trade buys the CDX with the margin financed at 1-year OIS and sells the
CDS for the replicating basket, financing the margin unsecured at 1-year OIS. We assume the CDX margin is
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Figure 1.14: Convenience Yield Around Announcement of Stress Test Results. I estimate the effect of a constraining stress test on the
convenience yield using Convenience Yieldt = α+β1I(Day Index) +β2I(Constraining Test) +β3I(Day Index)× I(Constraining Test) +β4Xt+ εt where
the sample are the ten days before and after the CCAR stress test result announcement from 2012 to 2019, and Xt is a vector of controls, including the
log-level of Treasury Bills outstanding, the average financial CDS spread, and year fixed-effects. Test is classified as constraining if at least one G-SIB
did not pass unconditionally. The convenience yield measure is the OIS−Tbill spread at the 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month maturity. To make the
coefficients easier to interpret, the convenience yield, the log-level of Tbills, and the average CDS spread are indexed to 100 on the day before the





The US financial system produces money in the form of “safe assets.” Money provides a store of value and a
transaction medium: essential ingredients of a well-functioning financial system. What qualifies as money is a
question of what is safe, but which assets are safe change over time. This paper measures how issuers’ safe
asset production abilities change over time by examining the link between candidate safe asset issuance and
the price of safe assets as measured by the convenience yield.
A safe asset is an asset that is information-insensitive, thereby facilitating the security’s use as a store of
value and a medium for transactions. Safe assets require government guarantees (e.g., Treasurys or agency
debt) or collateral (e.g., mortgage-backed securities). Information-insensitive assets are the most efficient
transaction media because they give agents the lowest incentive to acquire private information. Uninformed
agents can comfortably trade information-insensitive assets without concern for adverse selection.
I classify safe asset issuers along two dimensions: first, what happens to the price of safe assets after
a candidate safe asset issuer produces more debt? The subsequent price of safe assets should fall after a
safe asset issuer creates more safe assets. Second, does the safe asset issuer opportunistically time their
issuance when the price of safe assets is high? I find that the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system is a
newly crucial component in safe asset production: the price of safe assets falls after FHLBs’ issuance, and
the FHLBs opportunistically time their issuance when the price of safe assets is high. Post-crisis, no other
potential safe asset issuer displays both characteristics.
We need to know what is safe and how it changes because it is painful when safe assets become unsafe. The
recent financial crisis is a prime example. When investors began questioning the collateral underlying their
safe assets—repurchase agreements (repo) collateralized by asset-backed securities (ABS), for example—the
safe asset production machine broke down; markets and institutions which depended on safe assets followed
64
shortly after that. Just as economists diligently monitor the size of the economy and construct the national
accounts, they should also monitor the production of safe assets.
The most obvious safe assets are US Treasurys and debt from similarly positioned sovereigns. Bernanke
et al. (2011) and Pozsar (2011) show global appetite for safe assets grew in lockstep with cash pools like
pensions, endowments, corporations, and sovereign wealth funds. Safe asset demand also increased because
safe assets are valuable collateral, particularly for repo, a widely used form of collateralized financing.
Sometimes there are not enough safe assets, and sometimes safe assets become unsafe: Greek sovereign debt
and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) both lost their safe asset status at points in the past decade.
When there are not enough Treasurys, cash pools push into agency debt from government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLB system. Unlike the US Treasury, the
agencies have profit motives but retain an implicit guarantee from the US taxpayer. In 2008, the implicit
guarantee for Fannie and Freddie became explicit after the government placed them into conservatorship.
This paper adds to the safe asset literature in three ways: first, I propose a pair of tests to identify who
issues safe assets and which safe asset issuers opportunistically time issuance when the price of safe assets is
high. Second, I propose a new proxy of the demand for safe assets using the magnitude of Treasury auction
tails. I combine the auction tails measure with existing measures of the convenience yield—the OIS-Tbill and
GCF-Tbill spreads—to proxy the price of safe assets. I perform the empirical tests using these measures of
the convenience yield.
Third, I document the changing role that agency issuers occupy in the production of safe assets. My
discussion focuses on the effect of the changes in the regulatory landscape—the conservatorship of the GSEs
in 2008, Basel III, and the 2016 money-market mutual fund reforms—and how the changes created a boom
in FHLB short-term debt and the relative decline of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as important safe asset
issuers.
I find the convenience yield responds to FHLB issuance on a day-to-day basis. Since the money-market
reforms announced in 2014 and implemented in 2016, FHLB short-maturity issuance drives the convenience
yield down; pre-crisis, FHLB issuance had no such effect. Explicitly, a one standard deviation increase in
FHLB issuance of $4.7 billion reduces the following day’s convenience yield between 0.3 and 0.4 basis points
after the money-market fund reforms. The effect is a significant reduction given the seasonally adjusted
convenience yield measures average roughly 2.5 basis points.
I also find that the FHLBs—and many other private safe asset issuers—issue debt opportunistically to
time fluctuations in the convenience yield and thereby earn the convenience yield. A one standard deviation
increase in the seasonally adjusted convenience yield of 14 basis points leads to an increase in FHLB issuance
of about $275 million with 4-week to 26-week maturity. Other candidate safe asset issuers behave similarly:
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ABCP ($200 million) and Freddie Mac ($130 to $160 million) and non-financial CP ($170 million) also display
timing behavior.
This paper builds on two threads of the incipient safe asset literature: the first strand studies how the
supply of safe assets changes over time. Gorton et al. (2012) document the changing composition of safe
assets since the 1970s, shifting from traditional safe assets (bank deposits) to private safe assets (ABS and
repo).
The paper also builds on a series of papers that study the incentives for private safe asset producers
to satisfy growing safe asset demand. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) show a scarcity of safe
assets relative to GDP—measured by US Treasurys (USTs) outstanding—push the spread between USTs
and highly rated corporate bonds higher as investors place a premium on the safety and liquidity uniquely
provided by USTs. Gorton (2010), Stein (2012), Sunderam (2015) and Xie (2012) discuss the incentives of
private safe asset producers to create short-term money-like liabilities when the demand for money is high,
which they empirically confirm in ABCP and ABS markets.
Literature Review There is a well-developed literature on the role of safe assets in an economy. Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990) explain that banks exist to create safe debt for use as an information-insensitive medium
of exchange. Dang et al. (2015) show that information-insensitive assets are the most efficient transaction
media because they give agents the lowest incentive to acquire private information. Therefore, uninformed
agents can comfortably trade information-insensitive assets without concern for adverse selection—concern
the counterparty has produced private information on the asset. Dang et al. (2017b) show banks are optimally
opaque to keep their debt trading at par, and thereby keep their debt useful for conducting transactions.
Pozsar (2011) and Bernanke et al. (2011) empirically document the increased demand for safe assets. As
the demand for safe assets increased over time, the private sector stepped into the gap to produce private
safe assets to help meet the growing demand. Private safe assets can include repo, commercial paper, and
some forms of securitized debt. Gorton et al. (2012) find a constant safe asset share relative to the size of the
economy over time. However, the composition of safe assets has shifted largely toward privately produced
safe assets, reflecting the gradual transition from traditional banking to shadow banking.
Safe assets earn the “convenience yield.” As the supply and demand for safe assets fluctuate, the relative
price of safe assets varies as well. The price of safe assets is related to the convenience yield, which is the
non-pecuniary return to securities that are useful in providing liquidity or safety. Issuers of safe assets can
earn the convenience yield: Gourinchas and Rey (2005) show that the annualized difference between the
return on assets and the return paid on liabilities for the US in aggregate—an exporter of safe assets—exceeds
2%. The US engages in a massive carry trade; the US finances higher-yielding assets by issuing safe debt,
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and since the debt is information-insensitive, it earns the convenience yield. Nadauld and Weisbach (2012)
show a similar phenomenon at the corporate issuer level: loans that can be securitized cost 17 basis points
less to the borrower because highly rated securitizations are private safe assets and earn the convenience
yield. Xie (2012) shows that private securitizations are sold into the market when the convenience yield is
high, on a day-to-day basis.
Krishnamurthy et al. (2016) show Treasurys are safe because a large amount of Treasury debt outstanding
relative to the alternatives leaves investors “nowhere else to go.” Krishnamurthy et al. (2019) present a model
of safe asset determination: fundamentals of a sovereign issuer and the size of outstanding debt determine
which bonds are safe, but the equilibrium depends on whether the demand for safe assets is high or low.
Safe assets play an important role in financial crises and bank runs, as described in Gorton (2017).
Historical safe assets include free banknotes backed by state bonds, chartered banknotes backed by loan
portfolios, national banknotes backed by Treasurys, and national bank demand deposits backed by bank
assets and the creditworthiness of a specific person. Modern private safe assets can include commercial paper,
ABS, repos, and money-market funds. Modern safe assets also include agency debt, the focus of this paper.
Money and short-term debt are socially useful creations: everyday life depends on the routine use of
almost riskless claims. Bank money and short-term claims are vulnerable to runs precisely because these
claims are useful despite being almost riskless. As the supply of genuinely safe assets (Treasurys) diminishes
relative to the size of the economy, financial vulnerabilities can build when private safe assets turn out riskier
than expected in bad times. Stein (2012) and Carlson et al. (2016) examine the monetary policy and financial
stability implications of safe asset supply and demand.
Several papers measure the empirical shortage of safe debt by examining trends in the price of safe assets
as measured via the convenience yield. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) show a scarcity of USTs
relative to GDP pushes spreads between USTs and highly rated corporate bonds higher as investors place a
premium on the safety and liquidity uniquely provided by USTs. Gorton et al. (2015) show that more repo
fails occur when the convenience yield is high. Gorton and Laarits (2018) show the contraction of post-crisis
safe asset supply using the GCF-Tbill convenience yield measure. Jiang et al. (2018) show the Treasury basis
measures the foreign convenience yield because dollar exchange rates embed foreign investors’ expectation of
the convenience yield.
Researchers have recently focused on the FHLBs. The first papers to discuss the FHLBs in their current
context are Flannery and Frame (2006) and Ashcraft et al. (2010). The latter showed the FHLBs acted
as a lender of “next-to-last-resort” during the financial crisis. They show FHLBs’ members often preferred
to borrow from the FHLBs rather than via the Federal Reserve’s stigmatized discount window. Anadu
and Baklanova (2017), Gissler and Narajabad (2017a), Gissler and Narajabad (2017b), and Gissler and
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Narajabad (2017c) show the effect of the money-market mutual fund reforms on flows to FHLBs and the
FHLBs’ increased reliance on the short-term financing provided by money-market funds.
Gissler and Narajabad (2018) also document the expansion of FHLB short-term debt and show banks
use FHLB borrowing as a substitute for deposit funding. Sundaresan and Xiao (2020) provide evidence
that liquidity reforms decreased banks’ production of short-term safe assets but increased their reliance
on borrowing the FHLBs, as the FHLBs are not subject to liquidity regulations. Tarullo (2019) mentions
the effect of money-market fund reforms on FHLBs, noting it as a concerning point for policymakers. The
FHLB literature constitutes a collective handwringing: that there should be some consternation about where
maturity transformation has moved after the crisis, and that the FHLB channel still ultimately depends on
implicit government support.
This paper contributes to the literature by estimating the relationships between agency issuance and
the price of safe assets to pin down which issuers help determine the price of safe assets, which issuers
opportunistically issue in response to a high price of safe assets, and how these two phenomena have changed
from pre-crisis to post-crisis.
2.2 Institutional Context
2.2.1 Agency Debt
Agency debt stands between USTs and privately produced safe assets on the pecking order of safe assets.
Several federal agencies issue debt: the most critical agency issuers include the Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLBs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac). Other agencies also issue securities, including the Federal
Farm Credit Bank System (FFCB), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). While the government guarantees Treasury debt with full
faith and credit, most federal agencies’ securities are not guaranteed. GNMA mortgage-backed securities
carry an explicit guarantee backed by the full faith and credit of the US government; other agencies’ debt
only carries the implicit backing of the government. Total agency debt outstanding was approximately $1.9
trillion in Q3 2018.
Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLBs issue debt with a maturity of fewer than 12 months, and some issue
overnight debt as well. Table 2.1 shows the outstanding amount of short-term debt from various agency
issuers compared to Treasury bills. Pre-crisis, both Freddie and Fannie became relatively large issuers of
short-term debt, together peaking at approximately $430 billion compared to a total of $1 trillion of Treasury
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bills outstanding.1 Post-crisis, Fannie and Freddie debt outstanding fell to less than $100 billion, whereas the
FHLB system surged past pre-crisis levels with outstanding of about $400 billion in 2019.
2.2.2 The Federal Home Loan Bank System
The Federal Home Loan Banks are a set of closely related but independent banks with the goal of financing
housing-related assets to its members, which include banks, credit unions, thrifts, and some insurance
companies. Flannery and Frame (2006) and Gissler and Narajabad (2017a, 2017b, 2017c) provide a detailed
discussion of the FHLB system’s history and operations.
There are eleven FHLB banks across the country: there were twelve until recently, but the FHLB Seattle
merged with FHLB Des Moines in 2015 after residual losses from the financial crisis. The FHLBs’ member
institutions own each FHLB, and the member institutions must reside within that FHLB’s district. Large
bank holding companies with operating subsidiaries spanning multiple FHLB districts, however, may belong
to many FHLBs.2 Owners of the FHLBs—the members—retain ownership in the FHLB in the form of
six-month or five-year redeemable equity states. Voting rights are not proportional to equity capital: each
shareholder has a single vote.3
A system-wide balance sheet is presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 which show the balance sheet in 2007
and 2018, respectively. At the peak in 2007, the entire system held about $1.3 trillion in assets, and in
2018 held approximately $1.1 trillion. Simple leverage in 2018 was 19, with a simple capital ratio (with no
risk-weighting) of 5.2%.
This paper focuses on the liability side of the FHLBs. Investors consider FHLB debt safe for three reasons:
first, the FHLBs overcollateralize loans to members; second, the “statutory super-senior lien” places FHLBs
above all other creditors including the FDIC and Federal Reserve Banks; and third, FHLB debt carries an
implicit government guarantee.4
FHLB debt carries an implicit government guarantee in part due to the FHLBs’ unique legislatively-granted
1The dramatic increase in outstanding debt for Fannie, Freddie, the FHLBs and the Treasury in 2008 and 2009 is an artifact
of actions during the financial crisis.
2For example, Bank of America Rhode Island is a member at FHLB Boston, Bank of America California belongs to FHLB
San Francisco, and Bank of America Oregon belongs to the FHLB Des Moines (which, in 2015, acquired FHLB Seattle and
renamed it the FHLB Des Moines Western Office).
3Table 2.24 shows the number of FHLB members by institution type. The majority are depository institutions, of which
commercial banks and credit unions are the largest groups. Insurance companies represented about 8% of total members in 2018.
Figure 2.12 provides the share of commercial bank assets by district. The FHLBs of New York, Cincinnati, Des Moines, and
Atlanta are the largest. The large fluctuations in Figure 2.12 are due to the shifting membership of the largest members. For
example, the change in 2011 is Citibank N.A. moving from FHLB San Francisco bank to FHLB New York; the dip in 2012 is JP
Morgan Chase Bank N.A. moving from the FHLB New York to FHLB Cincinnati.
4Although the super-lien applies to the collateral pledged to the Federal Reserve Banks by FHLB members, the Federal
Reserve and FHLBs traditionally agree to preserve the Federal Reserve Banks’ seniority position. (Gissler and Narajabad,
2017a).
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properties: FHLBs are exempt from federal, local and state taxes;5 the Federal Reserve acts as the fiscal
agent for the FHLBs; the FHLBs are considered a “federal instrumentality” and are therefore exempt from
the bankruptcy code; the Treasury is allowed to purchase up to $4 billion of FHLB securities; and, regulators
allow government money-market funds to purchase FHLB debt.
The FHLB Office of Finance’s credit rating webpage includes a discussion of “Strong US Government
Support,” noting that FHLB debt issuance is subject to US Treasury approval, and that FHLB debt is eligible
as collateral for public deposits and investment by national banks and thrifts. Moody’s rating of FHLB debt
states “any rating actions on the US Government would likely result in all individual FHLBanks’ long-term
deposit ratings and the FHLBank System’s long-term bond rating moving in step with any US sovereign
rating action.” Standard & Poor’s rating notes the FHLBs are a “government-related entity with an almost
certain likelihood of extraordinary government support.” Combined, these unique characteristics of the FHLB
system reinforce its implicit government guarantee.
FHLB liabilities—the focus of this paper—are debt issued by the FHLB system at a variety of maturities,
from overnight to 30 years. Debt with a maturity fewer than one year are discount notes (“discos”), whereas
debt with a maturity greater than one year are bonds. FHLBs issue debt via a consolidated obligation (CO)
joint with all other FHLBs: if a single FHLB cannot pay its CO debt, then the lender has recourse to other
FHLB branches. All CO debt is issued centrally by the FHLB Office of Finance, and lenders do not know to
which FHLB bank they are specifically lending. For this reason, all FHLBs pay the same rate on their CO
debt. In 2018, roughly 40%, $400 billion, of the aggregate FHLB system’s liabilities were discount notes with
maturities fewer than one year, whereas 60%, about $600 billion, were consolidated obligation bonds.
The FHLBs issue discount notes two ways: via the window and a regularly scheduled auction. Between
2009 and January 2020, auctioned discount note debt accounted for 58% of total discount note issuance. In
crisis times, window issuance of discount notes increases while auctioned issuance falls. Because the FHLBs
only provide daily data on auctioned issuance—and only monthly for window issuance—my analysis focuses
on auctioned discount notes. Using only auctioned debt means that my estimated relationships are lower
bounds and that the true relationship is likely larger in absolute terms. For example, my result that FHLB
auctioned debt issuance times the convenience yield is likely even stronger if I included window debt issuance,
because in times of stress on the financial system—times when timing the convenience yield is easier and
more profitable—window debt issuance increases as a share of total debt issuance.
Figure 2.1 shows the progression of outstanding FHLB auctioned debt. Maturities fewer than six months,
but excluding overnight, grew from approximately $50 billion the early 2000s, dramatically spiking to $250
5Despite the special tax treatment, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 imposed
system-wide assessments of approximately 25%.
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billion as the FHLB system ramped up its efforts to act as lender of “next-to-last” resort, then collapsed as
discount note issuance shifted to window issuance and later due to Fannie and Freddie related GSE fatigue.
FHLB debt surged post-crisis, moving to a peak of almost $300 billion, although falling from that high
through 2018.
There are two types of FHLB assets: advances and investments. Advances are loans to its member
institutions, representing 70% of FHLB assets. The FHLBs offer these loans at various rates and structures,
and each bank sets the rates and haircuts of its advances. The advances are subject to the statutory
super-lien. FHLB investments represent 30% of assets, and focus primarily on housing-related assets (agency
and private-label mortgage-backed securities) but include other categories including repo, Federal Funds
sold,6 and commercial paper.7
The FHLBs perform regular bank services, although their customers are different from a traditional bank.
They borrow at short maturities from creditors—including money-market funds, which will be discussed later
in the paper—and they lend the proceeds to members in the form of longer-term advances and also invest
in other investment securities. The maturity distribution of advances is important: as of 2018, about 50%
of advances have maturities fewer than 1 year, 40% 1 to 5 years, and the remainder greater than 5 years.
FHLBs are in the traditional bank business of maturity transformation.
2.2.3 FHLBs’ Systemic Importance
Can an FHLB fail? It is not unimaginable. Gissler and Narajabad (2017c) discuss the question extensively.
There are three candidate mechanisms: losses in the advances book, losses in the investment portfolio, or
failure to roll over financing. It is unlikely that losses in the advances book pose material risk given the
haircuts and super-senior lien FHLBs’ hold on collateral. Losses in the investment portfolio represent a
potential worry spot, but investments are generally a small share of assets. The FHLBs’ underlying business
of borrowing short and lending via advances involves significant maturity transformation, and FHLBs may
have trouble funding their assets if they lost the ability to issue debt regularly and cheaply. Indeed, in
2008 the FHLBs’ creditors pulled back from FHLB debt as they were “guilty by association” with other
government agencies—Fannie and Freddie.
The unlikely failure of an FHLB would be particularly concerning since many FHLBs advances go to
members without access to the discount window, so members without access to wholesale funding markets
6Post-crisis, the FHLB system is a significant player in the Federal Funds market. FHLBs do not earn interest on their
reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve because they are a GSE; they instead lend in the Federal Funds market to (mostly)
foreign banks who can earn interest on excess reserves (IOER) from the Federal Reserve. The foreign banks effectively arbitrage
the spread between IOER and the Fed funds rate, which has averaged about ten basis points since the crisis ended.
7Tables 2.25 and 2.26 and Figure 2.13 provide information on the types of collateral the FHLBs accept in their advances, the
haircuts for the collateral, and the concentration of advances to the largest members.
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would struggle. Ashcraft et al. (2010) describe the FHLB system’s role as a lender of “next-to-last” resort, as
many banks and thrifts relied on advances from the FHLB system rather than going to the Federal Reserve’s
traditional lender-of-last-resort facility: the stigmatized discount window.
Additionally, the members own the FHLBs, and so write-downs of FHLB equity would translate to losses
at banks—an important difference between the FHLBs compared to Fannie and Freddie, which were public
companies. In September 2008, Citi, JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo held $12.4 billion of
FHLB equity, and reporting at the time suggested banks considered writing down the value of the equity.
(Buhl, 2009). For comparison, the same four banks received $100 billion in public capital injections in the
Capital Purchase Program of October 2008. The four largest shareholders in 2019 include JP Morgan, Wells
Fargo, PNC, and Metlife (an insurance company). Combined, the top ten shareholders in Q3 2019 hold $8.8
billion of FHLB equity.
One episode is worth mentioning: capital levels at both FHLB Seattle and FHLB Chicago fell from
roughly 5% pre-crisis to less than 1% in 2008 as their investment portfolios, composed in part of private-label
MBS, sustained losses. FHLBs have two choices to shore up capital levels: they can retain earnings or they
can raise capital if more members join their branch. The main mechanism to increase capital levels is via
retained earnings since the latter choice is largely out of the FHLBs’ control. The FHLB Chicago retained
earnings and recovered from its portfolio losses. FHLB Seattle, however, struggled to retain earnings as
Washington Mutual simultaneously withdrew both its capital and its business from the bank. After six years
of struggling to raise capital, FHLB Seattle merged with FHLB Des Moines. Gissler and Narajabad (2017c)
provides additional discussion of this episode.
2.2.4 Post-Crisis Reforms
Two post-crisis reforms in financial regulations have changed the relative position of the FHLB system in
money-markets and have elevated FHLB debt as a new critical safe asset producer. The two recent changes in
the money-market structure are Basel III and the money-market mutual fund reforms. I now briefly describe
the critical components of these reforms as they related to the FHLBs.
Money-Market Mutual Fund Reforms In the aftermath of the Reserve Primary Fund breaking the
buck in September 2008 and the Treasury’s subsequent money-market fund guarantee, financial regulators
sought to limit the systemic risk of money-market mutual funds (MMFs). The SEC implemented reforms in
late 2016 which required funds to report floating net asset values (NAV) unless the fund imposed gates and fees
or invested only in government securities. The gate structure allows the fund to temporarily prevent investors’
redemptions to cash in times of stress and would (in principle) limit a run from the money fund. Liquidity
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fees work toward a similar goal by charging a withdrawal fee to slow a run and prevent the money-market
fund from fire-selling assets to satisfy panicky redemptions. Retail and government funds can keep $1 NAVs,
but institutional funds must have floating NAVs unless they invest in government securities or impose gates
and fees.
As discussed in Anadu and Baklanova (2017), the effect of the reform has been a marked shift from prime
funds, which invest primarily in commercial paper, toward government funds, since government funds have a
fixed $1 NAV but no gates or fees. MMF investors clearly prefer the fixed $1 NAV and the option to run in
bad times over the comparatively higher yield offered by prime funds.
FHLB debt is eligible for purchase from government funds, along with Treasurys and other agency
securities. Pre-reform, prime funds had $1.7 trillion in assets compared to government funds’ assets of
less than $1 trillion, as shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.3 shows the magnitude of the shift caused by the
money-market fund reforms, with almost $1.5 trillion—nearly 90% of prime funds’ pre-reform assets—moving
from prime funds to government funds. As government funds have absorbed this massive inflow, they
expanded purchases of government securities, particularly of FHLB debt.
Gissler and Narajabad (2017b) show that the weighted average rate on FHLB debt is ten basis points
lower than that of prime money funds after the money fund reforms. Thus, some banks prefer intermediation
via FHLB advances rather than commercial paper issuance to money-market funds. Indeed, Figure 2.4,
compiled by Gissler and Narajabad (2017b), shows that the share of MMF assets in FHLB debt has increased
from 10% to nearly 40% from 2012 to 2017 and that MMFs hold more than half of FHLB debt.
Basel III Basel III’s Liquid Coverage Ratio (LQR) requires that banks hold 30 days equivalent of net cash
outflows in high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs), among many other changes. HQLAs must offset any liability
with maturity shorter than 30 days. A bank faces the choice of increasing the number of HQLAs they have to
cover 30 days of outflows or otherwise push their liabilities’ tenor beyond 30 days. The overall effect increases
the cost for banks to borrow short. For this reason, banks are less motivated to expand their balance sheet by
producing commercial paper and performing matched book repo, which are vital sources of marginal private
safe assets.
Gissler and Narajabad (2017b) describe a second, related, effect of Basel III: “collateral upgrading.” Large
commercial banks increasingly rely on FHLB advances instead of commercial paper because FHLBs provide
cheaper financing via collateral upgrading. A simple example: the bank posts a less-liquid asset, like a whole
mortgage loan, as collateral for an FHLB advance. The bank then uses the cash proceeds of the FHLB
advance to purchase HQLAs. So long as the advance has a maturity greater than 30 days, the bank has
increased its LQR.
73
2.2.5 Changing Sources of Safe Assets
A useful way to show the changing sources of safe assets in the post-crisis world is to enumerate the most
important paths for cash to flow from cash pools to the ultimate cash user, either on deposit at the Federal
Reserve or as use in leverage provision for speculators. I summarize the paths in Figure 2.5 via a series of
asset/liability T-charts; the figure is the most critical figure in the paper, which shows how FHLBs, MMFs,
broker-dealers (BDs), and banks intermediate cash flows.
Pozsar (2017) classifies cash pools into two types: “passive” and “active.” Active cash pools take serious
two mandates “do not lose” and “make money;” the active pools include actively managed corporate treasuries
or hedge funds. Passive pools—pensions, many corporate treasuries—focus on the “do not lose” mandate and
use convenient financial products for cash management.
It is helpful to walk through each path listed in Figure 2.5 with a brief description:
1. PRE-CRISIS PATH 1: Passive cash pools use prime money-market funds, and the money-market fund
uses the cash proceeds to purchase bank certificates of deposit or commercial paper of various flavors.
Banks hence use the MMFs as a source of funding.
2. PRE-CRISIS PATH 2: Passive cash pools use prime money-market funds, which in turn conducts
tri-party repo with their broker-dealer; the broker-dealer uses the repo as the liability side of its matched
booked repo book and passes the funding on to its levered clients, like hedge funds, which in turn use
the cash proceeds to speculate.
3. PRE-CRISIS PATH 3: Active cash pools speculate across Tbills, bilateral repo, and FX swaps; the last
two of which end up as a liability to a broker-dealer which then intermediates the flows on toward fast
money investors.
The most important parts of this most important figure are the green balance sheet items: these represent
private safe asset production. The basic function of banks is to produce an information-insensitive liability
that is useful as a transaction medium and store of value, just as described in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
The production of information insensitivity assets in this figure takes the form of banks’ commercial paper,
tri-party, and bilateral repo. The passive cash pools are not performing serious information production (i.e.,
credit or market risk analysis) on the collateral or counterparty in these transactions. They may not even
have the ability to do so. Instead, passive cash pools use the products because they are information-insensitive
and thus are simple to use. Describing how these green line-items have relocated in the financial system is
the main focus of this paper.
The post-crisis paths correspond to their pre-crisis equivalents, but now reflect the various changes caused
74
by new financial regulations. There is also a new path, POST-CRISIS PATH 4, which is a result of the
Federal Reserve’s new monetary policy framework.
1. POST-CRISIS PATH 1: Passive cash pools use government money-market funds instead of prime funds
due to the gates and fees requirement of the money-market reforms; the government money-market
fund uses the cash proceeds to purchase, among other things, FHLB debt; FHLBs use this funding to
provide advances to banks, which in turn use the advances as a source of funding. Government MMFs
and FHLBs have replaced prime MMFs; and—just like prime MMFs before the reforms—government
MMFs and FHLBs ultimately fund banks.
2. POST-CRISIS PATH 2: Passive cash pools use government money-market funds, which in turn enter
into tri-party repo with their BDs; the BD uses the repo as the liability side of its matched booked
repo book and passes the funding on to its levered clients, like hedge funds, which in turn use the
cash proceeds to speculate. This path is unchanged from its pre-crisis equivalent, except that it is
more expensive for the BD to expand its balance sheet and so the transaction is less appealing, ceteris
paribus, to the MMF.
3. POST-CRISIS PATH 3: Active cash pools speculate across Tbills, bilateral repo, and FX swaps; the
last two of which end up as a liability to a BD which then intermediates the flows toward fast money
investors. Again, this path is unchanged from its pre-crisis equivalent except that it is more expensive
for the BD to expand its balance sheet.
4. POST-CRISIS PATH 4: Passive cash pools use government money-market funds, which can sidestep
their BD counterparties and directly use the Federal Reserve’s repo facility. This transaction was
not available pre-crisis due to changes in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy implementation. The
transaction is, all else equal, not preferred by money funds because tri-party repo is relationship-based,
and therefore MMFs would prefer to intermediate via their traditional counterparties. (Pozsar, 2017).
The orange and red boxes in post-crisis path two through four show the precise links which are more
expensive–or otherwise disfavored—and therefore limits that path’s relative importance. Contrast the colored
boxes on the bottom of the figure with where private safe assets are produced, shown in green. The reforms
severely diminished tri-party repo, bilateral repo, and commercial paper. Post-crisis, FHLB debt plays a new
and crucially important role in private safe asset production.
Government money funds do not only buy FHLB debt: they buy Treasurys, other agencies’ debt, and
engage in repo backed by government debt. However, FHLB debt has experienced the most substantial
growth in volume. Additionally, the majority of agency debt—namely Fannie and Freddie—do not use their
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debt issuance proceeds to finance banks, or do so only indirectly, as Fannie and Freddie guarantee mortgages
rather than provide advances to banks.
Table 2.4 shows the changing role of the FHLBs compared against Fannie and Freddie by showing
the debt outstanding by tenor by agency. Pre-crisis in 2007, Fannie and Freddie had debt outstanding
of approximately $1.5 trillion compared to FHLB debt of $1 trillion. In 2017, Fannie and Freddie debt
outstanding fell more than 60% to $632 billion, with more significant drops in short-term debt. FHLBs,
however, issue approximately the same amount, having doubled short-term issuance while reducing long-term
debt. Producing safe assets is profitable so long as one can time the convenience yield and use the proceeds
to invest in higher-yielding assets. The overall amount of debt outstanding and the creation of short-term
agency debt point in the direction of the FHLBs ramping up safe asset production.
One way to see the changing position of the FHLBs in the money-market is to examine the window-dressing
pattern in their debt. At month-ends, private safe asset producers (banks, BDs) pay down repo, commercial
paper, and other short-term liabilities to lower their reported leverage ratios. This reduction in the supply
of private safe assets means that cash-pools must search elsewhere for short-term stores of value for their
cash. After the reforms, the FHLBs absorbed a larger share of these month-end flows, which is evident
when comparing the difference between the average non-month-end and month-end rate the FHLBs pay on
overnight discount notes. If there is no search for safety at month-ends flowing to FHLBs, I would expect
this spread to be zero. The spread noticeably jumps as month-end FHLB overnight discount note yields are
pushed down as much as 30 basis points by flows from cash-pools seeking safety beginning in 2016, as shown
in Figure 2.6.
2.3 Data
The Federal Reserve provides commercial paper data. Price data on when-issued securities is from GovPX.
Repo, overnight indexed swap, benchmark Treasury, swap, exchange, and interbank offered rates are from
Bloomberg. Issuance and rate data on FHLB discount notes are from the FHLB Office of Finance. Freddie
discount note and reference bill data is from Freddie Mac. Issuance for agencies longer than one-year maturity
and corporate bond issuance is from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database. Markit provides credit
default swap data. CRSP provides equity and Treasury return data. ABS data is from the Asset-Backed
Alert Database. The Treasury’s website provides Treasury issuance data.
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2.3.1 The Convenience Yield
Correctly measuring the price of safe assets, as reflected by the convenience yield, is key to analyzing the
issuance patterns of safe asset producers. I consider two benchmark definitions of the convenience yield, and
I use both throughout the remaining empirical analysis. To test the validity of these measures I enumerate
expectations for the behavior of the convenience yield based on straightforward comparative statics in the
supply and demand for safe assets, and then check that each behavior is confirmed empirically with the two
proposed measures of the convenience yield.
Measuring the convenience yield is an effort of finding two instruments in which the only difference is their
“money-ness” or “collateral-ability.” For this reason, the short leg should be a Treasury rate, as Treasurys
can both be “spent” as money and are also useful as collateral. The challenge of measuring the convenience
yield is finding another instrument that is highly liquid and nearly risk-free but cannot be spent or used as
collateral like Treasurys. The literature has used three measures of the convenience yield, all based on yield
spreads:
ConYieldOISt ≡ OIS3mt − Tbill3mt (2.1)
ConYieldGCFt ≡ GCF3mt − Tbill3mt (2.2)
ConYieldAAAt ≡ Aaa Long Maturityt −UST Long Maturityt (2.3)
Sunderam (2015) measures the convenience yield using Definition 2.1, which is the spread between similar
maturity Tbills and the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate. The OIS rate is the market-determined fixed rate
at which investors can swap the daily fluctuating effective Federal Funds rate for a single fixed-term rate.
Duffie and Stein (2015) provide details on the mechanics of the swap. The OIS rate reflects the market’s
expectation for the average effective Federal Funds rate over the maturity of the swap, responding both to
fluctuations in the Federal Funds markets from reserve scarcity and also fluctuations due to changes in the
Federal Reserve monetary policy stance. The OIS is somewhat biased due to risk aversion to changes in
interest rates, but this is a small matter for short maturity contracts. Finally, while OIS transactions are
collateralized to limit counterparty risk, the underlying reference rate—the effective Federal Funds rate—is
itself unsecured.
The appeal of Definition 2.1 as a measure of the convenience yield is that only one leg moves around as
the supply of Treasurys fluctuates, and OIS instruments cannot be spent or easily used as collateral for other
transactions or otherwise rehypothecated. Therefore, fluctuations in the relative appeal of Treasurys—after
stripping out the level of interest rates embedded in the OIS rate—drive variations in the spread. The
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main disadvantage to the measure—other than the small risk aversion bias mentioned above—is that the
OIS market is small, standing at about $15 billion notional in dollar terms in 2016. Despite this, I will use
Definition 2.1 as one of the two benchmark measures of the convenience yield.
Definition 2.2 presents the second benchmark measure of convenience yield used in this analysis. The
measure, proposed by Xie (2012), uses the reference rate for general collateral repo, which is the general
collateral financing (GCF) repo rate. General collateral is a broad classification of securities that are eligible
for use as collateral in general collateral repo transactions. I focus on the Treasury GCF in this paper. The
eligible collateral in these GCF repos are Treasurys, and therefore credit risk is negligible; collateralization by
Treasurys, with a haircut, also negates counterparty risk.
GCF is not as useful as money as Tbills. It is more difficult to rehypothecate GCF repo collateral
than collateral owned outright. Since the rate is for general Treasury collateral, the aggregate supply and
demand for Treasurys affect the GCF rate. Both legs of the spread fluctuate as the demand and supply of
Treasurys vary. Nevertheless, the difference in the yield of the GCF repo rate and the Tbill rate largely
reflects differences in moneyness, given the minimal counterparty and credit risk. The measure is an attractive
complement to the OIS measure given the long time-series history and size of the market: the gross value of
GCF repo stood at $700 billion in Q4 2018 and data is available back to 1991. GCF rates are reported as
bids and asks, effectively the rates for repo (borrowing) and reverse repo (lending), and I use the average of
the two rates as the GCF measure.
For completeness, Definition 2.3 gives a third measure of the convenience yield used by Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012). The measure is useful due to its long time-series. There are myriad differences
between long-term US Treasurys and highly rated corporate bonds, only one of which is the degree of
moneyness. Therefore, this paper does not use the spread.
Combined, Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2 measure similar phenomena, albeit in different institutional
contexts. Table 2.5 presents summary statistics for the three spreads. In the post-crisis era, ConYieldGCFt
trades 8 basis points higher than ConYieldOISt . A brief discussion of how GCF and OIS trade relative
to each other is helpful: in general, GCF should trade below OIS because GCF is secured and OIS is a
reference rate for an unsecured rate insofar as effective Fed Funds is unsecured. Flight-to-quality and supply
or demand factors for new issue Treasurys will affect GCF but not OIS, as the OIS rate is a form of the
market’s expectation for interest rates over the life of the swap. If GCF3mt > OIS3mt likely reasons include
the oversupply of Treasury securities or the relative constraint on banks’ balance sheets: for example, the
reference repo rate traded above the Fed Funds rate during the Savings and Loan crisis.
Table 2.6 provides the correlation matrix for the three measures in the post-crisis era. The two benchmark
measures are closely correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.54, and somewhat lower correlations between
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the two benchmark measures and the AAA measure.
The convenience yield has significant seasonality as the demand for safe assets ebbs and flows predictably
throughout the year. For example, window-dressing by banks increases the convenience yield at month-ends
and quarter-ends. I will seasonally adjust the convenience yield in the following way: I run a rolling regression
window over the previous five years (excluding the current day) in which I regress the two measures of
convenience yield on week-of-year, day-of-week, month-end, and quarter-end dummies to estimate the seasonal
component of the convenience yield. I exclude the crisis period from June 2007 to July 2009 in the rolling
estimation as I am only interested in normal seasonal variation in the convenience yield. I then produce the
seasonally adjusted convenience yield by subtracting the seasonal component:
ConYieldSAt = ConYieldNSAt − SeasonalComponentt (2.4)
2.3.2 The Convenience Yield and the Price of Safe Assets
Since the convenience yield reflects the price of safe assets, comparative statics around the supply and demand
for safe assets generate straightforward predictions about the behavior of the convenience yield. I summarize
these predictions in Table 2.7, and I check that both benchmark measures of the convenience yield satisfy
these a priori predictions.
Ceteris paribus, when the supply of safe assets increases, the convenience yield should decrease; when the
supply of safe assets decreases, the convenience yield should increase. The logic produces four predictions for
the convenience yield. I now discuss each in turn.
First, when there are more Treasurys outstanding, the convenience yield should be lower, and when the
Treasury issues more debt, the convenience yield should fall. Table 2.8 presents the results for these two
predictions, using both the OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spread. The regression excludes a period from 2008
to 2011 when the Treasury conducted the Supplemental Financing Program (SFP) because the Treasury
issued bills to drain reserves from the financial system to assist the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy. In
regular times, the Treasury does not explicitly issue debt due to money-market conditions, but the SFP is
the exception. The regressions confirm our comparative statics prediction.
Second, window-dressing at financial institutions reduces the amount of private safe assets in the economy—
in particular, as banks reduce leverage by paying down liabilities like commercial paper and repo—so the
convenience yield should increase. Munyan (2015) shows, for example, that non-U.S. banks with relatively
low capital ratios remove an average of $170 billion, or 10% of the entire market, from the tri-party repo
market before quarter-ends to window-dress. I expect the convenience yield measures to spike at quarter-ends.
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I run the following regressions:
OIS3mt − Tbill3mt = α+ βIQuarter-End + θt + εt (2.5)
GCF3mt − Tbill3mt = α+ βIQuarter-End + θt + εt (2.6)
in which the dummy is equal to one if the date is in the last week of a quarter-end in March, June, September or
December and zero otherwise, and θt are year fixed-effects. I run the regression on both the entire time-series
available and the sample excluding the crisis. The results are reported in Table 2.9. The magnitudes show
the importance of window-dressing: relative to an average spread of 6 basis points (14 basis points) for the
OIS (GCF) measure of the convenience yield, the measure is 1.7 to 2.5 (3.6 to 4.0) basis points higher at
quarter-end. The results confirm the intuition that the two benchmark measures of the convenience yield are
higher at quarter-ends, consistent with my prediction.
Third, banks produce fewer safe assets like commercial paper and repo in periods in which banks are
relatively more constrained—as measured by bank-intermediated arbitrages identified by Boyarchenko et al.
(2018)—and the convenience yield should increase. When banks are not constrained and can lever up or down
as desired, the bank-intermediated arbitrage identities should be zero. When the arbitrage identities are
large in magnitude, banks are constrained and relatively less able to expand their balance sheet to produce
private safe assets. Empirically, I test this by checking the convenience yield measures’ correlations with the
bank-intermediated covered interest parity (CIP) arbitrages.
I calculate the covered interest parity violations (relative to the dollar) of G10 currencies at the one-week,
one-month, and three-month tenor using both OIS discounting and the respective national inter-bank offered
rate (IBOR), as in Du et al. (2018). The calculation results in six buckets of CIP violations: three tenors
times two discounting methods. I use daily data beginning in 1998. I next take the absolute value of each
violation, since the arbitrage identity should be zero and larger deviations from zero indicate frictions in the
bank-arbitrageur channel. I then extract the first four principal components from each of the six buckets
of CIP violations. I choose the first four principal components as the first four explain between 85% and
90% of the variation across each bucket. The goal of this aggregation process is to capture the intuition that
substantial CIP violations, in absolute terms, across many currencies occur when the intermediary sector is
constrained: if the CIP violation is large for a single currency, it may instead capture a specific, idiosyncratic
effect.
I check the pairwise correlations of both convenience yield measures with each of these six aggregated CIP
measures, shown in Table 2.10. The correlations are uniformly positive and significant, with the exception of
OIS with the 1-week and 3-month IBOR-discounted violations, neither of which are significantly negative. The
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aggregation process is not sensitive to small changes: using more or fewer principal components, normalizing
each CIP violation to standardized volatilities, or using subsamples of the time-series does not meaningfully
change the correlations. Broadly, this confirms my intuition that the convenience yield, a proxy for the price
of safe assets, is higher when banks are constrained, as measured by the magnitude of CIP violations.
The final prediction of the comparative statics exercise is to check that the price of safe assets is, on
average, higher in the post-reform time sample than the pre-crisis sample as the combination of regulatory
reforms have made it more expensive for intermediaries to expand their balance sheets. I confirm the
prediction empirically by comparing the average convenience yield, seasonally adjusted or not, before and
after regulators started phasing-in Basel III. My analysis is consistent with the finding of Gorton and Laarits
(2018), aptly titled “Collateral Damage.” I find that the convenience yield measures are uniformly higher
after the phase-in arrangements for Basel III implementation, which ramped up in 2015.8
I now discuss predictions based on the demand curve for safe assets. Ceteris paribus, when the demand
for safe assets increases, the convenience yield should increase; and when the demand for safe assets decreases,
the convenience yield should decrease. I walk through the two predictions for the convenience yield based on
changes in demand for safe assets.
First, safe assets are valuable as a transaction medium because they are information-insensitive. Dang
et al. (2015) shows that information-insensitive assets are the most efficient transaction medium because
they give agents the lowest incentive to acquire private information. Therefore, uninformed agents can
comfortably trade information-insensitive assets with less concern about adverse selection; namely, that the
counterparty has produced private information on the asset and is only willing to sell lemons. Dang et al.
(2015) additionally show that financial crises are information events. In this line of thinking, Chousakos et al.
(2018) show the amount of private information in the economy measured via the cross-sectional variance in
equity returns varies over time, and that increased private information production predicts financial crises.
This logic generates the following empirical prediction: when private information production is high, the
risk of adverse selection is also high, and investors will bid the price of safe assets up because safe assets are a
refuge for the uninformed. An example makes this explicit: suppose a money-market fund engages in repo
with a bank counterparty, which is collateralized by a basket of asset-backed securities. Suppose now the
economy switches to a high private information production regime. The money-market fund may be fearful
that its bank counterparty has produced information on the ABS collateral and is using the money fund to
finance its lowest quality collateral. Since the money-market fund does not have the expertise nor time (most
8LQR phase-in started in 2015, while counter-cyclical buffers ramped up beginning in 2016. Additionally, CET1 minimums
started increasing in 2013 from 3.5% to 4.5% by 2015. Broadly, Basel III increased capital requirements ramped up through the
entire period from 2013 to 2019, along the dimensions of total capital requirements, redefinitions of risk-weights, and rulemaking
for the supplementary leverage ratio and net stable funding ratio.
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repos are fewer than seven days maturity) to value the ABS (i.e., to produce private information on the
ABS), the fund exits the repo agreement and moves the balance to Treasurys. Hence, as private information
production in the economy picks up, the convenience yield should increase as well.
I measure information production in two ways: first, I use the daily cross-sectional standard deviation
in equity returns as proposed by Chousakos et al. (2018). Second, I use the daily cross-sectional standard
deviation of changes in 5-year credit default swap spreads on senior unsecured debt for AAA to BBB rated
debt. I test the prediction by confirming the uniformly positive and significant correlation between the
information measures and the two benchmark convenience yield measures, which I show in Table 2.11.
2.3.3 Issuance
I detrend all issuance series using a similar process as Xie (2012). I log each issuance series and then apply a
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ selected to reflect the daily nature of the data. The process separates
the trend from short-run deviations using only historical data; by construction, the one-sided filter does not
use future information. I then subtract the long-term trend from the total logged issuance number to produce
the detrended issuance number:
log(Issuance)Detrended,t = log(Issuance)t − log(Issuance)HP-Filter Trend,t (2.7)
The goal for this process is to measure when an issuer issues more or less than suggested by the recent past.
As a check, I also confirm that a piecewise linear regression produces similar detrended issuance series.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
This paper tests two related questions: first, does safe asset issuance help explain fluctuations in the
convenience yield? Second, do safe asset issuers time their issuance in part to earn the convenience yield—
that is, do issuers engage in so-called “opportunistic issuance”? I first answer these questions using FHLB
issuance. I also analyze whether other agencies and private safe asset producers have a similar impact on the
convenience yield and exhibit opportunistic issuance behavior, and how these issuers’ behaviors have changed
over time.
It is challenging to analyze the long-term relationship of fluctuations in the convenience yield and private
safe asset issuance; instead, I focus on daily fluctuations. Using daily data has two advantages: first, the
time-series of FHLB and other agency issuance is only available back to the mid-1990s, so daily data allows
for more observations. Second, this paper’s focus on short-term deviations in issuance and the convenience
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yield help control for changes in the underlying macroeconomic landscape, which are unlikely to change
meaningfully from day to day.
2.4.1 The Convenience Yield Responds to FHLB Issuance
First, I examine how the convenience yield responds to FHLB issuance, i.e., whether ConYieldSAt =
f(Issuancet) in the post-reform regime. I use the timing of the independent and dependent variables
purposefully; I want to rule out the possibility that convenience yield and FHLB issuance are jointly deter-
mined. Because issuance decisions are made before the market close, and the convenience yield is measured
at market close, the issuance decision occurs first. Therefore, the convenience yield on day t cannot affect the
issuance decision on day t because it is not yet known. Importantly, the detrended issuance is known at date
t.
I run the following regression:
∆ConYieldt = α+ β log(FHLBt)Detrended + θt + εt (2.8)
where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. The
dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield—both seasonally adjusted and not—and the independent
variable is the detrended FHLB issuance time-series of 4-week to 26-week discount notes. I use data from the
post-reform period from July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the money-market
reforms had been announced. I show the result in Table 2.12. Columns (1) and (2) show the results when I
measure the convenience yield with the OIS-Tbill measure, and columns (3) and (4) show the results with the
GCF-Tbill measure. Across the two measures of convenience yield the coefficient on issuance is significant
and negative. The result suggests that FHLB debt is a safe asset, as an increase in FHLB debt issuance
reduces the price of safe assets.
A one standard deviation increase in the FHLB issuance of $4.7 billion lowers the seasonally adjusted
convenience yield by 0.3 to 0.4 basis points using the OIS measure for the smaller estimate and the GCF
measure for the larger estimate, using betas shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.12. The effect is a
significant reduction given the average seasonally adjusted GCF and OIS convenience yield measures are
2.2 basis points and 2.9 basis points, respectively. In other words, a standard deviation increase in FHLB
issuance lowers the convenience yield by about 10% to 18%.
Additional Evidence for Benchmark Test 1 I first show there is no common variation between the
convenience yield and debt issuance more generally. I show the convenience yield does not fall following
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corporate bond or low rated commercial paper issuance. The result captures the idea that these two security
types are comparatively risky assets and not private safe assets, so an unusually large issuance should not
affect the convenience yield. Table 2.13 shows the result from running the benchmark test but changing the
independent variable from FHLB issuance to corporate bonds and low rated A2/P2 non-financial commercial
paper. As expected, the coefficient on detrended issuance is insignificantly different from zero, although
the coefficient of corporate bonds and the GCF is, if anything, marginally positive and significant—the
opposite of a safe asset producer whose issuance drives the convenience yield lower. The lack of a negative
and significant relationship across both securities and both measures of the convenience yield confirms the
intuition that there is no common variation between the convenience yield and debt issuance generally.
A second test is to run a horserace between how FHLB issuance affects the convenience yield compared
to other candidate safe assets, shown in Table 2.14. This test rules out the possibility that FHLBs issue
debt simultaneously with some other safe asset, which would spuriously make FHLB debt appear to decrease
the convenience yield. I run benchmark test 1 but now as a horserace of FHLB issuance and several other
candidates to confirm FHLB issuance is the correct focus. I run the regression on FHLB issuance and also
include as controls: AA-rated (top-rated) asset-backed, financial, and non-financial commercial paper with
maturity fewer than four days; total commercial paper with maturity fewer than four days, corporate bonds,
asset-backed securities, private-label mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations. The
standard detrending process described previously is applied to each issuance series. Table 2.14 presents the
results from this regression, using the GCF measure of the convenience yield in panel A, and the OIS measure
in panel B. When comparing FHLB issuance against these measures, the relationship between FHLB issuance
and convenience yield is unchanged, as can be seen by skimming along the top row and noting the always
negative and significant relationship between FHLB issuance and the convenience yield, even after controlling
for several other issuers. The only exception is the horserace against PLMBS and ABS—the coefficient is
negative, as expected, but not significantly. This likely due to the comparatively smaller sample.
A third check is to check the result holds for Treasurys: when the Treasury issues, the convenience yield
should fall since an increase in the supply of safe assets should subsequently drive down the price of safe
assets. This result was already presented in the discussion about the comparative statics of the convenience
yield and presented in Table 2.8. The table shows that the convenience yield is lower when there are more
USTs outstanding, and also that the convenience yield falls with UST issuance.
Overall, I have shown that the convenience yield responds in ways we expect with regards to risky
asset production (corporate bonds and low rated commercial paper), other candidates for private safe
asset producers (Fannie, Freddie, commercial paper, and flavors of ABS), and public safe asset production
(Treasurys). These tests show the vital role of FHLB issuance in explaining variation in convenience yield.
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Migration in Convenience-Yield-Determiners Benchmark test 1 shows FHLB issuance helps deter-
mine the convenience yield in the post-MMF-reform period. I now consider how the convenience-yield-
determining power of the FHLBs and similar debt-issuing government agencies have changed from pre-crisis
to post-reforms. In summary, I find that FHLB issuance has a more significant effect on the convenience
yield in the post-reform period and that the convenience yield effect is unique to the FHLBS, neither Fannie
nor Freddie debt—of any maturity—have a meaningful effect on the convenience yield, either pre-crisis or
post-crisis.
First, I run benchmark test 1 on the FHLB issuance over four regimes: pre-crisis, crisis, pre-reform, and
post-reform. Pre-crisis is before June 2007, the crisis is June 2007 to June 2009, the pre-reform period is
July 2009 to July 2014, and the post-reform period is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after
which the SEC announced the money-market reforms.
I show the results in Table 2.15. In the pre-crisis period, FHLB issuance does not have the negative
relationship between issuance and the convenience yield. In contrast, the post-reform period FHLB issuance
has a significantly negative effect on the convenience yield. This result shows the new position of FHLBs
as a result of the changing post-crisis regulatory regime, which has made FHLBs large suppliers of safe
assets to money-market funds; something that was not the case pre-crisis. The crisis period is included for
completeness, but the issuance behavior of the FHLB was markedly different during the crisis than outside
the crisis. For most of the crisis period, the FHLB system acted as the “lender of next-to-last resort” as
described by Ashcraft et al. (2010). During this unusual period, the convenience yield was high and the
balance sheet of the FHLB system expanded by its balance sheet via advances to members—financed by
increasing debt issuance—by roughly 50%.
Second, I run benchmark test 1 using interactions in a combined model rather than as a split-sample
regression corresponding to the four regimes. To perform this test, I use the following specification:




βi log(FHLBt)Detrended × IRegimei + IRegimei + θt + εt (2.9)
where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects and
i = 1, 2, 3 corresponds to indicator variables for the crisis, pre-reform, and post-reform periods, and the
regression is run relative to the pre-crisis baseline with the detrended issuance series. The marginal effect of
FHLB issuance in each period from this specification are provided in Table 2.16 and plotted in Figure 2.7
which uniformly shows the convenience yield falls after issuance of 4-week to 26-week maturity debt from
FHLBs in the post-reform period and in no other period. The marginal effects clearly show migration in safe
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asset production to the FHLBs post-reform.
I now return to the original split sample version of the benchmark test and run the specification separately
on each of the agency issuers to test if they display an effect on the convenience yield. I present the results
of these individual split sample regressions in Table 2.17, with Panel A showing the results when using the
OIS-Tbill measure and Panel B with the GCF-Tbill measure. The expectation for a safe asset producer
is a significantly negative coefficient on the issuance variable, and migration occurs when the coefficient
flips sign or loses significance. Figure 2.8 plots the effect of a standard deviation increase in issuance using
the regression results presented in Table 2.17. After a standard deviation increase in FHLB issuance, the
convenience yield falls between 0.3 and 0.4 basis points; the effect of Fannie and Freddie issuance is not
significantly different from zero. The FHLBs post-reforms are the only agency issuer to affect the convenience
yield.
2.4.2 Opportunistic Issuance
The second benchmark test examines whether the FHLBs issue opportunistically in response to variations in
the convenience yield, i.e., whether Issuancet = f(ConYieldt−1, Seasonal Componentt). The FHLB issues
discount notes depending on its own funding needs but is responsive to “reverse inquiry” in which FHLB
debt buyers contact the FHLB and ask it to sell new debt. Whether or not the issuance is via reverse inquiry
does not change the ability of the FHLB to opportunistically issue: the FHLB can both use the price of safe
assets and the amount of reverse inquiry to determine the best time to issue.
I use the timing of the independent and dependent variables carefully to ensure the explanatory variable—
the convenience yield—is not determined simultaneously with the issuance decision. To help identify the effect,
I use Xie (2012)’s methodology of using the seasonal component of the convenience yield as an exogenous
independent variable. Seasonality is useful because it is exogenous to issuers (i.e., it would be impossible
for the issuance at date t to affect the seasonal component estimated for date t from the existing data) and
seasonality is predictable to issuers.
Issuers can time the convenience yield in two ways: first, by anticipating fluctuations in the convenience
yield due to seasonality (e.g., window-dressing) or second, by noticing that the level of the seasonally adjusted
convenience yield has been high in the previous day. In this setup, I test the following specification:
log(Issuancet)Detrended = α+ β1SeasonalComponentt
+ β2ConYieldSAt−1 + θt + εt
(2.10)
in which I predict the SeasonalComponentt out-of-sample, I detrend issuance as described above, and θt are
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controls for day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects.9 I report the results in Table 2.18.
I measure the convenience yield via the two definitions, and the dependent variable is detrended issuance
of FHLB discount notes with 4-weeks to 26-weeks in maturity. The main result shown in columns (1) and
(2), using the seasonally adjusted convenience yield measures, show that FHLBs issue more debt when the
previous day’s convenience yield is higher. The empirical evidence does not support FHLBs timing the
seasonal predictability of the convenience yield, but rather time issuance based on the seasonally adjusted
convenience yield.
The magnitude is important. When the seasonally adjusted convenience yield is one standard deviation
higher, amounting to 11 (14) basis points, the FHLB system issues an incremental $389 million ($274 million)
as estimated using the OIS-Tbill (GCF-Tbill) convenience yield measure betas shown in Table 2.18.
Alternative Benchmark Test 2: When-Issued Market Using “tails” and “throughs” from Treasury
auctions to measure innovations in safe asset demand allows testing FHLB opportunistic issuance without
relying on the benchmark definitions of the convenience yield. When the Treasury announces an auction,
dealers start trading that specific security on the same day in the WI market. WI transactions settle on the
issue date of the auctioned security (i.e., not on the auction date). For example, if the Treasury announces a
bill auction on Thursday morning, then the auction results are announced Monday afternoon, with settlement
later that week. The WI market allows trading of the security before the security is physically available.
When the stop-out yield in the Treasury auction exceeds the yield on the WI security, the auction is termed
a “tail,” which indicates weak demand for the Treasury. Likewise, when the stop-out yield in the auction falls
below the yield on the WI security, the auction is termed a “through,” which indicates strong demand for the
Treasury. Mercer et al. (2013) provides additional details on the WI market.
Traders in the WI market can speculate and therefore have profit motives to forecast tails and throughs
correctly. For example, an investor who thinks the WI yield is too low—meaning Treasury demand will be
weaker than is priced in the WI security—can “play for a tail” by selling the WI short while covering the
short by placing a competitive bid at a yield higher than on the WI security. The covering leg must carry
a yield sufficiently low—below the stop-out yield—since covering with a too-high yield bid will leave the
investor with a naked short position in the WI (Treasurys are not allocated to investors submitting bids
which are too high). Similar, but reversed, logic applies for speculating on a “through” auction.
Tails and throughs provide a discrete method to measure unexpected Treasury demand. Tails and throughs
proxy the unexpected demand for safe assets because speculators have incentives to forecast Treasury demand
9By construction, the controls contain future information. I confirm the results using a rolling regression with only
backward-looking controls to ensure the results are robust to excluding the future information contained in the controls.
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correctly and because Treasury typically fixes the size of the offering. If the demand for safe assets is higher
than expectations, we would expect a through in the auction; if the demand is low, then we should expect a
tail.
I test FHLB issuance around tails and throughs in Treasury bill auctions. I measure the tail as the percent
difference between the yield in the WI market 1 minute before the Treasury announces the results at 1:00 pm





Thus, Tailt > 0 indicates a tail and Tailt < 0 indicates a through.
I test FHLB opportunistic issuance by running the following regression:
log(Issuance)t = α+ β1Tailt−1 + θt + εt (2.12)
I expect demand for safe assets is lower and FHLBs will issue less when the Treasury auction tailed the
previous day. The test examines opportunistic issuance based on the demand for safe assets but measured via
Treasury tails rather than the convenience yield measures. I report the results of running the regression in
Table 2.19. I report the main result in the first two columns, which shows that β1 in the above specification
is negative and significant, matching intuition. Columns (3) and (4) show the same result holds after adding
additional controls for the seasonality of the convenience yield.
Additional Evidence for Benchmark Test 2 It is important to show there is no typical common
variation in debt market issuance and money-markets to confirm the specification of benchmark test 2. I now
perform three robustness tests.
First, I test whether comparatively riskier issuers—corporate bond issuers and A2/P2 non-financial
commercial paper—opportunistically time the convenience yield. Since FHLBs produce private safe assets, I
have argued that they will want to issue these assets when the price of safe assets is high. However, corporate
bonds and low rated commercial paper are not as useful as safe assets. Therefore, I expect there is no timing
of the convenience yield by these issuers. Table 2.20 reruns the regression given in equation 2.10 but replaces
FHLB issuance. Columns (1) and (2) show corporate bond issuance does not exhibit opportunistic issuance
behavior—there is no evidence of corporate issuers timing the seasonally adjusted convenience yield, and if
anything corporate bond issuer issue more when the seasonal component is lower. Similar results hold for
A2/P2 non-financial commercial paper. These results are inconsistent with the traits of safe assets.
A second test is to check whether the Treasury issues opportunistically. There are two reasons to believe it
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does not. First—and most importantly—the Treasury pre-announces the time and size of its auctions. Second,
the Treasury follows a longstanding custom of not opportunistically issuing debt despite Treasury’s objective
to minimize debt costs. For this reason, I run the benchmark test 2 specification with Treasury issuance as
the dependent variable and expect that the coefficient on ConYieldSAt−1 is not significantly different from zero.
Columns (5) through (8) in Table 2.20 report the results from repeating the regression in equation 2.10. I
exclude a period in which the Treasury issued debt explicitly in response to adverse money-market conditions
as part of the supplemental financing program, a program in which the Treasury issued debt to drain reserves
from the banking system and therefore allow the Federal Reserve better control of its policy rate. Table 2.20
shows the Treasury does not time its issues based on the previous day’s convenience yield for either measure
of the convenience yield. Overall, the results confirm the prior that the Treasury, unlike FHLBs, does not
opportunistically issue debt to time the convenience yield.
A third check is to use Treasurys outstanding as an instrument for the convenience yield, as shown in
Table 2.21. As discussed in Xie (2012), the convenience yield fluctuates as the Treasury issues and redeems
Treasury debt. A large increase of Treasurys outstanding will crowd out other safe assets like FHLBs, and the
FHLBs will issue less. I now perform the following two-step regression: first, I show an increase in detrended
log Treasurys outstanding lowers the convenience yield in the first stage regression:
ConYieldNSAt = α+ β log(UST Outstandingt−1)Detrended + εt (2.13)
The first stage regression results are shown in columns (1) and (3) using the GCF and OIS measures of the
convenience yield, respectively. I use Treasury issuance as an instrument to predict the convenience yield as
shown in the above specification and then show the FHLBs are indeed crowded out by Treasury issuance,
which I present in
log(FHLBt)Detrended = α+ β ̂ConYield
NSA
t−1 + εt (2.14)
in which ̂ConYield
NSA
t−1 is the first stage estimate of the convenience yield from Treasurys outstanding.
Columns (2) and (4) show the second stage regression results in Table 2.21: when the convenience yield is
higher—due to fewer Treasurys outstanding—then FHLBs issue more. Importantly, FHLBs exhibit “gap-
filling” behavior with issuance in that FHLB issuance is lower when bill issuance the day before is larger: I
present the result in columns (5) of Table 2.21.
To summarize, I have presented five pieces of additional evidence for opportunistic issuance. First,
FHLBs issue less when demand for Treasury debt is low as measured via auction tails in the WI market.
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Second, issuers of risky assets do not time the convenience yield. Third, Treasury issuance does not time
the convenience yield. Fourth, FHLBs issue more when using Treasurys outstanding as an instrument to
estimate the convenience yield. Finally, FHLBs exhibit “gap-filling” behavior—they issue more when the
Treasury issues less. Each of these tests matches intuition and confirm the behavior of FHLBs as safe asset
producers who time the convenience yield.
Who Else Opportunistically Issuances? Benchmark test 2 shows that the FHLBs opportunistically
time issuance based on the convenience yield in the previous day, which has been the case for the entire
sample and not only after the money-market reforms. Who else opportunistically times the convenience
yield? I now run benchmark test 2 on other agency and candidate private safe asset issuers to examine
their opportunistic issuance behavior, and report the results in Table 2.22. As discussed before, there are
two possible ways to time the convenience yield: either based on SeasonalComponentt or ConYieldSAt−1. The
issuance series include Freddie discount notes (excluding overnight); Freddie reference bills; Fannie bond
issuance greater than one year; Federal Farm Credit Bank issuance greater than one year; one to four-day
maturity highly rated ABCP, financial CP, and non-financial CP; and collateralized debt obligations.
The test shows the following facts: first, that both types of Freddie discount notes, ABCP, and non-financial
CP time the seasonal component of the convenience yield using at least one measure of the convenience yield.
Second, the following issuers time ConYieldSAt−1: Freddie, non-financial CP, and CDOs. ABCP issuance times
the SeasonalComponentt, consistent with Sunderam (2015). Notably, financial commercial paper does not
time issuance: this is unsurprising since window-dressing constrains financials precisely when the convenience
yield is high (e.g., at quarter-ends during window-dressing), and so financials cannot opportunistically issue.
Figure 2.9 plots the economic magnitude of the timing behavior using the estimated β2 from Table 2.22:
it shows the effect of a standard deviation increase in the convenience yield on issuance. FHLB discount
notes increase issuance by roughly $300 million to $400 million across the two convenience yield measures.
ABCP ($200 million) and Freddie ($130 to $160 million) and non-financial CP ($170 million) also display
timing behavior, for example, with the GCF measure. The effect with the OIS measure is generally smaller
and less significant, except for FHLBs and ABCP. The non-timing behavior of financial commercial paper
appears again in the last bar, likely for the reasons related to window-dressing discussed previously.
2.4.3 Vector Autoregression
I now present a vector autoregression to analyze the persistence and the interaction between the convenience
yield and agency debt outstanding. Recall, benchmark result 1 showed that the convenience yield falls after
FHLB debt issuance post-reforms, and benchmark result 2 showed that many safe asset producers time
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issuance when the convenience yield is high through the full sample. A vector autoregression model allows
me to analyze the interaction of the two series (issuance and the convenience yield), the persistence of the
effect, and to test for Granger causality.
Let ot be the outstanding debt at time t, cyt be the convenience yield—as measured by the OIS-Tbill or
GCF-Tbill spread, and sct be the seasonal component of the convenience yield. I estimate a VAR of the form ot
cyt
 = a0 +A1
 ot−1
cyt−1







where a0 is a vector of intercept terms, A1, . . . ,At−k are 2× 2 matrices of coefficients estimated from the
lags of the outstanding and convenience yield variables, and Γt are coefficients on the exogenous seasonal
component control, sct. I select the lags k using Akaike’s information criterion. I estimate the VAR six times:
for both convenience yield spreads—the GCF-Tbill and also the OIS-Tbill spreads—across each of three
periods: pre-crisis, post-reform, and full sample excluding crisis.
I perform a pairwise Granger causality test to analyze whether lags of cy Granger-causes ot (and vice
versa) in the sense that lags of cy help predict ot. The pairwise Granger causality test regresses ot on its
lags and the lags of cy and uses a Wald test to check if the coefficients on lags of cy are jointly zero. The
null hypothesis is that the coefficients on the lags are jointly zero, and I say that a variable Granger-causes
another if I reject the null. I report the results in Table 2.23. I now discuss the results in the context of
benchmark test 1 and test 2.
First, benchmark test 1 found that FHLB issuance drove down the convenience yield post-reforms, but
not pre-crisis: that is, safe asset production migrated to the FHLBs post-reforms. The VAR confirms a
similar result by finding that log(FHLB outstanding) Granger-causes the GCF-Tbill and OIS-Tbill spreads
post-reforms at the 5% and 1% level, respectively, but not pre-crisis. This is shown in the bottom two rows
of the table.
Second, benchmark test 2 found that FHLB issuance opportunistically timed the convenience yield in the
full sample, excluding the crisis. The VAR confirms this result: log(FHLB outstanding) is Granger-caused by
both convenience yield spreads in the full sample but is robust at the 10% level when estimating the model
in just the pre-crisis or post-reform sample separately.
The VAR lets us analyze the persistence of the effects over many days and weeks, not just within a day or
the next. I plot the impulse response functions in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, using the OIS and GCF measures,
respectively. The VAR equivalent of benchmark test 1 is shown in the left and middle panel on the top row of
each figure: the effect of an impulse to log(FHLB outstanding) lowers the convenience yield post-reforms, but
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not pre-reforms. An impulse to the OIS measure lowers the convenience yield by almost 4 bps cumulatively
over the following 30 trading days; the GCF is somewhat smaller. For both measures, the pre-crisis and
post-reform periods have plainly different shapes of the impulse response on the convenience yield—this is
migration.
The VAR equivalent of benchmark test 2, of opportunistic issuance, is shown in the bottom right panel
of each figure. The panels show the effect of an impulse in the convenience yield on subsequent log(FHLB
outstanding). The effect is large, positive, persistent, and similar when looking across all three panels:
confirming the intuition that opportunistic issuance is not new post-crisis but has been a characteristic from
pre-crisis to post-reforms.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper aims to show three related facts: first, that various financial reforms in the wake of the financial
crisis have made the FHLBs major issuers of safe assets. Second, the fluctuations in FHLB issuance post-
reform help explain variation in the convenience yield on a day-to-day basis. Third, the FHLBs issue debt
opportunistically to time fluctuations in the convenience yield, allowing them to earn the convenience yield;
Freddie and ABCP also exhibit clear timing behavior. The results suggest that safe asset production has
migrated toward the FHLBs.
There are two systemic risk implications of this paper’s analysis. First, FHLBs’ opportunistic issuance is
socially valuable because they are a marginal producer of safe assets. However, what happens if they cannot
issue this marginal safe debt? Second, the FHLBs engage in a carry trade: they can borrow at low rates
because of the implicit government guarantee and invest the proceeds into higher-yielding advances and
investments. But this carry trade is risky given the magnitude of maturity transformation performed by the
FHLBs system. The fallout from a failure of the FHLBs—albeit unlikely—would be unlike that of Fannie
and Freddie because the FHLBs are an important source of financing to banks and because the banks hold
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Figure 2.4: FHLB Debt and money-market funds. Source: Gissler and Narajabad (2017b)
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Cash Starting Point Cash Ending Point
Pre-Crisis Path 1
via Prime MMMF $1 CD/CP $1 FRBNY Deposit CD/CP
Pre-Crisis Path 2
via Prime MMMF and BDs $1 Tri-party $1 GCF/Bilateral Repo Tri-party FRBNY Deposit GCF/Bilateral Repo
(matched book) (indirectly via asset purchase)
Pre-Crisis Path 3
via BDs Tbills GCF/Bilateral Repo Bilateral Repo FRBNY Deposit GCF/Bilateral Repo
Bilateral Repo FX Swaps FX Swaps FX Swaps
FX Swaps (matched book)
Post-Crisis Path 1
via Gov't MMMF and FHLBs $1 FHLB Discount $1 FHLB Advance Discount Notes FRBNY Deposit FHLB Advance
Treasurys, etc (Also FF lending to 
foreign banks)
Post-Crisis Path 2
via Gov't MMMF and BDs $1 Tri-party $1 GCF/Bilateral Repo Tri-party FRBNY Deposit GCF/Bilateral Repo
(matched book) (indirectly via asset purchase)
Basel III/DFA make this more expensive for B/D
Post-Crisis Path 3
via BDs Tbills GCF/Bilateral Bilateral Repo FRBNY Deposit GCF/Bilateral Repo
Bilateral Repo FX Swaps FX Swaps FX Swaps
FX Swaps (matched book)
Basel III/DFA make this more expensive for B/D
Post-Crisis Path 4
via Gov't MMMF $1 Fed Reverse Repo $1 Reserves
Funds don't like to sidestep their B/D; tri-party repo is relationship based
Safe Asset Production
Passive Cash Pool Prime MMMF Bank
Passive Cash Pool Prime MMMF Broker/Dealer Fast Money Investor
Active Cash Pool Broker/Dealer Fast Money Investor
Passive Cash Pool Gov't MMMF FHLB Bank
Passive Cash Pool Gov't MMMF FRBNY
Passive Cash Pool Gov't MMMF Broker/Dealer Fast Money Investor
Active Cash Pool Broker/Dealer Fast Money Investor
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Figure 2.6: Money Market Reforms Pushed Month-End Flows to FHLBs. Figure plots the difference between intra-month and month-end























∆(OIS-Tbill)SA ∆(GCF-Tbill)SA ∆(OIS-Tbill) ∆(GCF-Tbill)
Figure 2.7: Migration in Benchmark Test 1: Marginal Effect of FHLB Issuance. Plot gives the marginal effect of FHLB issuance on
changes in the convenience yield from regression reported in Table 2.16: ∆ConYieldSAt = α+ β1 log(FHLBt)Detrended +
∑
i βi log(FHLBt)Detrended ×
IRegimei + IRegimei + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the
daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads,
both seasonally adjusted (SA) and not. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated
from the detrended series of log FHLB auctioned discount note issuance of maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. Pre-crisis is before June 2007, crisis is
June 2007 to June 2009, pre-reform is July 2009 to July 2014, and post-reform is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the






























Figure 2.8: Issuance Impact on Convenience Yield. Bar graphs plot the effect of a one standard deviation increase in detrended issuance
on the conveience yield estimated from the following regression: ∆ConYieldt = α + β log(Issuancet)Detrended + θt + εt where θt represents controls
including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. The results for this regression are reported in Table 2.17. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is seasonally adjusted convenience yield, measured via the OIS-Tbill or
GCF-Tbill spread, corresponding to definitions 2.1 and 2.2. Issuance is calculated from the detrended series. Freddie discos are discount notes that are
not overnight. FHLB disco are auctioned discount notes with maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. Fannie>1yr are issuances with greater than 1-year in
maturity.
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Figure 2.9: Who Times Issuance? Effect of Elevated Convenience Yield on Issuance. Plots show the effect on issuance when the
convenience yield is one standard deviation higher using β2 coefficient shown in Table 2.22 from running benchmark test 2 regression across the
full sample: log(Issuancet)Detrended = α + β1SeasonalComponentt + β2ConYieldSAt−1 + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week,
quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is seasonally adjusted convenience yield, measured
either via the OIS-Tbill or GCF Tbill measure, which correspond to definitions 2.1 and 2.2. Independent variable is the issuance of the indicated series
which is calculated from the detrended log of the issuance series. FHLB are auctioned discount notes with 4-week to 26-week maturities, ABCP is AA
(highly rated) asset-backed commercial paper with maturities 1 day to 4 days, Non-fin. CP is AA-rated non-financial commercial paper, FreddieDisco
and FreddieRefBill refers to Freddie discount notes excluding overnight and reference bills, and Fin. CP is AA-rated financial commercial paper
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OIS-Tbill Impulse → FHLB Response
Figure 2.10: Impulse Response Function: OIS Measure. Plots show cumulative orthogonalized impulse response functions estimated from a
vector autoregression model including the OIS-Tbill spread and the log level of FHLB 4-week to 26-week auctioned discount notes outstanding. Each
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GCF-Tbill Impulse → FHLB Response
Figure 2.11: Impulse Response Function: GCF Measure. Plots show cumulative orthogonalized impulse response functions estimated from a
vector autoregression model including the GCF-Tbill spread and the log level of FHLB 4-week to 26-week auctioned discount notes outstanding. Each
column shows the model estimated in different samples: pre-crisis, post-reforms, and the full ex-crisis sample.
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2.7 Tables
Year FHLBs Freddie Fannie Farm Cred. Farmer Mac TVA Treasury Bills
2006 158.1 167.4 168.6 17.8 3.3 2.6 940.8
2007 378.4 197.6 234.2 19.7 0.7 1.6 999.5
2008 441.1 330.9 332.5 16.1 0.9 2.4 1,861.2
2009 198.6 238.3 200.6 11.6 1.9 1.1 1,793.5
2010 194.5 197.2 152.0 19.2 3.4 0.2 1,772.5
2011 190.2 161.4 146.8 13.6 4.1 0.8 1,520.5
2012 216.3 117.9 105.3 14.6 5.0 1.0 1,629.0
2013 293.3 141.8 72.3 18.6 5.0 1.8 1,592.0
2014 362.4 134.7 105.0 27.0 5.5 1.1 1,457.9
2015 494.3 113.6 71.1 32.3 5.0 1.5 1,514.0
2016 410.1 71.5 35.0 29.6 3.8 2.0 1,818.0
2017 392.0 73.2 33.4 25.6 1.7 2.7 1,955.9
2018 425.1 68.7 28.3 19.2 1.2 1.2 2,340.0
2019 389.2 94.5 35.9 17.8 2.2 0.9 2,416.9
Table 2.1: Short-Term Sovereign Safe Debt Outstanding ($ billions). Agency numbers include all maturities ≤1 year. 2019 value is 2019Q3.
Source: Sifma, US Treasury.
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Assets ($ billions) Liabilities ($ billions)
Advances 875.1 Consolidated Bonds 802.6
Held-to-maturity securities 151.2 Consolidated Discos 376.3
Mortgages loans held in portfolio 91.6 Deposits 22.1
Fed funds sold 85.8 Derivative Liabilities 5.3
Interest bearing securities 48.2 Repo 1.5
Trading securities 6.8 Mandatorily redeemable capital stock 1.1
Available-for-sale securities 5.8 Total 1,220.9
Reverse repo 0.8
Cash 0.3
Total 1,274.5 Loss absorbing capital 50.3
Memo:
GSE MBS 55.1 Leverage 25.4×
Private-Label MBS 88.0 Capital Ratio 3.94%
Total Investments 298.7
Table 2.2: Consolidated FHLB Balance Sheet, Year-End 2007
Assets ($ billions) Liabilities ($ billions)
Advances 706.0 Consolidated Bonds 613.5
Held-to-maturity securities 80.3 Consolidated Discos 402.8
Mortgages loans held in portfolio 60.1 Deposits 8.2
Fed funds sold 72.7 Derivative Liabilities 0.4
Interest bearing securities 13.6 Other 5.7
Trading securities 13.4 Mandatorily redeemable capital stock 1.1
Available-for-sale securities 80.3 Total 1,220.9
Reverse repo/Securities Lending 45.3
Cash/Deposits 14.4
Total 1,098.3 Capital + Retained Earnings 57.6
Memo:
GSE Obligations 19.6 Leverage 19.1×
Private-Label MBS 7.0 Capital Ratio 5.24%
GSE MBS 135.3
Total Investments 318.3
Table 2.3: Consolidated FHLB Balance Sheet, 2018 Q3
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$ billions 2007 2017 Percent Change
Freddie Mac Overnight 1.0
Short-term excl. o/n 159.5 44.7 -71.3
Long-term 362.8 162.3 -55.3
Other 254.6 98.7 -61.2
Total 776.9 306.7 -60.5
Fannie Mae Short-term 161.7 33.3 -79.4
Long-term 605.1 291.4 -51.8
Total 766.9 324.7 -57.7
FHLB Overnight 28.2 17.1 -39.4
Short-term, excl. o/n 188.6 386.8 105.1
Long-term 806.0 615.2 -23.7
Total 1,022.8 1,019.1 -0.4
Table 2.4: Agency Debt Outstanding: 2007 vs. 2017
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basis points
N Mean σ Min Max
AAA Long Maturityt −UST Long Maturityt 2,661 29 39 -65 92
OIS3mt − Tbill3mt 2,662 6 6 -17 28
GCF3mt − Tbill3mt 2,656 14 8 -11 46
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics: Convenience Yield Measures. Data is from the post-crisis period from July 2009 to February 2020. UST is
US Treasury. AAA Long Maturity yield is the ICE BofAML US Corporate AAA effective yield. Tbill is the 3-month constant-maturity yield. OIS is
the 3-month overnight indexed swap, and GCF is the Treasury general collateral financing repurchase agreement 3-month rate.
AAA-UST OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill
AAA Long Maturityt −UST Long Maturityt 1.00
OIS3mt − Tbill3mt 0.17 1.00
GCF3mt − Tbill3mt 0.50 0.54 1.00
Table 2.6: Correlation: Convenience Yield Measures. Data is from the post-crisis period from July 2009 to February 2020. UST is US Treasury.
AAA Long Maturity yield is the ICE BofAML US Corporate AAA effective yield. Tbill is the 3-month constant-maturity yield. OIS is the 3-month
overnight indexed swap, and GCF is the Treasury general collateral financing repurchase agreement 3-month rate.
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Curve Change ConYield Prediction Empirical Proxy
supply Supply of Safe Assets ↑ ↓ Treasury issuance
Window Dressing ↑ ↑ quarter-ends
Bank constraints ↑ ↑ covered interest parity
Bank constraints ↑ ↑ reform implementation
demand Information production ↑ ↑ cross-sectional σ(Equity Returns)
Information production ↑ ↑ cross-sectional σ [∆(CDS Spreads)]
Table 2.7: A priori predictions for convenience yield behavior
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
GCF-Tbill ∆(GCF-Tbill) OIS-Tbill ∆(OIS-Tbill)
UST Outstandingt -152.757∗∗∗ -73.956∗∗∗
(-7.90) (-3.38)
UST Issuancet -0.317∗∗ -0.227∗∗
(-3.09) (-3.02)
Constant 14.801∗∗∗ -0.166 14.407∗∗∗ -0.067
(21.61) (-1.39) (11.38) (-0.72)
Observations 6069 1269 3511 801
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01
Sample Exclude SFP Exclude SFP Exclude SFP Exclude SFP
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: Convenience Yield and US Treasurys. ConYieldNSAt = α+ β log(UST)t−1 + εt. UST is US Treasurys. Regression run at the daily
level. Dependent variable is convenience yield, in basis points, with no seasonal adjustment, measured either via the OIS-Tbill or the GCF-Tbill spread.
Independent variable is the detrended series for US Treasurys outstanding and issuance. Sample excludes the Supplemental Financing Program period
from September 2008 to August 2011. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
109
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OIS-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill GCF-Tbill
Quarter-End 1.66∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗
(5.18) (3.88) (7.47) (6.67)
Constant 0.76 0.58 18.34∗∗∗ 18.31∗∗∗
(1.30) (0.89) (19.39) (19.31)
Observations 4035 4557 6604 7117
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.63 0.50 0.49
Exclude Crisis Yes No Yes No
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.9: Convenience Yield Robustness Test: Quarter-End Dummy Regression. Regression specification: ConYieldNSAt = α +
β1IQuarter-End + θt + εt where θt are year fixed-effects. Dependent variable is convenience yield, in basis points, with no seasonal adjustment, measured
either via the OIS-Tbill or the d GCF-Tbill spread. Quarter-end dummy is equal to one if the date is in the last week of a quarter-end in March, June,
September or December and zero otherwise. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels respectively.
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OIS− Tbill GCF− Tbill 1W/OIS 1W/IBOR 1M/OIS 1M/IBOR 3M/OIS 3M/IBOR
OIS− Tbill 1.00
GCF− Tbill 0.75∗∗∗ 1.00
1W/OIS 0.11∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 1.00
1W/IBOR -0.02 0.16∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 1.00
1M/OIS 0.24∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 1.00
1M/IBOR 0.06∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 1.00
3M/OIS 0.21∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 1.00
3M/IBOR 0.01 0.23∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 1.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.10: Pairwise Correlation Between Benchmark Convenience Yield Measures and Covered Interest Parity Violations. Each
covered interest parity series is the first four principal components of the absolute value of the basis parity violation relative to the dollar from 1998 to
2018, measured at a daily level, and discounted either at OIS or the respective country’s interbank offered rate. Series include Australian dollar (AUD),
Canadian dollar (CAD), Swiss franc (CHF), Danish krone (DKK), Euro (EUR), Pound sterling (GBP), Japanese yen (JPY), New Zealand dollar
(NZD), and Swedish krona (SEK). 1-Week series does not include CHF as the data is not available. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% levels respectively.
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OIS− Tbill GCF− Tbill Equity Vol CDS Vol
OIS− Tbill 1.00
GCF− Tbill 0.75∗∗∗ 1.00
Equity Vol 0.10∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 1.00
CDS Vol 0.22∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.11: Pairwise Correlations between Benchmark Convenience Yield Measures and Information Production Measures Cross-
Sectional Standard Deviation of Equities and CDS. Cross-sectional volatility for stocks, Equity Vol, is proposed in Chousakos et al. (2018) and
is calculated from the cross sectional volatility of daily CRSP returns following sample selection of Asness et al. (2013). In particular, the sample
excludes: financials, real estate, insurance companies; stocks with share codes that are not ordinary common stocks; stocks with a price less than $1 at
the beginning of a month; stocks without at least 12 months of return history; and stocks that are not in the top 90% of market value when ranked by
market value. The purpose of this selection is to produce a sample of stocks that are the most liquid and easily traded. The credit default swap
measure, CDS Vol, is the cross-sectional standard deviation in the daily change in 5-year swap spreads across specific contracts. Daily data is provided
by Markit and the sample includes contracts with the following attributes:USD-denominated; North American reference entity, senior unsecured tier,
ratings between AAA and BBB.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)t ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)t
FHLBt -0.86∗ -0.71∗ -1.11∗∗ -0.94∗∗
(-2.56) (-2.20) (-2.97) (-2.85)
Constant -2.92 -3.25 -0.25 -2.34
(-1.12) (-1.66) (-0.14) (-1.25)
Observations 583 583 580 580
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.03
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.12: Benchmark Test 1 Main Result: FHLB Issuance Drives the Convenience Yield. ∆ConYieldt = α+ β log(FHLBt)Detrended +
θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent
variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads, both seasonally adjusted
(SA) and not. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated from the detrended series
of log FHLB auctioned discount note issuance of maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. Post-reform sample is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the
period after which the money-market reforms had been announced. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a
maximum of 20 lags.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt
Corporate Bondst 0.07 0.10
(1.61) (1.94)
A2/P2 Non-Fin. CPt 0.12 0.11
(0.78) (0.79)
Constant -0.73∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗
(-2.85) (-4.58) (-2.81) (-4.76)
Observations 1257 1253 1393 1387
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.13: Benchmark Test 1 Robustness Test: Corporate Bond and A2/P2 Commercial paper Issuance Does Not Drive the
Convenience Yield. ∆ConYieldt = α+β log(Issuancet)Detrended +θt+εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end,
and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes
in the seasonally adjusted (SA) OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis
period. Issuance is calculated from the detrended log issuance series of corporate bonds and A2/P2 (i.e., the lowest-rated) non-financial commercial
paper with less than 4 days maturity. Post-reform sample is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the money-market reforms
had been announced. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt
FHLBt -1.11∗∗ -1.08∗∗ -1.11∗∗ -1.10∗∗ -1.14∗∗ -1.08∗ -1.22∗ -0.40 -0.98

















Constant -0.25 -0.22 -0.26 -0.16 -0.32 0.00 1.86∗∗∗ 0.50 1.64∗∗∗
(-0.12) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.08) (-0.15) (0.00) (9.16) (0.74) (5.28)
Observations 580 580 580 579 580 523 385 95 260
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.00 0.06
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.14: Benchmark Test 1 Robustness Test: FHLB Horseraces, Panel A. ∆ConYieldt = α+ β log(Issuancet)Detrended + θt + εt where
θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is
changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the seasonally adjusted (SA) GCF-Tbill spread. Seasonal adjustment
from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated from the detrended log issuance series: FHLB is 4-week to
26-week maturity auctioned discos; ABCP, Fin. CP, and Non-fin. CP refer to flavors of AA rated (top-rated) commercial paper with less than 4 days
maturity, asset-backed, financial, non-financial; Total CP is all commercial paper with less than 4 day maturity; corporate bonds is all corporate bonds
in the Mergent Fixed-Income database; ABS refers to the sum of USD securitized asset-backed issuance of public SEC-registered ABS, private/rule
144A ABS, private-label MBS, CDO, and ABS/MBS sold primarily outside the US; CDO are collateralized debt obligations; and PLMBS refer to
private-label mortgage-backed securities that are SEC-registered with first-lien residential loans including jumbo and Alt-A mortgages. Post-reform
sample is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the money-market reforms had been announced. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses using robust standard errors.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt
FHLBt -0.86∗∗ -0.84∗ -0.93∗∗ -0.84∗ -0.94∗∗ -0.97∗∗ -0.80∗ -0.24 -0.45

















Constant -2.92 -2.90 -3.07 -2.67 -3.01 -2.50 2.28∗∗∗ -0.42 2.02∗∗∗
(-1.08) (-1.10) (-1.13) (-1.01) (-1.15) (-0.97) (16.69) (-0.85) (10.59)
Observations 583 583 583 582 583 525 386 95 261
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.10
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Benchmark Test 1 Robustness Test: FHLB Horseraces, Panel B. ∆ConYieldt = α+ β log(Issuancet)Detrended + θt + εt where θt represents
controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes
in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the seasonally adjusted (SA) OIS-Tbill spread. Seasonal adjustment from
preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated from the detrended log issuance series: FHLB is 4-week to 26-week
maturity auctioned discos; ABCP, Fin. CP, and Non-fin. CP refer to flavors of AA rated (top-rated) commercial paper with less than 4 days maturity,
asset-backed, financial, non-financial; Total CP is all commercial paper with less than 4 day maturity; corporate bonds is all corporate bonds in
the Mergent Fixed-Income database; ABS refers to the sum of USD securitized asset-backed issuance of public SEC-registered ABS, private/rule
144A ABS, private-label MBS, CDO, and ABS/MBS sold primarily outside the US; CDO are collateralized debt obligations; and PLMBS refer to
private-label mortgage-backed securities that are SEC-registered with first-lien residential loans including jumbo and Alt-A mortgages. Post-reform
sample is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the money-market reforms had been announced T-statistics are reported in
parentheses using robust standard errors.
116
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt ∆(OIS-Tbill)SAt ∆(GCF-Tbill)SAt
FHLBt -0.12 -0.41 0.04 -0.70 -0.49∗ -0.24 -0.86∗ -1.11∗∗
(-0.38) (-0.74) (0.04) (-0.67) (-1.98) (-0.76) (-2.56) (-2.97)
Constant 1.19 0.80 -16.16∗ -16.17∗∗∗ -2.30∗∗ -0.65 -2.92 -0.25
(1.85) (0.32) (-2.35) (-4.44) (-2.69) (-0.57) (-1.12) (-0.14)
Observations 469 857 215 210 527 525 583 580
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.06
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Pre-Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Crisis Pre-Reform Pre-Reform Post-Reform Post-Reform
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.15: Migration in Benchmark Test 1: FHLB Issuance Drives Convenience Yield Post-Crisis, Not Pre-Crisis. ∆ConYieldt =
α+ β log(FHLBt)Detrended + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run
at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the seasonally adjusted (SA)
OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated from
the detrended series of log FHLB auctioned discount note issuance of maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. Pre-crisis is before June 2007, crisis is June 2007
to June 2009, pre-reform is July 2009 to July 2014, and post-reform is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after which the money-market
reforms had been announced. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(OIS-Tbill)SA ∆(GCF-Tbill)SA ∆(OIS-Tbill) ∆(GCF-Tbill)
Pre-Crisis -0.49 -0.48 -0.01 -0.31
(-1.32) (-0.93) (-0.05) (-0.66)
Crisis 0.09 -0.82 0.00 -0.79
(0.06) (-0.54) (0.00) (-0.54)
Pre-Reform -0.40 -0.34 -0.18 -0.21
(-1.31) (-0.98) (-0.69) (-0.67)
Post-Reform -0.92∗∗ -0.86∗ -0.64∗ -0.70∗
(-3.07) (-2.30) (-2.31) (-2.07)
Observations 1794 2172 1898 2172
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.16: Migration in Benchmark Test 1: Pre-Crisis to Post-Reforms Migration to FHLBs. Table gives the marginal effect of FHLB
issuance on changes in the convenience yield estimated from ∆ConYieldSAt = α + β1 log(FHLBt)Detrended +
∑
i βi log(FHLBt)Detrended × IRegimei +
IRegimei + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Marginal effects are plotted in
Figure 2.7. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the
seasonally adjusted (SA) OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period.
Issuance is calculated from the detrended series of log FHLB auctioned discount note issuance of maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. Pre-crisis is before
June 2007, crisis is June 2007 to June 2009, pre-reform is July 2009 to July 2014, and post-reform is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period
after which the money-market reforms had been announced. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors.
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Panel A: OIS-Tbill Measure of Convenience Yield
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
i = FHLBDisco FreddieON FreddieDisco Freddie>1yr Fannie>1yr
Regime Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Issuancei -0.12 -0.86* 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.05
(-0.38) (-2.56) (0.99) (0.04) (0.23) (0.07) (-1.31) (-0.30) (-0.98) (0.86)
N 469 583 726 1196 1116 1369 997 985 1048 457
Adj. R2 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.07
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: GCF-Tbill Measure of Convenience Yield
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
i = FHLBDisco FreddieON FreddieDisco Freddie>1yr Fannie>1yr
Regime Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Issuancei -0.41 -1.11** 0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.09
(-0.74) (-2.97) (0.87) (-0.68) (0.09) (-0.47) (0.11) (-1.34) (1.26) (1.30)
N 857 580 2380 1191 2903 1364 2928 984 3006 456
Adj. R2 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.08
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.17: Migration in Benchmark Test 1: Migration to FHLBs. ∆ConYieldt = α+ β log(Issuancet)Detrended + θt + εt where θt represents
controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is changes in the
convenience yield, in basis points, as measured by changes in the OIS-Tbill and GCF-Tbill spreads seasonally adjusted from preceding 5-year rolling
window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated from the detrended series of log issuance of: FHLB auctioned discount notes maturities
4-weeks to 26-weeks, Freddie overnight discount notes, Freddie discount notes excluding overnight, Freddie debt with greater than 1-year maturity, and
Fannie debt with greater than 1-year maturity. Pre-crisis is before June 2007 and post-reform is July 2014 to February 2020, reflecting the period after
which the money-market reforms had been announced. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of
20 lags.
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Constant -0.4718∗ -0.2965 -0.4727∗ -0.3069
(-2.53) (-1.81) (-2.57) (-1.86)
Observations 1579 1970 1579 1970
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.26
Sample Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.18: Benchmark Test 2 Main Result: FHLB Issuance Responds to Convenience Yield the Day Before. log(Issuancet)Detrended =
α+β1SeasonalComponentt+β2ConYieldSAt−1 +θt+εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-effects.
Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is issuance calculated from the detrended series for FHLB issuance of auctioned discount notes
with 4-week to 26-week maturity debt. Seasonal adjustment of convenience yield from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tailt−1 -0.1101∗∗∗ -0.0988∗∗∗ -0.0959∗∗ -0.0942∗∗









Constant -0.0762∗∗ 0.0234 0.1647 -0.0749
(-3.09) (0.19) (1.01) (-1.15)
Observations 389 389 381 247
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.17
YearFE None Year Year Year
Sample GovPX GovPX GovPX GovPX
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.19: Benchmark Test 2 Alternative Specification: FHLB Issuance Responds to Treasury Demand the Day Before as
Measured by Tails. log(Issuancet)Detrended = α+ β1Tailt−1 + θt + εt. Regression run at the daily level. Dependent variable is issuance calculated
from the detrended series for FHLB issuance of auctioned discount notes with 4-week to 26-week maturity debt. The independent variable, Tailt−1,
which is the percent change between yields implied 1 minute before auction and yields realized 30 minutes after the Treasury bill auction. A positive
value for Tailt−1 means yields increased after auction indicating lower Treasury bill demand than anticipated in the when-issued market. ConYieldSAt−1
is the seasonally adjusted convenience yield, measured either via the OIS-Tbill or the GCF-Tbill measure, which correspond to definitions 2.1 and 2.2,
respectively. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Tails are calculated from 1991 to 2008 due to data
constraints. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Corp. Bondst Corp. Bondst A2/P2 Non-Fin. CPt A2/P2 Non-Fin. CPt Tbillt Tbillt USTt USTt
ConYieldOIS,SAt−1 0.0031 0.0037 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.49) (1.86) (-0.04) (0.06)
SeasonalComponentOISt 0.0039 0.0003 -0.0672∗ -0.0470∗
(0.51) (0.14) (-2.46) (-2.43)
ConYieldGCF,SAt−1 -0.0008 -0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0015
(-0.37) (-3.40) (0.13) (0.39)
SeasonalComponentGCFt -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗∗ -0.0063 -0.0064
(-4.89) (-3.79) (-0.65) (-0.82)
Constant 0.0406 0.4327∗ 0.0610 0.2766∗∗∗ 1.6707∗∗∗ 2.1081∗∗∗ 1.3605∗∗∗ 1.5504∗∗∗
(0.17) (2.46) (1.21) (3.91) (3.76) (8.01) (5.56) (9.84)
Observations 3632 6174 3781 4227 535 897 814 1278
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.39 0.38 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.20
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis Ex-Crisis Ex-SFP Ex-SFP Ex-SFP Ex-SFP
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.20: Additional Evidence for Benchmark Test 2: Corporate Bonds and Treasurys. log(Issuancet)Detrended = α +
β1SeasonalComponentt + β2ConYieldSAt−1 + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-
effects. Regression run at the daily level. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated
from the detrending process described above. The corporate bond and commercial paper sample excludes the crisis period and the Treasury sample
excludes the time the supplemental financing program was in effect, from September 2008 to August 2011. T-statistics are reported in parentheses
using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Stage (GCF) Second Stage First Stage (OIS) Second Stage FHLBt






Constant 15.15∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ 13.33∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗ -0.0399∗∗
(17.83) (-4.39) (10.92) (-3.14) (-2.62)
N 1849 1849 1560 1560 1860
F-stat 1st Stage 44.71 13.87
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.21: Additional Evidence for Benchmark Test 2: Treasury Issuance Shock. Regression in columns (2) and (4) is
log(FHLBt)Detrended = α + β ̂ConYield
NSA
t−1 + εt, where ̂ConYieldNSAt−1 is estimated in the first stage by regressing the OIS-Tbill or GCF-Tbill
spread on the detrended Treasury outstanding series: ConYieldNSAt = α+ β log(UST Outstandingt−1)Detrended + εt, which is shown in columns (1)
and (3). Excludes supplemental financing program period from September 2008 to August 2011. Issuance is calculated from the detrended series of log
FHLB auctioned discount note issuance of maturities 4-weeks to 26-weeks. T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors
with a maximum of 20 lags.
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Panel A: Agency Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FreddieDisco FreddieRefBill Fannie>1yr FFCB>1yr
OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill
SeasonalComponentt 0.001 0.010*** 0.001 0.004** 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.10) (4.19) (0.26) (2.71) (0.11) (-1.39) (0.56) (1.41)
ConYieldSAt−1 0.005 0.013** -0.004 0.005 -0.023** -0.017*** 0.006 0.002
(0.52) (2.71) (-0.87) (1.58) (-2.66) (-3.80) (1.09) (0.60)
Constant 0.911*** 0.691*** 0.324** 0.040 0.663*** 1.072*** 0.961*** 0.542*
(6.16) (3.66) (3.21) (0.44) (4.88) (8.37) (12.86) (2.12)
Observations 3733 5533 969 1249 2484 4461 3271 4659
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.20 0.37 0.35 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Private Safe Assets
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
ABCP Fin. CP Non-Fin. CP CDO
OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill OIS-Tbill GCF-Tbill
SeasonalComponentt 0.004* 0.001 -0.002 -0.007** 0.000 0.006* 0.012 0.000
(2.25) (1.43) (-0.55) (-2.95) (0.05) (2.47) (1.95) (0.10)
ConYieldSAt−1 -0.006* 0.001 -0.002 -0.016*** 0.012 0.012* 0.002 0.010*
(-2.05) (0.53) (-0.32) (-3.37) (1.72) (2.52) (0.25) (2.25)
Constant 0.269*** 0.002 -0.040 0.440*** 0.712*** 0.148 -0.205 -0.205
(13.93) (0.04) (-1.22) (3.39) (7.77) (1.15) (-1.13) (-0.85)
Observations 3780 4226 3731 4177 3776 4222 1878 2649
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.31 0.30 0.12 0.09
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.22: Who Times Issuance: Non-FHLB Agencies and Commercial Paper Issuers. log(Issuancet)Detrended = α +
β1SeasonalComponentt + β2ConYieldSAt−1 + θt + εt where θt represents controls including: day-of-week, quarter-end, month-end, and year fixed-
effects. Regression run at the daily level. Seasonal adjustment from preceding 5-year rolling window, excluding the crisis period. Issuance is calculated
from the detrended logged series: FreddieDisco refers to Freddie discount notes (excluding overnight); FreddieRefBill are Freddie reference bills; Fannie
is bond issues with maturity greater than 1 year; FFCB to Federal Farm Credit Banks bond issues with greater than 1 year maturity; ABCP, financial,
and non-financial refers to highly-rated commercial paper issuance with maturities 1 day to 4 days; and CDO are collateralized debt obligations.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses using Newey-West standard errors with a maximum of 20 lags.
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Prob > χ2
Equation Excluded Pre-Crisis Post-Reform Full ex-GFC
log(FHLB Outstanding) GCF-Tbill 0.024 0.067 0.000
log(FHLB Outstanding) OIS-Tbill 0.098 0.048 0.019
GCF-Tbill log(FHLB Outstanding) 0.310 0.032 0.150
OIS-Tbill log(FHLB Outstanding) 0.544 0.009 0.054
Table 2.23: Granger Causality. Table presents the results from running pairwise Granger causality Wald tests after estimating the vector
autoregression in equation 2.4.3. The pairwise Granger causality test regresses yt (shown in column “Equation”) on its own lags and the lags of xt
(shown in column “Excluded”) and uses a Wald test to check if the coefficients on lags of xt are jointly 0. The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on
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Figure 2.12: Share of Total Commercial Bank Assets by District. Source: FHLB and Federal Reserve. Only includes commercial banks
matched in WRDS and does not include non-commercial-bank members.
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Figure 2.13: Advance Haircuts, Q4 2017. Source: 2017 FHLB Office of Finance Collateral Q&A.
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Member Type Charter Q4 2009 Q2 2018
Commercial Bank State 4,496 3,504
Credit Union Federal 516 735
State 488 734
Insurance Company N/A 207 419
Savings Bank Federal 437 0
State 395 331
Savings Association Federal 0 316
State 0 52
Savings and Loan Federal 227 0
State 73 0
CDFI N/A 0 52
Table 2.24: Total Number of FHLB Members by Institution Type
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Blanket Listing Delivery Total Blanket Listing Delivery Total
Collateral Type % % % % $ bil $ bil $ bil $ bil
Single family mortgage 43.5 68.4 2.2 51.6 484 885 6 1,375
CRE loans 33.7 11.3 12.4 20.8 376 146 32 554
Multifamily loans 6.4 12.2 4.9 9.1 71 158 12 241
HELOCs 7.9 7.1 0.0 6.8 88 92 0 180
Agency MBS, CMOs 48.0 4.6 122 122
Agency Securities 7.5 0.7 19 19
U.S. obligations 6.5 0.6 16 16
CMBS 6.3 0.6 16 16
PLMBS/PLCMO 2.2 0.2 6 6
Other 8.5 1.0 9.9 5.0 95 13 25 133
Total 100 100 100 100 1,114 1,294 254 2,662
Table 2.25: Advance Collateral
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$ billion Large Borrowers All Others Large Share
Advances Outstanding (principal) 527 209 72%
Other Credit Products 79 69 54%
Collateral Outstanding 1,583 1,080 59%
Average Haircut 33% 19%
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3.1 Introduction
We study the effect of corporate cash holdings on stock returns. Cash is necessary for a firm’s operations,
and firms use their cash holdings as a means of payment, financing investments, and managing risk. Firms
earn different returns on cash and their non-cash assets, and failing to account for cash holdings and the
return on cash leads to biases in standard asset pricing frameworks.
Cash is also an economically significant source of time-series and cross-sectional variation in public firms’
assets (Figure 3.1). In December 2020, the value-weighted U.S. stock market held roughly 22% of its assets in
cash and short-term equivalents compared to approximately 8% on average in the late 1970s. The variation
in individual firms’ cash share has increased on average almost every decade, with a substantial large peak
during the dot-com bubble.
We estimate firm-specific cash returns with a model of the value of cash from Faulkender and Wang
(2006). We find the average value of a $1 inside a firm is $0.95, but the value varies considerably over time
(Figure 3.2). We calculate a firm’s cash-hedged stock return with the firm’s stock return, cash return estimate,
and our stock return decomposition. We use our firm-level cash return and cash-hedged return to study how
cash balances affect portfolio optimization, factor creation, betas, and cross-sectional asset pricing.
We motivate our results with a simple model to show the effect of a firm’s implicit cash holding on the
investor’s portfolio optimization. We decompose a firm’s standard stock return into the firm’s cash-hedged
return, cash share, and return on cash, and we present five main empirical results.
First, we show that standard equity returns are not cash-hedged returns by decomposing stock returns
into their cash and non-cash components. Second, we show that common empirical asset pricing factors—size,
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value, and momentum—have large and time-varying net cash positions. We show that our cash-hedging
strategy effectively removes these net cash positions. Third, we show how common empirical asset pricing
factors covary with cash holdings; namely, that value strongly covaries with high cash holding. Motivated by
this strong covariance structure, we propose the Cash factor, which captures the premia between firms with
high cash holdings and firms with low cash holdings.
Fourth, we show how to decompose standard betas into the cash-hedged return beta and other components.
We perform this beta decomposition for CAPM betas and multifactor betas. We show that the CAPM
decomposition provides a securities market line that clearly shows the positive relationship between expected
returns and betas. The beta decomposition shows that cash-hedged portfolios will have a more efficient
tangency portfolio and a steeper efficient frontier.
Last, we run cross-sectional regressions. We find a significant and positive price of market risk only when
using the cash-hedged market factor. Using characteristics instead of betas, we show that firms with higher
cash shares have higher expected equity returns and suggest that firms do not hold cash because they think
their cash balances will have a strong return.
Related Literature We contribute to the literature that studies how cash affects firm equity returns. A
firm’s cash holdings may increase firm value. Cash kept on a firm’s balance sheet allows firms to finance
investments without incurring transaction costs (Miller and Orr, 1966), information asymmetry costs (Myers
and Majluf, 1984), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and other costs (Huberman, 1984) associated
with raising funds from external capital markets. Cash allows firms to decrease the probability of incurring
costs associated with financial distress and bankruptcy when cash flow is inadequate for paying interest and
principal on debt obligations (Acharya et al., 2012).
Firms may use cash as an instrument for risk management (Bolton et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2007). A
firm’s cash holdings may also decrease firm value. Cash may create differences in the interests of managers
and shareholders and allow managers to invest in projects with negative net present value for shareholders
but positive benefits for themselves (Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006). The benefits of cash for a firm’s
shareholders also depend on the strength of the firm’s corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).
Additional empirical studies showing cash influences firm value for shareholders are Opler et al. (1999) and
Faulkender and Wang (2006). Several other studies1 also investigate the relationship between cash holdings
and firm value.
1Some additional studies are Kim et al. (1998), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Smith and Kim (1994), Bates et al. (2009),
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007), Foley et al. (2007), Mikkelson and Partch (2003), Dittmar et al. (2003), Almeida et al. (2004),
Harford et al. (2008), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Gamba and Triantis (2008), Han and Qiu (2007),
Livdan et al. (2009), and Haushalter et al. (2007).
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The paper most closely related to the present paper is Palazzo (2012). Palazzo (2012) shows firms’
cash holdings may be influenced by the correlation between firm cash flows and aggregate cash flows. The
correlation increases cash holdings because financing operations with cash may be cheaper than external
financing following adverse aggregate cash flow shocks. The paper uses accounting-based estimates of stocks’
expected returns and cross-sectional tests with stock portfolios to evaluate the paper’s hypothesized connection
between cash holdings and stock returns. Palazzo (2012) is broadly similar to this paper because both study
the relationship between firms’ cash holdings, firms’ expected returns, and aggregate risks. Palazzo (2012)
differs from the present paper because the focus of Palazzo (2012) shows the correlation between firm cash
flows and aggregate cash flows creates a novel precautionary savings motive for firms. This paper estimates
cash and non-cash returns for several established risk factors—market, size, value, and —and studies the
cross-sectional properties of the factors’ cash and non-cash returns.
3.2 Motivating Model
We describe a simple model to show the effect of a firm’s implicit cash holding on the investor’s portfolio
optimization. We solve the problem with infinite horizon optimal portfolio choice problem, intermediate
consumption, no outside income, lognormal stock returns, and independent and identically distributed
returns.2 A representative investor with CRRA utility makes a consumption and portfolio choice between the
two assets available, a risk-free bond Bt which pays rtdt and a firm’s stock St which follows
dR = µSdt+ σSdZ
The investor’s problem is







such that dNt = NtαtdRt +Nt(1− αt)rdt− ctdt.
We model the effect of corporate cash holdings on the firm’s stock return by assuming the stock is a
portfolio of two assets, the firm’s non-cash assets with price Et and the firm’s cash invested in risk-free bonds.
The stock’s weight on the non-cash asset is (1 − ωt), and the stock’s weight on the risk-free bonds is ωt.
The stock’s weight on the risk-free bond asset satisfies 0 ≤ ωt < 1. We also assume, for simplicity, ωt is
deterministic with no volatility. We assume the investor observes ωt, Et, and Bt. We assume the investor
2Section 5.2 of Cochrane (2007) provides details on this special case of the Merton problem and on a number of extensions.
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realizes the firm’s stock is a portfolio of the firm’s risk-free bonds and non-cash assets. The stock’s return is a
function of the firm’s non-cash assets, cash assets, and cash weight
dR = (1− ωt) (µEdt+ σEdZ) + ωtrdt.












Equation 3.1 shows the investor holds the stock St in proportion to its Sharpe ratio, and hedges the firm’s
bond position using leverage. For example, if ωt = 0.5 then the investor would hedge the bond position by
selling a risk-free bond and purchasing additional stock in a ratio that offsets the bond share indicated by ωt.
For comparison, suppose the investor mistakenly thinks the stock’s return follows the process
dR = µSdt+ σSdZt.









When the investor does not account for the effect of cash on the firm’s return, the investor’s allocation to the
stock is too small by a factor of 11−ωt when 1 > ωt > 0. The investor’s allocation to the bond is too large.
Equation 3.1 presents two adjustments the investor must make in her portfolio allocation decision. First,
she must correctly measure the first and second moments of the true source of risk; the optimal portfolio
share depends on the Sharpe ratio of E (using moments µE and σE) not S (using moments µS and σS).
Second, she must hedge out the stock’s implicit risk-free bond position. Figure 3.3 confirms the intuition of
the model by plotting αt as a function of ωt. When the risky asset available to the investor carries a larger
implicit risk-free bond position, the investor must lever up their risky asset allocation to compensate.
3.3 Decomposing Stock Returns
We assume a firm’s stock, with return rit for firm i in month t, is a portfolio of two assets: a firm’s cash and a
firm’s non-cash assets. The firm’s cash earns monthly return bit. We assume cash returns are firm-specific due
to the empirical and theoretical evidence indicating many factors generate variation in the value of cash across
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firms. The firm’s non-cash assets include all of a firm’s assets except for the firm’s cash and has monthly
return eit, which we call the cash-hedged stock return. Partitioning each stock’s value into the two disjoint
assets lets us equate a stock’s gross return as the weighted average of the cash return and the cash-hedged













= (1− wit)eit + witbit.
(3.3)
Modeling a stock’s return with equation 3.3 gives us a standard accounting identity equating a portfolio’s
return to the returns of the portfolio’s constituent securities. Thus, we can back out unknown variables from
the equation’s observed variables.
For our empirical analysis, we use the ratio of cash and short-term equivalents to total assets from
Compustat to compute wit, and we will use stock returns from CRSP for rit. We use a model from Faulkender
and Wang (2006) to help us compute bit, the return on firms’ cash assets. The equation’s only unknown
variable is eit, a firm’s non-cash return. We use the following equation to determine a stock’s non-cash return








Using equation 3.4, we can consider a stock’s non-cash return, or its cash-hedged return, eit as the return of a
particular portfolio constructed with two hypothetical trades. The first trade buys 1(1−wit) shares of the firm’s
stock. Since the fraction of a firm’s total assets held in cash is between zero and one, the stock’s weight
in equation 3.4 exceeds one. In other words, the non-cash portfolio’s first position is a levered position in




, underlying the portfolio’s
1
(1−wit)
units of the firm’s stock. The second trade hedges the non-cash portfolio’s exposure to the firm’s cash
associated with the portfolio’s long position in the firm’s stock. The portfolio’s two trades leave the portfolio
with net-zero units of the firm’s cash and one unit of the firm’s non-cash assets. The equation’s description
as a portfolio implemented with two trades is hypothetical because firms’ cash and non-cash assets cannot be
individually bought and sold.
We use the firm-level stock return decomposition to determine the cash and non-cash components of
several value-weighted portfolios. The return of value-weighted stock portfolio rpt where member stocks have
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vit((1− wit)eit + witbit). (3.5)
The value-weighted non-cash only and cash only portfolio returns—ept and b
p
t— are useful for measuring
a stock portfolio’s aggregate cash and non-cash returns without cash-share changes contributing to the













where vit is asset i’s value weight within portfolio p. We define the term γit = wit(eit − bit) as the difference
between a stock’s non-cash and cash return, weighted by the stock’s cash share. We use γit to decompose a
stock’s return:
rit = eit − wit(eit − bit)
= eit − γit .
(3.8)
The equation is helpful for two reasons. First, we can interpret the equation’s first term as the stock’s return
if management saved no cash on its balance sheet; the second term is the cost that management incurs by
holding cash on its balance sheet instead of additional non-cash assets. Second, we can view the equation
as the reorganization of a stock’s cash and non-cash returns into one term γit), containing variation in the
stock’s return due to variation in the firm’s cash holdings, and another term, eit, that does not.
We also define a stock’s excess return as ri,xst = rit − r
f
t , where r
f
t is the risk free rate, and define a stock’s
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excess non-cash return as ei,xst = eit − r
f












































We use monthly stock return, price, and share data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
and Compustat. We join CRSP and Compustat data with the CCM link table provided by Wharton Research
Data Services. Our stock sample construction follows Asness et al. (2013). Our stock sample’s construction
begins with all U.S. stocks (sharecodes 10 and 11) traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, with share
prices greater than one dollar at the beginning of each month. We exclude REITS, ADRs, preferred shares,
financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6799), and we require stocks to have monthly returns for the previous 12
months to construct the momentum characteristic. We require stocks to have book values available six
months before the current month, and we require stocks to have share prices and shares outstanding for the
previous month and six months ago. These conditions are necessary for constructing the book-to-market and
size characteristics. We require firms’ book-to-market ratios and market capitalization are greater than zero.
We also use the market capitalization procedure from Asness et al. (2013) to create a very liquid collection
of stocks with low trading costs for moderately sized trade volumes. Each month we rank stocks by their
market capitalization at the beginning of the month, beginning with the largest stock by market capitalization
and ending with the smallest stock by market capitalization. Beginning with the largest stock, we incrementally
add stocks to the current month’s stock sample until the stock sample makes up 90% of the stock market’s
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total market capitalization. This procedure creates a sample of large and very liquid stocks. Asness et al.
(2013) report the stocks included in the sample, on average, make up the largest 17% of firms in the United
States.
To estimate firms’ cash returns, we also use conditions from Faulkender and Wang (2006) to build our
stock sample. We exclude utility firms from our sample (SIC codes 4900–4999). We require firms have
non-missing observations for the following Compustat variables during the current and previous fiscal year:
cash and short term securities, total assets, income before extraordinary items, common stock dividends, and
the total debt, including current debt or total long term debt. We also use the following Compustat variables
for the present and previous fiscal years but replace missing observations with zero: sales of common and
preferred stock, purchases of common and preferred stock, long-term debt issuance, long-term debt reduction,
research and development expense, and interest expense. Setting these variables to zero may introduce
measurement error into our cash return estimates. However, these variables are required for estimating cash
returns using Faulkender and Wang (2006). Dropping observations where these variables’ values are missing
would create a prohibitively small sample.
We place restrictions on the paper’s stock sample to estimate firms’ cash shares and non-cash returns.
We require non-missing quarterly total assets and non-missing quarterly cash and short-term equivalent
observations six months before the current month. We also require firms’ quarterly total assets and quarterly
cash and short-term equivalents variables to be greater than zero. These sample restrictions are necessary to
construct the paper’s cash share variable. We do not use annual analogs of the quarterly total asset and cash
variables. We consider these variables’ timeliness for determining the contribution of firms’ cash and non-cash
returns to their stock returns. Since the most recent annual versions of these variables are potentially 16
months old, the annual variables for fiscal periods too far in the past to reasonably proxy for a firm’s current
cash share.
We also drop pharmaceutical firms (SIC codes 2830–2836) because these firms’ cash holdings are unusually
large relative to their total assets. Pharmaceutical firms’ unusually large cash-to-asset ratios maybe due to
the pharmaceutical industry practicing much more conservative accounting than other industries (Easton
and Pae, 2004). Accounting conservatism may prompt these firms to provide pessimistic valuations of assets
with uncertain value, like drug research and development, but not easily valued assets, like cash. As a
consequence, cash makes up a large fraction of these firms’ reported balance sheets. Chandra (2011) also finds
that pharmaceutical firms are particularly likely to practice conservative financial accounting because of these
firms’ greater shareholder litigation risk and the high level of conservatism required by accounting standard
Financial Accounting Standard Board (1974) for their research and development activities. Pharmaceutical
conservative accounting practices mean their reported net assets are too low (Watts, 2003a,b), and their
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assets subject to less conservative accounting, like cash, make up too large a fraction of their reported balance
sheets.
Our paper’s sample begins in January 1976 and ends in December 2020. Both CRSP and Compustat
provide data for years before 1976. We do not include earlier years in our sample because the quarterly cash
and total asset observations necessary for our cash share variable are missing for approximately 80% of the
merged, monthly CRSP–Compustat sample before 1976. We use observations from 1976 to the end of 1977
to construct some of the paper’s variables. We do not use the years 1976 and 1977 to construct factor and
test portfolios because many of the requisite variables are not available before 1976.
3.4.2 Variables
We use the variable definitions from Asness et al. (2013) for the book-to-market and momentum firm charac-
teristics. A stock’s book-to-market ratio (BEME) at the beginning of the month is Book Valueit−6/Market Valueit−1.
Asness et al. (2013) use this specific value definition because it is a standard, conservative, and easily
implemented definition of BEME. Fama and French (1992) provide another common BEME definition with
more complex lags than the above definition. The paper’s results are similar when using the BEME and
market value definitions from Fama and French (1992). We compute the firm size characteristic as the
product of a firm’s shares outstanding and share price at the beginning of the current month. We define
momentum (MOM) as a stock’s gross return from the beginning of month t− 12 to the end of month t− 2
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Asness, 1994; Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2004). Our definition of MOM is
standard, including our omission of a stock’s return over month t− 1 from the construction of MOM.3 We
use these characteristics to characterize empirical features of stocks’ aggregate cash and non-cash returns, so
basic definitions of these variables suffice.









where t − 6 reflects accounting variables for the period six months before. We view a stock’s cash share
in month t as an unobserved variable and a firm’s lagged cash to total asset ratio as a reasonable proxy
for a stock’s cash share. We later report results supporting our assumption that lagged cash shares proxy
3A stock’s month t− 1 return also predicts stock returns and may attenuate the return predictability of MOM. Standard
explanations for t− 1 month return reversals are market microstructure and limited liquidity (Jegadeesh, 1990; Boudoukh et al.,
1994).
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for current cash shares. We chose a six-month lag for the cash share, consistent with the BEME variable’s
timeliness. A six-month lag also makes the variables’ information relatively recent without risking the use of
financial information before it’s available to investors. Impink et al. (2012) report 91% of 10Ks between 1999
and 2006 are filed within 90 days of the fiscal year-end. Alford et al. (1994) report 20% of firms between 1977
and 1985 filed 10Ks more than 90 days after fiscal year-end. Only 2% of firms file 10Ks more than 150 days
after fiscal year-end. The paper’s six-month lag for BEME and cash shares could contain information for this
2% of firms before it’s available to the public. However, the average market cap of a firm filing more than 150
days after fiscal year-end is $4.9 million. The smallest firm’s market capitalization in our sample between
1977 and 1985 is $54 million. The 2% of firms where financial statements may not be available within six
months of fiscal year-end are likely too small to be in our sample.
3.4.3 Firm-Level Cash Return Variable Construction
Our procedure for estimating the return on firms’ cash has four steps. First, we use the methodology from
Faulkender and Wang (2006) to estimate the marginal value of cash for each firm in our sample. Second, we
integrate our estimate of the marginal value for a firm’s cash to determine the average value of the firm’s
cash. Third, we compute the return on a firm’s cash by dividing the market value of a firm’s cash at fiscal
year-end by the market value of a firm’s cash at the previous fiscal year-end. Last, we create firm-specific
cash return mimicking portfolios to estimate cash returns at a higher frequency.
We follow the methodology from Faulkender and Wang (2006) to calculate the marginal value of cash
for each firm, and we summarize this methodology below.4 For the dependent variable in the regression,
Faulkender and Wang (2006) use a stock’s excess return over a fiscal year t, which is calculated as the stock’s
return from the beginning to the end of the fiscal year return less the return of a benchmark portfolio over
the same year. The benchmark portfolio controls for a stock’s expected return associated with the stock’s size
and book-to-market ratio. The regression’s independent variables are firm characteristics that could fluctuate
alongside the firm’s cash. The independent variables are scaled by the firm’s market equity at the beginning
of the fiscal year, M it−1. Since both the dependent and independent variables are scaled by a stock’s beginning
of fiscal year market equity, the regression coefficient measures the dollar change in shareholder value when
4See Faulkender and Wang (2006) 1967–1968 for further details.
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the firm’s cash changes by one dollar. The regression specification from Faulkender and Wang (2006) is
rit −R
i,B




































The return of stock i over fiscal year t is rit, and R
i,B
t is the fiscal year return for one of the 5×5 size and
book-to-market portfolios available on Ken French’s website. The dependent variable is the firm’s return
after controlling for the firm’s expected return, as calculated using the corresponding 5× 5 portfolio. The
portfolios’ fiscal year returns are computed from the portfolios’ monthly returns over each firm’s fiscal year.
The stock’s size and BEME quintiles determine which of the 25 value-weighted size and BEME portfolios
Ri,Bt represents.5
In the regression, ∆Xit equals Xit −Xit−1 and proxies for unexpected changes in the variable. Cit is cash
and short-term equivalents. Iit is interest expense. Dit is common dividends paid. Lit is market leverage at the
end of fiscal year t and equals total debt divided by total debt plus market equity. NF it is net financing and
equals total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemptions. RDit is research
and development expense. Eit is earnings before extraordinary items plus deferred tax credits and investment
tax credits. NAit is net assets and equals total assets minus cash holdings. Last, M it−1 is the market value
of equity at the end of the previous year. Earnings, net assets, research and development expense, interest
expense, dividends paid, and net financing are variables controlling for correlation between cash and returns
and unobserved variables that affect stock returns.
Table 3.23 reports regression coefficients for the Faulkender and Wang (2006) regression specification.
Our regression results are similar to the results in Faulkender and Wang (2006). Since Faulkender and Wang
(2006) provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the regression, we refer interested readers to the original
paper’s methodology.
Taking the partial derivative of equation 3.11 with respect to ∆Cit yields the marginal value of $1 to firm
5We use NYSE breakpoints from Ken French’s website for the size and BEME quintiles. We use firm ME at the beginning of
month t and the ME breakpoint for month t to determine a stock’s ME quintile. We use the current year’s BEME breakpoint to
assign stocks BEME quintiles for July to December. We use the previous year’s BEME breakpoint to assign stocks BEME
quintiles for January through June of the current year. We align stocks’ BEME values with BEME breakpoints in this manner
because the BEME breakpoints are updated at the beginning of each July. July through December of year t and January
through June of year t+ 1 form one, complete BEME “breakpoint year.” Months are assigned to BEME “breakpoint years” in
the same manner months are assigned to fiscal years.
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i at time t:














The equal-weighted average marginal cash value across all firms is 1.261 + (−0.719× 0.17) + (−1.171× 0.20) =
$0.90. We then compute the average value of a firm’s cash by integrating the marginal dollar value equation
with respect to the firm’s cash at the beginning of the year, then dividing by the firm’s cash at the beginning
of the year. We assume the value of zero dollars to the shareholder is zero, as the value of the next dollar
would likely have to go toward expenses or debtors.
















We use a firm’s average cash value estimates to compute the return on a firm’s cash by dividing the current
fiscal year-end average cash value by the previous fiscal year-end average cash value:




Last, we compute a firm’s monthly cash return over a fiscal year t by forming firm-specific cash return
mimicking portfolios in the spirit of Adrian et al. (2014). We form the mimicking portfolios by regressing a
firm’s cash returns on returns for 30-day, 1-year, 10-year, and 30-year U.S. Treasuries using annual data. We
then estimate a firm’s monthly cash returns with the mimicking portfolio weights.
3.4.4 Cash-Hedged Stock Return Construction
After estimating firms’ cash returns, we have the variables necessary for creating estimates of firms’ cash-
hedged stock returns. We use firms’ monthly stock returns rit, cash-to-total asset ratios (wit, estimated using
the six-®month lag of the cash-to-total asset ratio), and monthly cash return estimates (bit). We use the
quarterly frequency Compustat variables cash and short-term equivalents and total assets for the cash-to-total
assets ratio. We drop from our sample firms with cash-to-total asset ratios that are less than or equal to
zero; firms with negative cash and short-term equivalents; and firms with negative total assets. To compute a
firm’s cash-hedged monthly stock return we substitute the firm’s cash return, bit, cash-to-total assets ratio,
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We winsorize the yearly cash return and eit at the 1 and 99 percent levels to reduce the effect of outliers. After
estimating firms’ monthly cash-hedged stock returns, we construct value-weighted test and factor portfolios
using definitions collected in Table 3.1.
3.4.5 Portfolio Construction
Gathering stocks in portfolios sorted on a characteristic is a standard procedure for constructing cross-
sectional asset pricing tests dependent variables. All of the portfolios we construct use monthly returns, use
value-weights, and are re-balanced monthly. Stocks value weights are determined monthly by their beginning
of month market capitalizations. We construct two sets of 25 size and book-to-market portfolios, which
we will use as test assets in our cross-sectional regressions. First, we construct 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios, similar to Fama and French (1992). We independently double sort on size and book-to-market,
each into five groups. By intersecting these groups, we assign stocks to one of 25 portfolio groups. We then
calculate the value-weighted portfolio returns for each of these 25 portfolio groups. These are the standard
5x5 size and book-to-market portfolios in stock return terms. Second, we construct 25 cash-hedged portfolio
returns. We use the same methodology to assign stocks to portfolios, but we calculate the returns using each
firm’s cash-hedged returns rather than the firm’s stock return to calculate the value-weighted returns. We
follow an analogous procedure to form 10 momentum-sorted portfolios.
3.4.6 Factor Construction
For analysis, we use two approaches to construct factors: the first only uses the sorting variable in a single
sort, and the second uses double and triple sorts. Each approach results in long-short self-financing factors.
All of the factors use monthly returns, use value-weights, and are re-balanced monthly. Stocks value weights
are determined monthly by their beginning of month market capitalizations.
First, we create simple factors: based on only the sorting variable, we single sort our data into three
equal-sized groups, and then we calculate the three value-weighted portfolios (High (P3), Middle (P2) and
Low (P1)). We calculate each strategy’s premium as P3-P1. For example, the value premium is the difference
between the return of the high book-to-market portfolio less the return of the low book-to-market portfolio.
We construct five simple factors: Value, Size, Mom, and Cash and calculate the standard returns and
cash-hedged returns to each trading strategy. The first three factors are constructed using the commonly-used
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sorting variables of book-to-market, book value, and past returns as discussed in 3.4.2. The sorting variable
for Cash is a firm’s cash share.
Second, we construct HML, HMLTriple, SMB, SMBTriple, WML, WMLTriple, and CASHTriple using
double and triple sorts. SMB and HML are constructed using the same strategy as Fama and French (1993).
We construct WML in the same way as HML, but using sorts on size and past returns. In this way, all three
factors control for size. As in Fama and French (1993), SMB is constructed to be largely independent of
value, and HML is designed to be largely independent of size. Double sorting helps “control” for the fact that
high and low value stocks may consistently coincide with higher and lower returns because sorting on value
implicitly sorts on another variable that coincides with differential expected returns.
Likewise, we construct triple sorted-factors that “control” for cash share—which we find varies with returns—
in addition to size. To construct HMLTriple we perform independent sorts on cash share (Flush/Mid/Pennies),
size (Big/Midsize/Small), and book-to-market (HiBM/MidBM/LoBM), and then construct the triple-sorted
factor. To be explicit, the equation for HMLTriple is below. As we discuss later, the results suggest that it is
important to triple sort to construct the cash factor CASHTriple because cash holdings and value strongly
covary.
HMLTriple =HiBM/Flush/Big + HiBM/Mid/Big + HiBM/Pennies/Big6
+ HiBM/Flush/Small + HiBM/Mid/Small + HiBM/Pennies/Small6
− LoBM/Flush/Big + LoBM/Mid/Big + LoBM/Pennies/Big6
− LoBM/Flush/Small + LoBM/Mid/Small + LoBM/Pennies/Small6
The remaining triple-sorted factors are constructed analogously.
3.5 Results
First, we show that standard equity returns are not cash-hedged returns by decomposing stock returns into
their cash and non-cash components. Second, we show that common empirical asset pricing factors—size,
value, and momentum—have large and time-varying net cash positions. We show that our cash-hedging
strategy effectively removes these net cash positions. Third, we show how common empirical asset pricing
factors covary with cash holdings; namely, that value strongly covaries with high cash holding. Motivated by
this strong covariance structure, we propose the Cash factor that captures the premia between firms with
high cash holdings and low cash holdings.
Fourth, we show how to decompose standard betas into the cash-hedged return beta and other components.
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We perform this beta decomposition for CAPM betas and multifactor betas. The CAPM decomposition
provides a securities market line that clearly shows the positive relationship between expected returns and
betas. The beta decomposition shows that cash-hedged portfolios will have a more efficient tangency portfolio
and a steeper efficient frontier.
Last, we run cross-sectional regressions. We find a significant and positive price of market risk only when
using the cash-hedged market factor. Using characteristics instead of betas, we show that firms with higher
cash shares have higher expected equity returns and suggest that firms do not hold cash because they think
their cash balances will have a strong return.
3.5.1 Stock Portfolio Return Decomposition
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total asset portfolios.
The portfolios are constructed by sorting stocks into terciles (P1, P2, and P3), and P3-P1 is the spread
between the top and bottom terciles. We calculate each portfolio’s stock return and the separate the non-cash
and cash components of the overall stock return. For each portfolio p, the non-cash return is calculated as∑
i∈p v
i









The table reports the portfolios’ average return, standard deviation, annualized Sharpe ratio, and the
alpha and t-statistic from time-series regressions of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The t-statistics
use Newey-West standard errors with ten lags.
The stock portfolios’ average returns and other statistics are consistent with the previous literature
using the same characteristics. Looking across the low to high portfolios, we can broadly see the value and
momentum effects. The value and momentum effects have smaller t-statistics than usual due to our use of a
sample of large and liquid stocks.
The non-cash and cash return columns indicate the bulk of the stock returns come from the non-cash
return component. The cash components are smaller returns, with values around 0.05%, and the portfolios’
non-cash component is slightly larger than the portfolios’ stock returns.
Table 3.3 reports the average non-cash and cash returns for each tercile. These returns are formed using
firms’ non-cash and cash returns and equations 3.6 and 3.7. We do not scale the returns by firms’ cash-shares,
which distinguishes the returns from the non-cash and cash component returns reported in Table 3.2.
Compared to stock returns formed on the same characteristics, the non-cash returns are slightly larger in
magnitude and are more volatile, but the Sharpe ratios and alphas are in a similar range. The cash portfolios’
returns are noticeably larger than the cash return component of stock returns in Table 3.2, but, overall, the
cash portfolios’ returns are small relative to the non-cash portfolios returns.
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Table 3.4 reports summary statistics on the cash share of each tercile portfolio. For a given month t and






t. The table reports time-series averages and
standard deviations of the portfolios’ monthly cash-shares. Unsurprisingly, cash-to-total asset portfolios’ cash
shares increase considerably, from 0.02 for the low portfolio up to 0.25 for the high portfolio. The average
cash-share decreases from the low to the high book-to-market portfolio. The other sorting variables have a
weaker correlation with firms’ cash shares. Across size portfolios, the average cash share is flat; and across
momentum portfolios, cash share increases slightly.
3.5.2 Stock Returns Differ from Non-Cash Returns
What is a firm’s stock return? An inspection of Equation 3.3 makes it clear that rit, the firm’s stock return, is
a firm’s non-cash return only under the unlikely event a firm carries no cash or other short-term equivalents:
that is, rit = eit if and only if wit = 0. The stock return rit is less than return of a public firm’s non-cash return.
Specifically, if Eeit > Ebit, then Equation 3.3 shows:
Erit = E
[




(1− wit)eit + witeit
]
= Eeit
Similarly, in the aggregate market, rm,xst = e
m,xs
t − γmt , so the aggregate stock market return is less than the
aggregate non-cash market return.
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics for the stock market excess return, market non-cash excess return,
market cash excess return, and the value-weighted market cash share. For the market-level aggregate returns,
the average monthly non-cash return is 1.06% and larger than the average stock return of 0.76%, as predicted.
The Sharpe ratio for the cash-hedged market return is about 20% larger, with the 40% increase in average
return offset by larger volatility. This is sensible since the stock returns had an implicit investment in cash,
which is a low volatility asset.
Table 3.6 confirms that firms’ non-cash excess returns are greater than stock excess returns on average,
both at the firm level (column 1) and at the aggregate market level (columns 2 and 3). The table reports
the regression of the standard stock excess returns on non-cash excess returns. If the stock excess return is
less than the non-cash excess return, the coefficient in this regression will be less than one. The regression’s
coefficient is 0.71 in the firm-level regression and significantly different from zero. The regression at the
aggregate market level yields similar results: the coefficient is 0.82 in our sample and 0.72 using Fama–French’s
market excess return. This means that for a one percentage point increase in non-cash return, the stock
return increases by less than one percentage point.
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3.5.3 Cash-Adjusted Factor Premia
Table 3.7 presents the returns for the most common asset pricing factors when calculating returns and
volatilities for the standard stocks and separately for the cash-hedged returns, which corresponds to the
standard return and the cash-hedged return. Figure 3.4 presents the cumulative returns for standard and
cash-hedged HML and WML.
We find that comparing the standard measure against the cash-hedged measure flips the sign of value
to negative. A similar phenomenon appears for HML, in which in standard terms carries a 1.46% average
excess return, but when adjusted for its cash holdings has a −2.37% average monthly excess return. Table
3.8 shows the average cash share for each of the 25 size- and BEME-sorted portfolios. Within each size
bucket, the cash share monotonically increases as we move from value portfolios to growth portfolios. The
results suggest that growth stocks have lower returns because they have larger cash shares and thus a larger
implicit investment in the risk-free bond, which drags the overall return down for growth stocks. Value stocks
outperform growth stocks–in standard returns–in the same way a 95% stock/5% bond portfolio outperforms
an 80%/20% portfolio.
The differential cash holding between growth and value means growth stocks will grow proportionally
more as the investor hedges out the larger cash share: since growth stocks have a larger implicit holding
of a low-return investment, moving from standard returns to cash-hedged returns will change the mean
and standard deviation of growth stocks. Of course, average cash-hedged returns and volatility should also
increase for value stocks, but to a lesser extent. In Table 3.21, we can see this: comparing standard to
cash-hedged returns, the mean and standard deviation of growth stocks increase more than that of value
stocks. Thus, in standard terms, value outperforms growth; but in cash-hedged terms, growth outperforms
value.
Looking at the mean and standard deviation together, it appears that as cash-hedged returns increase—
going from value to growth—volatility also increases. This relationship is in line with the simple idea that
returns are compensation for risk. In contrast, looking at standard returns, value stocks have higher returns
and less volatile returns. This result suggests that cash share helps us refine our understanding of the value
premium as compensation for risk.
These results strongly suggest that there is a strong covariance between value and cash, and thus it
is crucial to triple sort value when looking in cash-hedged terms. Looking back at Table 3.7, HMLTriple
maintains the positive mean return and Sharpe ratio when we look between standard returns and cash-hedged
returns.
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3.5.4 Cash-Related Covariance in Common Asset Pricing Factors
We test how common asset pricing characteristics covary with cash holdings by sorting each stock at each
point in time into percentiles for size, book-to-market, momentum, and cash share separately. We then regress
the cash share percentile on the percentile for size, value, and momentum in Table 3.9. The table shows that
cash holdings negatively covary with size and value and positively covaries with momentum. In other words:
larger firms hold less of their assets in cash; firms with higher book equity-to-market equity ratios hold less of
their assets in cash; and, firms with high momentum have a larger cash share. Most notable is the magnitude
of the covariance: cash share and value have a large negative coefficient of −0.332, nearly twenty times larger
than the negative correlation between cash share and size. We get similar results for value and momentum
when we regress the change in a firm’s cash share percentile on the change in a firm’s characteristic percentile.
The covariance between cash holdings and value motivates triple sorting of HML, SMB, and WML to
control for cash. We report summary statistics for the triple sorted factors in Table 3.7 which shows that
after triple sorting HML the value premium nearly triples. Controlling for cash for SMB and WML do not
appear to have a significant effect on their average standard returns.
Additionally, we test covariance via spanning tests: we regress each factor on the other candidate factors
from standard pricing models. If a factor is not spanned by other factors, it will have a statistically significant
intercept and therefore should be included in our pricing model. Table 3.10 presents the spanning tests for the
Fama–French 3 factor model with a momentum factor. These factor returns are in standard terms. Scanning
across the constant terms, we can see that only SMB is spanned by the other factors, as each other factor
has a statistically significant intercept. Therefore, each factor except for SMB is not spanned by a linear
combination of the other factors, consistent with the asset pricing literature consensus that size, without
adjustments, is a marginally significant anomaly.
Table 3.11 presents the spanning tests for the cash-hedged factors. Again, SMB is spanned by the other
hedged factors. HML’s constant is marginally significant. Since our sample ends in early 2021—which
coincides with a large drawdown in value—we expect that the HML constant will become positive again as
the cycle continues.
The cash factor and HML have a strong negative covariance. Table 3.12 presents the spanning tests for
the cash-hedged factors in the previous table, and the Cash factor. Importantly, all of the factors significantly
load and covary with Cash, and the Cash factor has a large significant coefficient and a strong negative
covariance with HML. This table motivates an asset pricing model with a cash factor or an asset pricing
model in which the factors control for their implicit cash holdings. As in the previous spanning tests, SMB is
spanned by the other factors.
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3.5.5 Factor Legs Have Varying Cash Holdings
Firm cash holdings bias factor returns constructed from sorts on a characteristic like size, book-to-market,
and momentum. We can decompose the returns to the factor, long, and short portfolios into the returns to
the constituent firms’ equity and cash holdings. Let ft be the factor return, rLt be the return to the long leg
of the factor, and rSt be the short leg of the factor. Then:
ft = rLt − rSt (3.14)
Substituting the portfolio decompositions for the long and short legs into the equation for the factor portfolio
return is
ft = (eLt − eSt )− (γLt − γSt ) (3.15)
The first term, eLt − eSt , denotes the return of the cash-hedged components of the factor’s long and short
portfolios and is typically the term of interest when constructing a factor from a characteristic sort’s high and
low portfolios. The last term, γLt − γSt , describes bias in the factor’s realizations due to firm cash holdings in
the long and short legs.
Figure 3.5 shows there is considerable time variation in the net cash position of factor portfolios constructed
size, value, and momentum. The value factor portfolio’s negative time series values mean stocks in the sort’s
low portfolio have larger cash holdings than stocks in the sort’s high portfolio. The momentum portfolio
typically contains a long but volatile cash position. The size factor portfolio’s net cash holding is the smallest
of all three characteristics. However, the size factor’s net holdings also appear to exhibit long-lived trends up
and down in the factor’s net cash.
Table 3.13 reports the results of regressing each factor’s net cash position on a constant; the coefficient
is the average net cash holdings for each factor portfolio. Importantly, this provides a test of whether the
factor’s net cash position is statistically different from zero. The table’s results are in line with the time series
figures. The value factor has a significant, negative average net cash position. The momentum factor has a
significant, positive average net cash position.
We report empirical results for size, book-to-market, and value factor portfolios constructed after adjusting
for their estimated cash holdings in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.14. These results show using our estimate of
cash holdings of the high and low characteristic portfolios’ cash holdings suffices for reducing the effect of
firm cash holdings on the factor portfolios. The average net cash holdings for the cash-adjusted value, size,
and momentum factor portfolios remain close to zero in Figure 3.6. We also test if the cash-adjusted factor
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portfolios’ average net cash is significantly different from zero and report the results in Table 3.14. The
average net cash position of the cash-adjusted factor portfolios is not significantly different from zero for the
size, value, and momentum characteristics. Therefore, we conclude that hedging cash holdings by using our
conservative measure of what is known to investors effectively hedges out implicit cash holdings implicit in
these portfolios.
3.5.6 Decomposing Standard Betas
In this section, we show the relationship between the standard time-series beta and the cash-hedged beta. We
study both a one-factor CAPM model and an expanded multifactor model, and we show that cash holdings
affect both betas and expected returns. In particular, the effect of cash attenuates beta estimates, and using
cash-hedged returns produces betas with more heterogeneity which leads to better estimates of risk prices.
CAPM Beta Decomposition
We calculate the excess returns of each portfolio, rp,xst , and the market-level excess standard stock return,
rm,xst , using the equations from Section 3.3. We can decompose the standard stock CAPM into the cash-
hedged beta, scaled by the ratio between the variance of the market-level excess cash-hedged return and the








































For each portfolio, the market beta calculated using a time series regression is equivalent to the sum of the
parts using the decomposition above. In addition, intuitively, if all companies held no cash (wit = 0 for all i)
then the market beta and the cash-hedged beta are equivalent, and the standard return and cash-hedged
return are also equal.
Figure 3.7 shows the Securities Market Line (SML), with the standard returns of the 25 size and book-
to-market portfolios on the y-axis and the market beta of each portfolio on the x-axis. As reported in the
literature, the SML is flat and betas and expected returns fail to line up linearly in a positively sloped
line. The right panel of Figure 3.7 shows the SML for cash-hedged returns. Now, there is a stronger linear
relationship between average cash-hedged betas and expected cash-hedged returns. The results suggest that
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adjusting standard returns for cash holdings brings basic empirical asset pricing facts to be consistent with
basic CAPM intuition that the only measure of risk that is relevant for pricing securities is covariance with
the market, which has served as the foundation of asset pricing over the last 60 years.
Table 3.15 shows the empirical beta decomposition. Looking at the averages row, it appears that βstandard
and βcash−hedged are very similar. The ratio of the variances is equivalent for all portfolios since we compute
both parts at the market-level. The ratio of 1.51 indicates that the aggregate cash-hedged return is 51%
more volatile than the standard aggregate return.
Figure 3.8 shows the cash-hedged and standard beta for each portfolio and the difference between the two
betas. In each size bucket, the result is consistent: portfolios with the largest and smallest value numbers
have the biggest difference between βstandard and βcash−hedged. Moving from growth to value in each size
bucket, it switches from βstandard < βcash−hedged to βstandard > βcash−hedged. It is unsurprising that the
most extreme value portfolios have the largest discrepancy: as we discussed previously, there is a strong
covariance between cash share and value as growth stocks tend to have high cash share and value stocks
tend to have low cash share. Ultimately, even though there is no difference in beta on average, there is a
differential effect on beta depending on the portfolio’s BEME. Since growth stocks have the largest cash share
and the most negative difference in beta, this suggests that cash shares attenuate the standard market beta
relative to the cash-hedged market beta (|βstandard| < |βcash−hedged|).
The CAPM beta decomposition shows that cash holdings affect both beta and expected returns, leading
to the substantial change in the securities market line. When firms choose their cash holdings, they are also
implicitly choosing their expected returns and beta.
Multivariate Beta Decomposition
We can extend the beta decomposition to the multivariate factor model. We will focus on the Fama–French
3 factor model. We use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem (FWL) to produce an equation of each factor’s
standard beta as a function of the factor’s cash-hedged beta and the adjustment term. Below, we have
described the process for HML, but the procedure is similar for SMB and the market. For the three-factor
Fama–French asset pricing model, the time-series regression for each portfolio p is:
rp,xst = α+ r
m,xs
t β
p,standard + rSMBt βp,SMB + rHMLt βp,HML + et
We will use the following FWL procedure to decompose the HML standard stock beta βp,HML. The procedure
is similar for βp,SMB and βp,standard.
1. Regress rp,xst onto r
m,xs




2. Regress rHMLt onto r
m,xs
t and rSMBt . Define the residuals as r̃HMLt .
3. Regress r̃p,xst on r̃HMLt . The coefficient on r̃HMLt is equivalent to βp,HML from the time-series regression.
Let us construct xz as a matrix using three vectors xz = [1, rm,xs, rSMB ], where 1 is a T×1 vector of ones, and
rm,xs and rSMB are vectors of the excess standard return and SMB return. Let βz = [α;βp,standard;βSMB ]
be the 3× 1 vector of coefficients from the first regression. Then:
r̃p,xst = r
p,xs
t − xzβz = (1− xz(x′zxz)−1x′z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Q z
rp,xst
Let us define Q z = (1− xz(x′zxz)−1xz), and let Q z be the operator that transforms any variable x into x̃ so
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t . As before, we can decompose standard return r
p,xs
t
into a cash-hedged component and the remaining component γpt We can also write r̃
p,xs
t as:
r̃p,xst = Q zr
p,xs









We analogously create r̃HMLt = ẽHMLt − γ̃HMLt , where eHMLt is created from the same 6 portfolios as rHMLt .








































Using this equation, we decompose HML betas into the HML cash-hedged beta multiplied by the ratio of the
variances (of the cash-hedged component of HML to the standard HML returns), plus an adjustment term.
Analogous decompositions for SMB beta and market beta of the 3 factor Fama-French model can be formed
switch out the parts in xz and βz.
Tables 3.16, 3.17, and 3.18 show the multivariate beta decompositions for the market factor, the size
factor, and the value factor, from the 3 factor model. For the market factor decomposition, the results are
similar to the decomposition of the market beta using the CAPM model. For SMB, the cash-hedged beta
and standard beta are similar.
For the value factor decomposition, the results suggest a large difference between the standard HML
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factor and the cash-hedged component of the HML factor, which filters to the betas. On average, the 25
portfolios have a HML beta of 0.10, but a cash-hedged HML beta of 0, meaning the volatility and adjustment
terms do not offset each other as much as in the previous results. In addition, the cash-hedged component of
HML is 75% more volatile than the standard factor.
Figure 3.9 shows the decomposition of the market standard beta from the 3 factor model against the
expected returns. As in the univariate CAPM model, we fail to find a positive linear relationship. However,
once we adjust all returns to be in cash-hedged terms, as we do in the right panel, we recover a positive,
linear relationship between portfolios’ expected returns and market cash-hedged beta. Figure 3.10 shows a
similar pattern for the size factor.
For value, we also see a flat relationship between HML standard beta and expected returns in Figure 3.11;
but for the cash-hedged returns and betas, there is a negative linear relationship. It is clear that cash-adjusted
growth stocks outperform cash-adjusted value stocks, which has implications for the value premium and the
explanations for the value premium in the literature. The results in Figure 3.11 imply that if we formed our
value factor as Low minus High, rather than High minus Low, the relationship would be positive and linear.
Figure 3.12 plots the standard beta and cash-hedged beta for each of the three factors, and Figure 3.13
plots the difference between the betas for each factor. For the size and market factors, growth stocks tend to
have a smaller standard beta than cash-hedged beta, and value stocks tend to have a smaller cash-hedged
beta than standard beta. However, for the value factor, the cash-hedged beta is smaller than the standard
beta for each of the 25 portfolios. The figures again highlight the negative covariance between value and cash
holdings.
3.5.7 Efficient Frontier
Investors can benefit from using cash-hedged portfolios for two reasons. First, cash-hedging produces a
richer covariance structure across test portfolios by eliminating the correlation across portfolios due to shared
exposure. Second, cash-hedging produces a larger variation in the cross-section of expected returns, which is
important if the investor is concerned they have poorly sorted their test portfolios or are unsure of which
characteristics to use as sorting variables. These two issues suggest that the cash-hedged efficient frontier is
steeper than the standard returns efficient frontier, and therefore the cash-hedged tangency portfolio is more
efficient than the standard return tangency portfolio.
An immediate consequence of cash-hedging portfolios is that the difference in expected returns across
portfolios will grow so long as the portfolios have different amounts of cash holdings, which is empirically
true across many batches of single, double, and triple sorts. Why? Suppose ten portfolios have the same
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average return but with considerable variance in their average cash holdings. When we estimate the portfolios’
standard market CAPM beta, each portfolio will have approximately the same beta, and the cross-sectional
regression may struggle to find a significant slope between betas and expected returns. However, when you
cash-hedged these same portfolios, there will be variation in cash-hedged returns even if the standard expected
returns across portfolios are equivalent purely because the differential cash holdings will require the investor
to differentially lever up the portfolios proportional to their cash share.
A second advantage to using cash-hedged returns is to protect against lousy sorting. What if investors
poorly sorting stocks into test portfolios? If an investor sorts portfolios according to some arbitrary
characteristic, then the cross-sectional regressions will struggle to find a significant price of risk for their risk
factor of preference.
But we argue the investor can better detect priced risk factors by using cash-hedged returns. This is
because hedging out the cash implicit in portfolios will both give the investor a larger spread in expected
returns—so long as the portfolios have differential cash shares—and additionally the portfolios will have a
richer covariance structure because the share of each portfolio invested in cash will bias the correlation of
portfolios’ standard returns upwards.
This logic generates a prediction: with poorly-sorted portfolios, the tangency portfolio calculated from
standard returns will have a lower Sharpe ratio than the tangency portfolio formed from the same portfolios
cash-hedged returns. To be concrete, by poorly sorted we mean little variation in the expected returns across
the portfolios. If, however, portfolios are sorted in a way that generates substantial differences in expected
returns in unhedged returns, the tangency portfolio improvement using hedged returns will be smaller. In
this sense, using cash-hedged portfolios serves as a hedge against poorly-sorted portfolios.
We now provide an example. First, we sort portfolios into nine size and book-to-market portfolios. This
sorting allows for a large difference in expected returns across the portfolios. We calculate both standard
and cash-hedged returns for these portfolios, where the latter hedge out the implicit cash holding of each
portfolio. Figure 3.14 plots the resulting tangency portfolio using both the standard and cash-hedged returns.
Table 3.19 provides the summary statistics for the portfolios: the annualized Sharpe ratio is 0.63 for the
standard return portfolios and 0.69 for the cash-hedged portfolio, roughly a 10% increase in efficiency.
To test the implications of lousy sorting, we sort stocks into 26 portfolios based on the first letter of
their ticker and look at the first 13 letter portfolios. In order for a test of CAPM to work in pricing these
portfolios, we need considerable variation in expected returns. Since we have poorly sorted stocks, each
portfolio’s expected return is approximately the market’s return with an error term. Effectively, we have
nearly-random samples of the market.6 Thus, there is little variation in the cross-sectional of expected
6Of course, some risk factors may covary with tickers starting with certain letters for a good reason—or some other subtle
154
returns for these portfolios, and if we run the standard cross-sectional CAPM regression on these portfolios,
we will not find a significant price of risk. However, insofar as these ticker portfolios have meaningfully
different cash shares—which they empirically do—we can now scale the small difference in their average
stock return by their cash shares. This scaling allows us to create more dispersion in expected returns across
these poorly sorted portfolios and allows us to reduce the correlation across these portfolios by eliminating
their shared covariance stemming from the return of risk-free bonds implicit in their cash holdings (Table
3.19). Figure 3.15 shows the result of calculating the tangency portfolio on these poorly-sorted portfolios:
now, the difference in the efficiency of the tangency portfolio is large. The annualized Sharpe ratio for the
tangency portfolio using standard returns is 0.80, whereas the cash-hedged portfolio is 21% more efficient
with a Sharpe ratio of 0.97.
3.5.8 Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Results
We now implement the CAPM model using the two-stage asset pricing regressions. In expected return-beta
terms, we first implement the time-series regression:
Ri = ai + βi,afat + βi,bf bt + . . . , i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T (3.18)
where f is a factor which proxies the stochastic discount factor, index i indicates each test portfolio and t
indicates time. This regression relates a portfolio’s return with its exposure to the various proposed factors,
and estimates β’s for each test portfolio. In particular, CAPM posits that f is equal to the return on the
market portfolio.
The second regression is the cross-sectional regression:
ERi = γ + βi,aλa + βi,bλb + . . . , i = 1, . . . , N (3.19)
The cross-sectional regression provides estimates of the price of risk for a given factor. Our main focus will be
on the price of market risk, λMkt. More generally, a good factor pricing model will feature an economically
small and statistically insignificant intercept γ, a stable and significant price of risk across many sets of
test portfolios of different assets, and an economically small and jointly zero pricing errors ai across all test
portfolios. The second test implies that we will reject CAPM if λMkt is statistically negative and less than
zero. We will check the third test by examining the Gibbons-Ross-Shaken test statistic, which tests whether
the ai from the time-series regressions are jointly zero.
pattern may exist— but we are abstracting away from this to make a simple illustrative point.
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Table 3.20 presents the results from the cross-sectional regression for the 25 size- and book-to-market-sorted
portfolio and 10 momentum-sorted portfolios. The first two columns test the CAPM model—column one
is in standard terms and column two cash-hedged terms—and the last two columns test a model with four
factors: the market, HML, SMB, and WML.
The cross-sectional test reveals two facts. First, the price of risk for the cash-hedged market is both
significant and positive (1.08 with a GMM t-statistic of 1.94), whereas the standard market price of risk is not
statistically different from zero (0.63 with a t-statistic of 1.3). The cash-hedged price of risk is economically
large: a one standard-deviation increase in beta corresponds to an increase of 2.16 percentage points annually.
Second, although the price of market risk is marginal in the four-factor model, each price of risk point
estimate is larger using cash-hedged terms relative to the standard terms. As shown in the beta decompositions,
cash in standard portfolios attenuate beta estimates, which attenuates cross-sectional price of risk estimates.
The expected positive slope between betas and expected returns is clear only after hedging cash holdings.
Characteristic Cross-Sectional Regressions Table 3.22 shows firm-level cross-sectional regressions
using characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 show that firms with higher cash shares have higher expected equity
returns, consistent with our finding of a strong return on the cash factor. Switching from no cash on the
balance sheet to 100% cash reflects a 1.3% increase in a firm’s monthly equity return. Cash-hedged returns
in columns 3 and 4 are mechanically higher when cash share is higher.
Firms hold cash for many reasons. One way to categorize the reasons is based on their anticipated
return on cash: firms may hold cash because they think they can earn a high return on cash based on good
management; alternatively, firms may hold cash that earns a low return in order to have precautionary savings
or avoid financing. Table 3.22 indicates that firms with higher cash shares face lower average returns on cash,
which suggests that firms hold cash despite the lower returns.
3.6 Conclusion
Firms hold cash on their balance sheet, and an investor with a position in that firm’s stock implicitly holds
a position in the firm’s cash position. We produce a model to motivate the effect of a firm’s implicit cash
holding on portfolio optimization. We decompose a firm’s standard stock return into the firm’s cash-hedged
return, cash share, and return on cash.
We show that standard stock returns are not cash-hedged returns: standard stock returns are lower
on average and less volatile. Common asset pricing factors also have time-varying and non-zero net cash
positions, and hedging out these implicit cash positions change factor premia. In the cross-section, cash
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate market cash share and cross-sectional cash share standard deviation. The left panel reports the time-series of the
aggregate market’s value-weighted cash share from 1978 to 2021. The cash share is the share of cash and short-term equivalents as a percent of total
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate market average value of $1 and its cross-sectional standard deviation. The left panel reports the time-series of
the aggregate market’s value-weighted cash share from 1978 to 2021. The cash share is the share of cash and short-term equivalents as a percent of
























Figure 3.3: Optimal portfolio allocation to risky asset. Assumes CRRA utility, γ = 10, µE = µS = 1.1%, σE = σS = 4.7%. Vertical grey lines
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Note: Cumulative return is sum of log returns.
Standard Cash-Hedged
Figure 3.4: Cumulative returns for value and momentum. Figure plots the cumulative return—defined as sum of log returns—for both HML
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Figure 3.5: Factor portfolios’ net cash holdings. This figures report time series of net cash holdings for factor portfolios constructed on the size,
book-to-market, and momentum characteristics. In other words, the figure shows the difference between the cash share of the long leg less the cash
share of the short leg. Notice: the cash share is measured at the same time as the return, and hence deviates from our standard cash adjustment which

































































1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
 
Momentum
Net Cash Position Forecast Error
Figure 3.6: Net Cash Holdings. This figure reports the time series of net cash holdings for cash-hedged factor portfolios. We estimate the cash
position in each factor’s long and short legs. Then, build the factor portfolio as long the cash-adjusted high portfolio and short the cash-adjusted low

















































0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
Cash-Hedged Market Beta
Figure 3.7: Security Market Line for Standard Market and Cash-Hedged Betas for 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The left
panel is the standard common stock security market line using Fama–French’s market factor and the Fama–French size/book-to-market 5× 5 sorted
portfolios. Market beta for each portfolio is the sum of the components of the decomposition shown in Equation 3.16 and equivalent to the coefficient
of a time-series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The right panel is the security market line for the 25 portfolios using the
portfolio’s cash-hedged excess returns and cash-hedged beta calculated as the coefficient of a time-series regression of the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess
return on the market’s cash-hedged excess return. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged return
as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right panel
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Portfolio
Standard Beta Minus Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.8: CAPM Beta Comparison. The top panel plots the standard beta and cash-hedged beta across the 25 size/book-to-market sorted
portfolios. The common beta is calculated from the beta of the 25 portfolios and excess market factor on French’s website. The cash-hedged market beta


















































0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Market Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.9: Security Market Line for Market from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. The
left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s market beta from a
time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and cash-hedged market
beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged return as the return
after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right panel shows the line

















































-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
SMB Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.10: Expected Excess Returns and SMB Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios. The left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s
SMB beta from a time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and
cash-hedged SMB beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged
return as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right

















































-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
HML Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.11: Expected Excess Returns and HML Betas from the Fama–French 3 Factor Model for 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios. The left panel plots the standard excess returns for the 25 Fama–French size/book-to-market sorted portfolios against that portfolio’s
HML beta from a time-series regression of the Fama–French 3 Factor model. The right panel plots the 25 portfolios’ cash-hedged excess returns and
cash-hedged HML beta calculated using Equation 3.17. To calculate the portfolio’s cash-hedged excess return, we calculate each stock’s cash-hedged
return as the return after adjusting for cash share and then aggregate individual firm cash-hedged returns to the portfolio and market level. The right






























































Standard Beta Cash-Hedged Beta
Figure 3.12: Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta from 3 Factor Model. Standard betas are standard betas from Fama–French 3 factor model.

















































































































Figure 3.13: Stock and Cash-Hedged Beta Comparison from 3 Factor Model. Plot shows the difference between the standard stock beta
and the cash-hedged beta for each factor in the Fama–French 3 factor model. Common stock betas are standard betas from Fama–French 3 factor
model. Equity betas are calculated as described in Section 3.5.6.
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Figure 3.14: Efficient frontier for 9 standard and cash hedged size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. This figure reports the
efficient frontier calculated using 9 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. The two efficient frontiers are calculated using different return data: the
standard efficient frontier uses the unhedged stock return portfolios. The cash-hedged efficient frontier uses the cash-hedged stock returns calculated
for each of the 9 portfolios. This latter measure of returns uses the cash balance known to investors at the time to hedge out the portfolio’s implicit
cash holdings. Time frame is January 1980 to December 2020.
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Figure 3.15: Efficient frontier for standard and cash hedged first-letter-of-ticker-symbol sorted portfolios. This figure reports the
efficient frontier calculated based on the first letter of the firms’ ticker symbols. The two efficient frontiers are calculated using different return data:
the standard efficient frontier uses the standard common return on the portfolios. The cash-hedged efficient frontier uses the cash-hedged equity returns
calculated for each of the 26 portfolios. This latter measure of returns uses the cash balance known to investors at the time to hedge out the portfolio’s
implicit cash holdings. Time frame is January 1980 to December 2020.
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3.8 Tables
Individual stock i Value-Weighted Portfolio p, including p = m






















































Table 3.1: Summary of return decompositions.
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Book-to-market
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.96 1.00 1.14 0.19 1.01 0.99 1.16 0.16 −0.06 0.02 −0.03 0.03
Stdev 5.08 4.55 4.68 3.17 5.05 4.53 4.66 3.13 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27
Sharpe 0.65 0.76 0.85 0.20 0.69 0.76 0.86 0.17 −1.00 0.27 −0.51 0.38
Alpha, CAPM 0.26 0.38 0.53 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.55 0.23 −0.06 0.02 −0.03 0.03
t-stat 2.86 4.33 5.26 1.69 3.60 4.24 5.40 1.49 −2.65 0.65 −1.51 0.86
Size
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.14 1.10 1.01 −0.13 1.19 1.14 1.03 −0.16 −0.11 −0.05 −0.01 0.10
Stdev 5.57 5.31 4.48 2.71 5.53 5.27 4.46 2.73 0.86 0.20 0.13 0.85
Sharpe 0.71 0.72 0.78 −0.16 0.75 0.75 0.80 −0.21 −0.45 −0.93 −0.34 0.40
Alpha, CAPM 0.41 0.38 0.37 −0.03 0.47 0.43 0.39 −0.07 −0.11 −0.06 −0.01 0.10
t-stat 2.95 3.40 7.44 −0.21 2.99 3.73 8.18 −0.44 −1.31 −2.80 −0.93 1.16
Momentum
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.93 0.98 1.25 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.23 0.22 −0.07 −0.03 0.02 0.09
Stdev 5.27 4.33 5.54 4.78 5.25 4.33 5.48 4.70 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.23
Sharpe 0.61 0.78 0.78 0.23 0.66 0.80 0.77 0.17 −1.64 −0.57 0.30 1.37
Alpha, CAPM 0.27 0.38 0.55 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.53 0.19 −0.08 −0.03 0.02 0.09
t-stat 2.40 6.24 4.57 1.42 3.19 6.53 4.53 0.97 −4.60 −1.73 1.03 4.04
Cash-to-total assets
Stock Returns Non-Cash Component Cash Component
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.90 1.02 1.21 0.30 0.90 1.01 1.30 0.40 0.01 0.01 −0.10 −0.10
Stdev 4.39 4.36 5.84 3.90 4.39 4.36 5.75 3.78 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.31
Sharpe 0.71 0.81 0.72 0.27 0.71 0.80 0.78 0.37 0.66 0.26 −1.07 −1.15
Alpha, CAPM 0.33 0.42 0.43 0.10 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.20 0.00 0.01 −0.10 −0.10
t-stat 3.23 5.96 3.47 0.52 3.16 5.77 4.80 1.10 1.72 0.68 −2.95 −3.12
Table 3.2: Decomposition of Portfolio Returns into Non-cash and Cash Components. Table
reports the returns of value-weighted portfolios formed from sorting stocks into terciles on the book-to-market,
size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets. Returns are monthly and reported in percentage points. The
table reports returns for value-weighted portfolios of stock returns as well as the stock portfolios returns
decomposed into portfolios their non-cash and cash returns. The return of each non-cash portfolio p is defined













t. The variable vit is each firm’s value weight, wit is a firm’s ratio of cash to total assets, eit
is a firm’s non-cash return, and bit is a firm’s cash return. The “Alpha, CAPM” row reports a portfolio’s
alpha from a time series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return. The t-stat column contains
t-stats for the alphas reported in the above column. t-statistics are computed with Newey-West standard
errors and ten lags.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.31 1.20 1.30 0.00 −0.38 0.37 0.13 0.51
Stdev 6.68 5.24 5.05 4.23 1.28 2.26 2.60 2.52
Sharpe 0.68 0.79 0.89 0.00 −1.03 0.56 0.17 0.70
Alpha, CAPM 0.41 0.49 0.64 0.23 −0.38 0.33 0.09 0.47
t-stat 3.19 4.91 5.86 1.14 −2.91 1.28 0.31 1.66
Size Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.40 1.40 1.25 −0.15 −0.54 0.17 0.05 0.59
Stdev 6.64 6.37 5.46 3.34 3.91 1.78 1.53 3.73
Sharpe 0.73 0.76 0.80 −0.15 −0.48 0.33 0.11 0.55
Alpha, CAPM 0.54 0.54 0.48 −0.05 −0.58 0.15 0.03 0.61
t-stat 3.00 4.13 7.46 −0.25 −1.58 0.87 0.18 1.86
Momentum Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 1.18 1.16 1.60 0.42 −0.56 0.16 0.43 0.99
Stdev 6.33 5.06 7.07 6.21 1.95 1.49 1.99 2.26
Sharpe 0.64 0.79 0.78 0.23 −0.99 0.37 0.74 1.51
Alpha, CAPM 0.39 0.47 0.72 0.34 −0.58 0.14 0.41 0.99
t-stat 3.21 6.13 4.58 1.38 −2.77 1.00 1.99 3.88
Cash Share Portfolios
Non-Cash Portfolio Return Cash Portfolio Return
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1 P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.92 1.08 1.91 1.00 0.14 0.18 −0.31 −0.46
Stdev 4.46 4.65 8.69 6.42 1.84 2.22 1.55 2.06
Sharpe 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.54 0.27 0.28 −0.70 −0.77
Alpha, CAPM 0.33 0.44 0.79 0.46 0.12 0.16 −0.32 −0.44
t-stat 3.17 5.78 4.32 1.75 0.56 0.70 −1.95 −1.76
Table 3.3: Non-cash and Cash Portfolio Returns for Single-Sorted Portfolios. The non-cash












t. Note, firms’ non-cash
and cash returns are not scaled by firms’ cash-shares for these portfolios’ construction. The “Alpha, CAPM”
column reports a portfolio’s alpha from a time series regression of the portfolio’s return on the market return.
The t-stat column contains t-stats for the alphas reported in the above column. t-statistics are computed
with Newey-West standard errors and ten lags.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.16 0.10 0.07 −0.09
Stdev 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.05
Size Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00
Stdev 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Momentum Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.04
Stdev 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Cash Share Portfolios
P1 P2 P3 P3-P1
Mean 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.23
Stdev 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.07
Table 3.4: Cash to total asset ratios for tercile portfolio sorts on book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets. The
table reports average cash shares for portfolios formed from stocks sorted into terciles on the book-to-market, size, momentum, and cash-to-total assets







column reports the time series average of each portfolios’ monthly cash-shares. The standard deviation reports the time series standard deviation of
each portfolios’ monthly cash-shares.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Sharpe
Market Standard Excess Return 0.76 4.73 −23.16 14.52 0.50
Market Cash-Hedged Excess Return 1.06 5.76 −25.43 20.60 0.58
Market Cash Excess Return −0.12 1.62 −8.09 8.26 −0.26
Cash Share 11.71 4.38 3.30 23.59
Table 3.5: Summary statistics. We describe the construction of firm cash-hedged excess returns in section 3.5.2. Briefly, a firm’s cash-hedged
return is the return of a portfolio long the firm’s common stock and short the firm’s cash and short-term equivalents. Excess returns are monthly. Cash
share is the value-weighted aggregate market cash share. Sharpe ratio is annualized using monthly data.
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(1) (2) (3)
Unhedged Unhedged Market Unhedged Market (Fama–French)
Cash-Hedged 0.711∗∗∗
(59.26)
Cash-Hedged Market 0.820∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(106.02) (28.21)
Constant 0.000∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(2.70) (−4.42) (0.44)
Observations 217,672 555 555
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.99 0.86
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.6: Regression of stock excess returns on non-cash excess returns. We describe the construction of firm cash-hedged excess returns
in section 3.5.2. Briefly, a firm’s cash-hedged return is the return of a portfolio long the firm’s common stock and short the firm’s cash and short-term
equivalents. “Unhedged Market” in Column 2 is the value-weighted aggregate market return of the sample described in Section 3.4. “Unhedged Market
(Fama–French)” in Column 3 is the value-weighted aggregate market return as available on Ken French’s website. The firm level regression in column
includes firm fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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Standard Cash-Hedged
Mean Sharpe Mean Sharpe
Simple Factors Value 2.80 0.19 0.45 0.02
Size −1.93 −0.18 −1.87 −0.14
Mom 3.95 0.23 5.41 0.24
Cash 3.98 0.27 13.40 0.56
Sorts HML 1.46 0.14 −2.37 −0.16
HMLTriple 2.98 0.32 1.24 0.11
SMB 1.24 0.14 1.63 0.14
SMBTriple 0.74 0.09 0.35 0.04
WML 5.37 0.34 6.17 0.29
WMLTriple 4.22 0.31 3.88 0.23
CashTriple 5.29 0.47 13.11 0.71
Strategies 1/2HML + 1/2WML 3.25 0.52 1.67 0.19
1/2HMLTriple + 1/2WMLTriple 3.60 0.62 2.55 0.35
1/3HML + 1/3WML + 1/3CASH 3.84 0.70 5.77 0.75
1/3HMLTriple + 1/3WMLTriple + 1/3CASH 4.16 0.78 5.97 0.80
Table 3.7: Sort and factor premia. Annualized returns and sharpe ratios. Simple factors are high tercile minus low tercile (p3−p1), whereas sorts
are double or triple sorts to control for covariance with size and cash holdings. E.g., Cash refers to the premia earned by the strategy long firms in the
top tercile for cash share and short firms in the bottom tercile for cash share. HMLTriple is triple sorted to control for covariance between value, size
and cash; CashTriple is tripled sorted to control for covariance between cash holdings, size and cash.
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.07
0.21 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06
0.21 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.06
0.17 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.05
Big 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07
Table 3.8: Average Cash Share for 25 Size/BEME-Sorted Portfolios. For each portfolio, the value-weighed cash share is calculated at each
point in time. Table reports the time-series average of the value-weighted cash share.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)













Constant 51.329∗∗∗ 67.076∗∗∗ 45.535∗∗∗ 69.374∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(59.49) (72.97) (68.20) (49.90) (−8.06) (−5.82) (−6.60) (−6.25)
Observations 17,910 17,910 17,708 17,708 15,437 15,437 15,282 15,282
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.9: Regression of cash share percentile onto characteristic percentiles. Observations are firm-year, as measured by characteristics
known in January of each year. We independently sort stocks into percentiles for size, value, momentum and cash share each January, as well as the
change in the percentile from the previous January. Percentile on percentile regression (columns 1 through 3) have Newey-West standard errors with
ten lags, corresponding to a decade. Difference in percentile on difference in percentile regression are are clustered at the firm level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market HML SMB WML
HML −0.344∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗ −0.422∗∗∗
(−3.51) (−2.62) (−4.01)
SMB 0.329∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ 0.040
(3.42) (−3.17) (0.36)
WML −0.205∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ 0.018
(−3.72) (−4.34) (0.35)
MKT −0.146∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗
(−3.68) (4.27) (−3.24)
Constant 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗∗
(4.08) (2.76) (0.47) (4.26)
Observations 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.09
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.10: Spanning Test: Fama–French Factors. Table presents the results from regressing the standard, unhedged Fama–French factors on
the remaining factors. Data from Ken French’s website. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market HML SMB WML
HML −0.676∗∗∗ −0.142∗ −0.775∗∗∗
(−10.00) (−2.23) (−6.33)
SMB 0.256∗ −0.142∗ −0.154
(2.41) (−2.35) (−1.45)
WML −0.215∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗ −0.051
(−3.94) (−7.42) (−1.11)
MKT −0.266∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗
(−6.11) (2.63) (−3.85)
Constant 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000 0.009∗∗∗
(4.00) (1.60) (0.16) (3.89)
Observations 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.47 0.07 0.28
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.11: Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors. Table presents the results from regressing the cash-hedged factors on the remaining
cash-hedged factors. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market HML SMB WML CASH
HML 0.097 −0.183∗∗ −1.125∗∗∗ −0.903∗∗∗
(1.16) (−2.65) (−10.65) (−15.60)
SMB 0.218∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.130 −0.065
(2.64) (−2.81) (−1.34) (−0.90)
WML −0.019 −0.333∗∗∗ −0.061 −0.208∗∗∗
(−0.39) (−9.34) (−1.30) (−3.86)
CASH 0.626∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.320∗∗∗
(13.50) (−9.92) (−0.88) (−3.41)
MKT 0.035 0.123∗∗ −0.023 0.492∗∗∗
(1.17) (2.79) (−0.39) (12.43)
Constant 0.003 0.004∗∗ 0.000 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(1.52) (3.17) (0.34) (2.86) (3.17)
Observations 516 516 516 516 516
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.67 0.08 0.39 0.66
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.12: Spanning Test: Cash-Hedged Factors with CASH Factor. Table presents the results from regressing the cash-hedged factors on




Constant 0.342 −9.273∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗
(0.59) (−12.28) (5.18)
Observations 516 516 538
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.13: Net Cash Holding Is Statistically Non-zero for Value and Momentum. Table shows result from regressing net cash holding
shown in Figure 3.5 – the cash holding of the long leg minus the cash holding of the short leg, in percentage points – on a constant. Newey-West




Constant 0.061 −0.177 −0.025
(0.81) (−1.88) (−0.26)
Observations 516 516 516
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.14: Net Cash Holding is Statistically Zero in Cash-Hedged Factors. Table shows result from regressing net cash holding of the cash
hedged portfolios (equivalently, the forecast errors shown in Figure 3.6) on a constant. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
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Small Lo 1.17 1.35 1.51 -0.59 -0.41 0.13
2 1.09 1.10 1.51 -0.35 -0.31 0.07
3 1.07 1.06 1.51 -0.29 -0.30 0.07
4 1.09 0.98 1.51 -0.17 -0.26 0.03
Hi 1.07 0.94 1.51 -0.12 -0.25 0.02
ME2 Lo 1.13 1.30 1.51 -0.57 -0.40 0.13
2 1.09 1.08 1.51 -0.29 -0.30 0.06
3 1.10 1.02 1.51 -0.21 -0.28 0.04
4 1.15 1.02 1.51 -0.15 -0.28 0.03
Hi 1.09 0.93 1.51 -0.10 -0.23 0.02
ME3 Lo 1.19 1.37 1.51 -0.61 -0.40 0.14
2 1.12 1.11 1.51 -0.31 -0.32 0.07
3 1.04 0.99 1.51 -0.23 -0.27 0.05
4 1.02 0.90 1.51 -0.14 -0.23 0.03
Hi 1.12 0.97 1.51 -0.12 -0.25 0.02
ME4 Lo 1.08 1.20 1.51 -0.49 -0.36 0.11
2 1.08 1.09 1.51 -0.33 -0.31 0.07
3 0.99 0.92 1.51 -0.21 -0.24 0.05
4 0.98 0.86 1.51 -0.12 -0.21 0.02
Hi 0.97 0.81 1.51 -0.07 -0.20 0.01
BIG Lo 1.09 1.21 1.51 -0.48 -0.39 0.12
2 1.00 1.01 1.51 -0.31 -0.29 0.07
3 0.88 0.83 1.51 -0.20 -0.22 0.05
4 0.89 0.79 1.51 -0.12 -0.20 0.03
Hi 0.90 0.79 1.51 -0.12 -0.20 0.03
Average 1.06 1.03 1.51 -0.27 -0.28 0.06
Table 3.15: Beta Decomposition for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios. The beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the
cash-hedged beta, ratio of variances, and drag terms as defined in Equation 3.16.
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Small Lo 0.98 1.09 1.49 -0.43 -0.30 0.09
2 0.96 0.96 1.49 -0.29 -0.25 0.06
3 0.95 0.93 1.49 -0.24 -0.25 0.06
4 1.00 0.91 1.49 -0.15 -0.24 0.03
Hi 1.01 0.90 1.49 -0.10 -0.25 0.02
ME2 Lo 0.93 1.03 1.49 -0.41 -0.29 0.09
2 0.96 0.94 1.49 -0.25 -0.25 0.05
3 1.03 0.96 1.49 -0.19 -0.25 0.04
4 1.07 0.97 1.49 -0.14 -0.27 0.03
Hi 1.02 0.89 1.49 -0.10 -0.23 0.02
ME3 Lo 1.06 1.20 1.49 -0.51 -0.33 0.11
2 1.01 1.00 1.49 -0.28 -0.27 0.06
3 0.98 0.93 1.49 -0.20 -0.25 0.04
4 0.97 0.87 1.49 -0.13 -0.23 0.03
Hi 1.10 0.97 1.49 -0.12 -0.26 0.03
ME4 Lo 0.97 1.05 1.49 -0.39 -0.28 0.09
2 1.01 1.01 1.49 -0.29 -0.28 0.07
3 0.94 0.89 1.49 -0.19 -0.23 0.04
4 0.96 0.84 1.49 -0.11 -0.21 0.02
Hi 0.97 0.82 1.49 -0.06 -0.21 0.01
BIG Lo 1.08 1.19 1.49 -0.46 -0.35 0.11
2 1.01 1.03 1.49 -0.31 -0.28 0.07
3 0.93 0.89 1.49 -0.22 -0.23 0.05
4 0.94 0.85 1.49 -0.13 -0.22 0.03
Hi 0.97 0.87 1.49 -0.13 -0.23 0.03
Average 0.99 0.96 1.49 -0.23 -0.26 0.05
Table 3.16: Decomposition of Market Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The market beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged market beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined
analogously to Equation 3.17.
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Small Lo 0.87 1.19 1.64 -0.81 -0.59 0.33
2 0.86 0.82 1.64 -0.29 -0.28 0.10
3 0.83 0.81 1.64 -0.27 -0.32 0.09
4 0.91 0.80 1.64 -0.20 -0.28 0.08
Hi 0.86 0.72 1.64 -0.15 -0.23 0.06
ME2 Lo 0.90 1.21 1.64 -0.82 -0.59 0.32
2 0.78 0.77 1.64 -0.27 -0.30 0.09
3 0.55 0.54 1.64 -0.16 -0.25 0.07
4 0.73 0.58 1.64 -0.11 -0.14 0.03
Hi 0.84 0.69 1.64 -0.11 -0.23 0.04
ME3 Lo 0.60 0.70 1.64 -0.41 -0.28 0.14
2 0.64 0.60 1.64 -0.20 -0.19 0.05
3 0.56 0.52 1.64 -0.18 -0.17 0.06
4 0.60 0.48 1.64 -0.07 -0.12 0.01
Hi 0.61 0.45 1.64 -0.04 -0.09 0.00
ME4 Lo 0.41 0.50 1.64 -0.31 -0.21 0.11
2 0.41 0.43 1.64 -0.19 -0.15 0.04
3 0.36 0.33 1.64 -0.11 -0.09 0.03
4 0.46 0.40 1.64 -0.09 -0.13 0.03
Hi 0.42 0.35 1.66 -0.04 -0.12 0.00
BIG Lo -0.25 -0.31 1.64 0.15 0.19 -0.07
2 -0.12 -0.12 1.64 0.06 0.07 -0.04
3 -0.24 -0.25 1.64 0.10 0.12 -0.06
4 -0.23 -0.17 1.64 0.05 0.02 -0.02
Hi -0.16 -0.12 1.64 0.08 0.00 -0.04
Average 0.49 0.48 1.64 -0.18 -0.17 0.06
Table 3.17: Decomposition of SMB Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The SMB beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged SMB beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined
analogously to Equation 3.17.
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Small Lo -0.71 -0.98 1.75 0.77 0.53 -0.30
2 -0.12 -0.20 1.75 0.23 0.07 -0.08
3 0.03 -0.06 1.75 0.15 0.04 -0.06
4 0.43 0.33 1.75 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01
Hi 0.70 0.54 1.75 -0.06 -0.21 0.03
ME2 Lo -0.68 -0.96 1.75 0.76 0.53 -0.30
2 -0.18 -0.22 1.75 0.18 0.12 -0.08
3 0.15 0.11 1.75 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
4 0.42 0.38 1.75 -0.09 -0.16 0.02
Hi 0.67 0.56 1.75 -0.09 -0.22 0.01
ME3 Lo -0.45 -0.65 1.75 0.55 0.42 -0.28
2 -0.20 -0.21 1.75 0.12 0.11 -0.07
3 0.16 0.11 1.75 0.04 -0.04 -0.03
4 0.46 0.37 1.75 -0.05 -0.15 0.01
Hi 0.74 0.59 1.75 -0.06 -0.24 0.01
ME4 Lo -0.54 -0.72 1.75 0.58 0.36 -0.22
2 -0.14 -0.14 1.75 0.09 0.06 -0.05
3 0.20 0.15 1.75 0.03 -0.07 -0.03
4 0.49 0.37 1.75 0.00 -0.16 -0.01
Hi 0.64 0.51 1.74 -0.05 -0.20 0.01
BIG Lo -0.52 -0.58 1.75 0.35 0.28 -0.14
2 -0.12 -0.12 1.75 0.06 0.07 -0.04
3 0.17 0.17 1.75 -0.04 -0.10 0.00
4 0.33 0.25 1.75 -0.03 -0.09 0.01
Hi 0.49 0.35 1.75 -0.05 -0.10 0.02
Average 0.10 0.00 1.75 0.14 0.03 -0.06
Table 3.18: Decomposition of HML Beta from the Fama–French 3 Factor Regression for 25 Size and Book-to-Market Sorted
Portfolios. The HML beta for each portfolio is decomposed into the cash-hedged HML beta, ratio of variances, and an adjustment term, defined in
Equation 3.17.
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9 Size/Book-to-Market Sorted Portfolios Rtan σtan rf Sharpe
Standard 1.34 5.45 0.36 0.63
Cash Hedged 1.51 5.90 0.36 0.68
First Letter of Ticker Portfolios Rtan σtan rf Sharpe
Standard 1.46 4.80 0.36 0.80
Cash Hedged 1.95 5.70 0.36 0.97
Table 3.19: Tangency Portfolio Summary Statistics. Table reports the monthly moments of the tangency portfolio as calculated from the
efficient frontier shown in Figures 3.14 and 3.15. Cash hedged portfolios contain the same stocks as the standard portfolios, but their returns are equity
returns and hedged to compensate for the portfolio’s implicit cash holdings. Sharpe ratio annualized from monthly statistics.
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Prices of Risk: E[Rei ] = α+ β′λ
Model CAPM 4 Factor
Standard Hedged Standard Hedged
Intercept 0.099 −0.057 −0.053 0.191
t-GMM (0.23) −0.114 (−0.13) (0.43)
t-FM (0.24) (−0.12) (−0.14) (0.45)
Mkt−Rf 0.631 1.081 0.774 0.824
t-GMM (1.31) (1.94) (1.67) (1.58)











MAPE (%) 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mean TS R2 0.72 0.68 0.84 0.81
GRS p-value 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.44
Annualized Risk Premium 0.73 2.16 0.55 0.72
Months (T ) 515 515 515 515
Portfolios (N) 35 35 35 35
Table 3.20: Pricing 25 Size/Book-to-Market Portfolios. Table presents the pricing results for the 25 size and book-to-market and 10 momentum-
sorted portfolios. Coefficient presents the price of risk, λfac. Unhedged columns present the results from a model using common excess returns for both
factors and portfolios: that is, returns for the factors and portfolios that have not been adjusted for cash holdings. Hedged columns refers to tests in
which both the factors and portfolios have been adjusted to hedge out the implicit cash holdings. Standard and hedged factors and portfolios are those
as described in the data construction section. All returns are excess returns. Fama-MacBeth t-stats. MAPE is mean absolute pricing error. T.S. R2 is
the average time series R2. GRS is the Gibbons-Ross-Shaken test whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. Annualized risk premium row is the
increase in expected return associated with a 1 standard deviation increase in βMkt: σβ × λMkt.
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Standard Returns Cash-Hedged Returns
Average Return Low Book-to-Market High Average Average Return Low Book-to-Market High Average
Small 0.58 0.53 0.92 0.87 1.05 0.79 Small 1.21 1.00 1.26 0.98 1.05 1.10
1.06 0.88 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.83 1.73 1.23 0.99 0.96 0.93 1.17
0.62 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.84 0.70 1.15 1.01 0.92 0.82 0.97 0.97
0.55 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.89 0.69 1.02 1.01 0.86 0.68 0.94 0.90
Big 0.77 0.82 0.56 0.49 0.82 0.69 Big 1.14 1.18 0.78 0.65 1.09 0.97
Average 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.87 Average 1.25 1.08 0.96 0.82 1.00
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
7.09 6.17 5.91 6.17 6.28 6.33 10.81 7.93 7.35 7.04 6.95 8.02
6.86 6.01 6.00 6.22 6.35 6.29 10.48 7.48 7.07 7.01 6.91 7.79
6.64 5.98 5.58 5.81 6.48 6.09 9.77 7.49 6.65 6.44 7.02 7.47
5.94 5.67 5.26 5.52 5.63 5.60 8.37 7.19 6.14 6.11 5.98 6.76
Big 5.70 5.19 4.73 4.79 5.05 5.09 Big 7.79 6.57 5.69 5.31 5.57 6.19
Average 6.44 5.80 5.50 5.70 5.96 Average 9.44 7.33 6.58 6.38 6.49
CAPM Pricing Errors CAPM Pricing Errors
Small −0.27 −0.26 0.13 0.07 0.26 −0.01 Small −0.17 −0.12 0.18 −0.02 0.09 −0.01
0.23 0.09 −0.05 −0.12 −0.06 0.02 0.40 0.14 −0.05 −0.09 −0.02 0.07
−0.25 −0.18 −0.04 −0.04 0.01 −0.10 −0.25 −0.13 −0.08 −0.10 −0.03 −0.12
−0.23 −0.10 −0.03 −0.11 0.18 −0.06 −0.20 −0.10 −0.08 −0.19 0.11 −0.09
Big −0.02 0.10 −0.08 −0.15 0.17 0.00 Big −0.10 0.16 −0.06 −0.14 0.29 0.03
Average −0.11 −0.07 −0.01 −0.07 0.11 Average −0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.11 0.09
Table 3.21: Summary Statistics and Pricing Errors 25 Size and Book-to-Market Portfolios Under Standard CAPM and Cash-
Hedged CAPM. Table presents the average returns in terms of both common returns and equity returns, where equity returns hedge out the cash
holdings known to investors. Common CAPM pricing errors are the time-series pricing errors across all 25 portfolios using the aggregate stock market
excess return as the single factor across the 25 Fama-French size and book-to-market portfolios, both available from Ken French’s website. Equity
CAPM pricing errors are the time-series pricing errors across all 25 portfolios using cash adjusted returns in the sample described in the data section,
and the market factor is similarly cash hedged. All returns are excess returns.
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Equity Return Cash-Hedged Return Cash Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.987 1.552 0.892 1.424 -0.138 -5.559
(4.69) (2.17) (4.44) (1.75) (-0.98) (-3.85)
Cash Share 1.289 1.676 4.975 5.363 -3.069 -2.164
(2.04) (2.58) (4.31) (4.63) (-2.80) (-1.87)
ln(Size) -0.034 -0.035 0.358
(-0.87) (-0.74) (4.30)
ln(B/M) 0.212 0.200 0.416
(2.74) (2.24) (3.12)
Months (T ) 548 548 548 548 548 548
Firms (N) 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
Table 3.22: Cross-sectional Regression of Firm Returns Using Cash Share. Table presents the cross-sectional pricing results for monthly
firm returns. The regressions test the relationship between a firms’ cash shares and expected returns for equity, cash-hedged, and cash returns.






















Ct−1 × ∆Ct −0.719∗∗∗
(0.064)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.23: Marginal cash value regression using Faulkender and Wang (2006) specification.
The regression’s explanatory variable is risk-adjusted annual, fiscal year stock returns. Risk-adjusted returns
are computed as the difference between a firm’s stock return and the return of the Fama and French (1992)
portfolio with the most similar size and book-to-market characteristics. All of the explanatory variables
except Lit are scaled by lagged market value of equity. The explanatory variables are: Ct is cash. Et is
income before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. NAt is
total assets less cash holdings. It is interest expense. Dt is common dividends paid. Lt is market leverage.
NF t is the total equity issuance minus equity repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. RDt is
research and development expense. The subscript t indicates at the end of year t. ∆Xt is the first difference
of variable Xt, i.e. Xt −Xt−1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
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